141 N.Y.S. 437 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1913
The plaintiff claimed to he the owner of the following securi-' ties, the subject-matter of this action: 1. Thirty-three $1,000 par value trust certificates of the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company for the common stock of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company. 2. One hundred shares of the preferred capital stock of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Company. 3. Forty-two $1,000 par value trust certificates of the St. Louis and San Francisco Rail- ' way Company for the common stock of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company. 4'. One hundred shares of the common capital stock of Borden’s Condensed Milk Company. The question involved is the right of the defendants, bankers and brokers, to retain possession of these securities concededly deposited with them as collateral under their claim of hen thereon.
There are two separate sets of facts in this record, one pertaining to the securities known as Nos. 1 and 2 and the other to those designated as Nos. 3 and 4. All of the securities belonged to the estate of General Ketcham and upon the distribution of that estate came into the ownership and possession of Charles B. .Ketcham, his son.
As between Charles B. Ketcham and his wife¿ Suzanne, the plaintiff herein, and for the purposes of this suit we hold that, though not delivered, Mr. Ketcham gave all of said securities to his wife in May, Í907.
The defendants were bankers and brokers and Mr. Ketcham was an office associate and conducted his personal stock transactions through them.
We take up now the transactions in regard to parcels Nos. 1 and 2. . On May 13, 1907, the certificate for thirty-three shares of St. Louis and San Francisco was returned to the company and reissued in the name of Charles B. Ketcham. At Mr. Ketcham’s request the defendants had opened an account in the name of his wife, Mrs. Suzanne B. Ketcham. ■
Mr. Provost testified that the reason for the demand was that “the Eastern Illiriois certificates were not good collateral in the banks at that time.” In speaking of a subsequent demand on Mr. Ketcham in 1910 when other securities were delivered, hereinafter set forth, he said: “We did not call for further collateral for the 33 certificates and the 100 Omaha; they were amply provided with collateral; for the debit balance of that account; that is, the $20,500 account was safe. That was the Suzanne B. Ketcham account.”
In order to maintain her claim of delivery to the defendants of parcels 1 and 2 plaintiff asserts that her husband was acting as her agent and with her consent when he deposited said securities with the defendants. That she had knowledge of that transaction is, therefore, established. It follows that she is bound by his actions as her agent, with her knowledge and consent in what he did.
We thus have an account opened for her and in her. name on the books of the defendants, recéipt by her of a check for $20,500 as a loan, acknowledged in writing by her, secured by
So that the learned trial court, in.spite of her constant assertion in her evidence that she had nó account or any indebtedness, during the trial said: “ It is perfectly evident to my mind that she had an account and received statements; I will say that for the record.” It is testified to without contradiction: “ The total debit balance, including interest to date, in the Suzanne B. Ketcham account,.all the charges, in other words, against her is $40,212.27; that is the total gross amount. The total credits to this account, including interest to date, is $17,694.43, leaving a net balance due to the defendants to date of $22,517.84.” '
Hence lots 1 and 2 had been delivered to and were held by the defendants as collateral security upon this account. We now consider' lots 3 and 4. - About January 27, 1910, Mr.
■ Ketcham’s debit balance on his account with the defendants amounted to $113,163.54. They had some stock that he owned' outright and some bought on margin. The defendants demanded further security and there was an interview with Mr. and Mrs. Ketcham. As a result Mr.'Ketcham had lots No. 3 and No. 4, which had been indorsed over to him by the executors of his father’s estate, delivered to the said companies who reissued them in the name of Suzanne B. Ketcham. The transfer was consummated on February 4, 1910. On that day Mrs. Ketcham executed under seal and delivered the following instrument to the defendants:
“ Gentlemen.— The securities set forth have been deposited by me with you as collateral security for my account with you and also for security for the account, of my husband, Charles B. Ketcham, as hereinafter stated. Forty-two- One thousand dollar (par value) trust certificates of the St. Louis & San Francisco E. E. Go., for the stock of the Chicago & Eastern. Illinois E. E. Co.,-Nos, -, ——; One hundred shares of*481 Borden’s Condensed Milk Co. common certificates No. 3065. For that purpose, I do hereby sell, 'assign and transfer said securities to you, and do hereby constitute and appoint-my true and lawful attorney, irrevocably for me and in my name and stead, to sell, assign and transfer, hypothecate, pledge and make over all or any part of said securities and for that purpose to make and execute all necessary acts of assignment and transfer thereof, and to constitute one or more persons with like power, hereby ratifying all that my said attorney or his substitute or substitutes shall lawfully do by virtue hereof.
