Kesean Boykin, Magen Brooke Grimes, Joseph Cain Culpepper, and Tracey Grimes v. Beatrice Land
SC-2024-0156; SC-2024-0190
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
March 21, 2025
SELLERS, Justice.
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025; Appeals from Russell Circuit Court (CV-21-900024)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
Kesean Boykin, Magen Brooke Grimes, Joseph Cain Culpepper, and Tracey Grimes (“the proponents“) appeal from a judgment of the Russell Circuit Court, entered after a jury trial, in favor of Beatrice Land (“Beatrice“) in an action in which Beatrice contested the validity of a will and a deed that her sister, Nancy Walker (“Nancy“) had executed in 2020.1 Beatrice cross-appeals from the circuit court‘s refusal to award her costs incurred in challenging the will. We affirm the circuit court‘s judgment to the extent that it invalidates the will, reverse the circuit court‘s judgment to the extent that it invalidates the deed, reverse the circuit court‘s denial of Beatrice‘s request for an award of costs, and remand the matter for further proceedings.2
Procedural Background
In 2011, Nancy executed a will (“the 2011 will“). In the 2011 will, Nancy left personal property to her stepchildren and to her sister, Beatrice. She also left certain specific real property to Beatrice (“the subject property“), left other real property to her stepchildren, and left the residue of her estate to Beatrice. The 2011 will named Beatrice as the personal representative of Nancy‘s estate, and, along with executing the 2011 will, Nancy granted Beatrice a general power of attorney over Nancy‘s affairs and made Beatrice Nancy‘s health-care proxy for purposes of making medical decisions on her behalf.
In April 2020, Nancy executed a new will (“the 2020 will“), which the parties agree devised the subject property to Nancy‘s stepgranddaughter, Magen Grimes (“Magen“), and Magen‘s husband, Joseph Culpepper (“Culpepper“). The 2020 will named Magen as the personal representative of Nancy‘s estate. Along with executing the 2020
Nancy died three weeks after she executed the 2020 will and the 2020 deed. Beatrice, who was named as the personal representative of Nancy‘s estate in the 2011 will, declined to serve. Joseph Don Mirabella, who is Beatrice‘s son-in-law, was named in the 2011 will as an alternative personal representative. He petitioned the Russell Probate Court to admit the 2011 will for probate and to grant him letters testamentary with respect to Nancy‘s estate. In his petition to probate the 2011 will, Mirabella noted the existence of the 2020 deed and requested that the
Approximately one month later, Magen filed a petition requesting the probate court to admit the 2020 will for probate and to appoint her as the personal representative of Nancy‘s estate. In response, Mirabella filed a motion to strike Magen‘s petition, asserting that Magen had falsely asserted that she was Nancy‘s biological granddaughter and Nancy‘s next of kin when, in reality, Magen was Nancy‘s stepgranddaughter. Mirabella did not specifically ask the probate court to declare the 2020 will invalid.
Notwithstanding Mirabella‘s motion to strike, the parties stipulated in January 2021 that the 2020 will would be admitted for probate and that Magen would be named as the personal representative of Nancy‘s estate. Approximately one month after stipulating to the admission of the 2020 will for probate, Mirabella, joined by Beatrice, filed
The proponents filed a motion to dismiss Mirabella and Beatrice‘s action, asserting that the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over that action. Thereafter, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Mirabella from the case and concluding that, “[c]onsequently, defendants’ ‘Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction’ is dismissed.” The matter proceeded to a jury trial, during which Beatrice limited her legal theory to Nancy‘s alleged lack of
Discussion
Jurisdiction Over the Will Contest
In their brief on appeal, the proponents assert that the circuit court did not acquire subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest. They point to
For her part, Beatrice concedes that the administration of Nancy‘s estate was not removed to the circuit court under
It is not entirely clear that Mirabella‘s filings in the probate court, which the proponents claim constituted a will contest, actually asked the probate court to declare the 2020 will invalid. It is at least noteworthy that this Court has said that “[i]t is plain under our statute and our case law that a will must have been ‘offered for probate’ before it can be contested in either the probate or the circuit court.” Hooper v. Huey, 293 Ala. 63, 67, 300 So. 2d 100, 104 (1974), disapproved of on other grounds in Bardin v. Jones, 371 So. 2d 23 (Ala. 1979). Mirabella‘s petition to admit the 2011 will for probate, which the proponents suggest constituted a will contest, was filed before the 2020 will was offered for probate. The proponents also suggest that Mirabella‘s motion to strike Magen‘s petition to admit the 2020 will for probate constituted a will contest, but the motion to strike simply alleged that Magen had misrepresented her status as Nancy‘s biological granddaughter and as next of kin. In any event, there does not appear to be a dispute between the parties that Mirabella contested the validity of the 2020 will in the probate court.