“ In consideration of the extension of the payment by said .Charles B. Ketcham to Provost Bros. & Co., of the balance due on his account, I agreé that the securities so deposited with you shall be security for the payment to you of the balance of his account as the same now stands or may hereafter exist, provided, however, that said collateral shall not be used for that purpose until after exhaustion by you of any collateral of my husband held by you and of the proceeds of the sale of his Stock Exchange seat. Upon the settlement of my account and of the account of my husband the aforesaid securities are to be returned to me, or accounted for.”
These lots, it must be conceded, were thereafter held by the defendants under the terms of said instrument. By the- 10th of March, 1910, the debit account of Mr. Ketcham had been reduced to $59,059.41, a liquidation of $64,000. On November 29, 1910, all of Mr. Ketcham’s securities had been sold with the exception of one bond of the value of $800. At the date of the trial Mr. Ketcham’s debit balance with defendants was $19,199.27 against which they held no securities other than those in suit. It is also established that the defendants have not used any of these securities to liquidate either Mr. Ketch-am’s or Mrs. Ketcham’s indebtedness. They were all produced upon the trial. They simply held them under the claim of the lien established by her. How, then, without a settlement, without a tender of payment, can she have a return of these securities ?
On the 29th of November, 1910, Mrs. Ketcham, accompanied
■ Mr. Provost testified: “ I did not say on that occasion, or at any other time, to Mr. Brightson or to Mr. McCarty, or to'the plaintiff5, or to any one else, that it was true that I held these securities, or any of them, in trust for the plaintiff. Mr. McCarty demanded the 42 bonds and the 100 Bordens, and I said, I hold those under the signed agreement, as there was money due me on them. He made a demand for the 33 St.. Louis or the 100 Omaha preferred and I said, ‘ well, there is an indebtedness against these,’ I said ‘one check for $20,500;’ he said, ‘may I see it ? ’ and I said, ‘ yes,’ and I went and got the'
I do not understand that a pledgor of collateral security has a right, without tender or payment, to demand a return of the collateral. The holder of the collateral has an election. He may sue without regard to the collateral upon the original indebtedness or he may , apply the collateral without attempt to collect from the original debtor, but in any event the election is in his hands. The pledgor must dispose of the debt before he can dispose of the lien and get back his collateral. Nor is a Stock Exchange seat such a collateral as may be sold by the pledgee. The way in which it could be accomplished would be to report the failure of the member to meet his obligations to the Stock Exchange, whereupon he might be suspended for a year and for such further time as the governing board in its discretion might give. The seat cannot be sold by individuals. It is not transferable like a stock or bond; membership in the exchange is the right to participate as a member in a voluntary private organization. The courts cannot force a person upon the exchange, as has been frequently held.
While a seat on the exchange is to a certain extent property, subject to certain conditions, which may be taxed under specific provisions of law (Matter of Hellman, 174 N. Y. 254), the proceeds of which may pass to a trustee in bankruptcy (Page v. Edmunds, 187 U. S. 596), it would only be when the Stock Exchange itself acted and disposed of the seat that the proceeds thereof would become available.
I do not think that there was any direct obligation placed upon the defendants by the instrument of February fourth to
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and the complaint dismissed, with costs to the appellant.
Ingraham, P. J., McLaughlin and Laughun, JJ., con- . curred; Dowling, J., dissented.
Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed, with costs to appellant. Order to be settled on notice.