The proponents have not demonstrated that the relevant law and evidence precluded Beatrice from commencing a will contest in the circuit court because she “aided and abetted” Mirabella. In their opening brief, the proponents point to Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 510, 11 So. 156, 158 (1892), for the proposition that those who “aid[] and abet” a will contestant in probate court “become jointly responsible with him for what was done in his name alone, but really for their common benefit.” The proponents provide no further discussion of the facts or result reached in Knox with respect to aiding and abetting a will contest. They also concede that the Court in Breeding v. Grantland, 135 Ala. 497, 33 So. 544 (1903), “seemed to say” that a person‘s aiding and abetting a will contest in probate court does not preclude that person from challenging the will in circuit court. See also Alexander v. Alexander, 230 Ala. 170, 173, 160 So. 343, 346 (1935) (citing, among other cases, Breeding, and noting that “any one not a contestant in the probate court, although aiding and promoting the contest in such court, is still entitled to contest in chancery“). The proponents ask us to overrule Breeding (and, we assume, other opinions that might have relied upon it). We decline to do so.
The evidence does not indicate that Beatrice significantly “aided and abetted” Mirabella. The proponents point out that Beatrice and Mirabella met with the attorney who drafted the 2011 will, that Beatrice declined to serve as personal representative, that she asked Mirabella to go to the subject property to retrieve the 2011 will, and that she “provided [Mirabella] with information he could use to support his allegations that the 2020 will was invalid.” Proponents’ brief at 41.4 We are not convinced by the proponents’ argument that these preliminary actions on the part of Beatrice should essentially make her a party to Mirabella‘s alleged will contest in the probate court.5
The proponents also note that Beatrice and Mirabella did not expressly state in their circuit-court petition that “the will has not been contested previously under other provisions of the law.‘” Proponents’ brief at 39 (quoting Segrest v. Segrest, 328 So. 3d 256, 277 (Ala. 2020)). But the materials before the circuit court, which the proponents claim show that Mirabella had commenced a will contest in the probate court, clearly established that Beatrice did not commence a will contest in the probate court. The Court in Segrest forgave the petitioner‘s failure in that case to expressly assert that the will in question had not yet been challenged because the circuit court in Segrest was in possession of the probate court‘s entire file pursuant to the removal of the administration of the estate in question, and the materials in that file demonstrated that no will contest had been commenced when the circuit-court proceedings began. Although the administration of Nancy‘s estate in the present case was not removed to the circuit court, the very documents upon which the
Jurisdiction Over the Deed Contest
The proponents assert that, even if the circuit court had jurisdiction over the will contest, it did not have jurisdiction over the challenge to the validity of the 2020 deed. In support, they point to Branch, supra. In that case, some of a decedent‘s children, who had been omitted from the decedent‘s will, challenged in the probate court the validity of that will, as well as inter vivos transfers of real and personal property the decedent had made to the sole beneficiary of his will before the decedent died. Later, the omitted children filed a petition in the circuit court making the same challenges to the will and to the transfers of property. On appeal, this Court held that the circuit court neither had acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest pursuant to any of the applicable statutes allowing for challenges to a will in a circuit court, including
Relevant to the present case, the omitted children in Branch argued that, regardless of the status of the will contest, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the challenges to the inter vivos transfers of property the decedent had made because, the omitted children argued, the probate court would not have had jurisdiction over that equitable matter. This Court rejected that argument, reasoning as follows:
“The omitted children also assert that the circuit-court action was equitable in nature and was not a will contest. More specifically, the omitted children assert that their request to cancel conveyances of real and personal property and their request for a temporary restraining order [enjoining the waste of estate assets] were equitable in nature and that, because the probate court does not have equitable jurisdiction, they were required to seek that relief in the circuit court. See Daniel v. Moye, 224 So. 3d 115, 140 (Ala. 2016) (explaining that, with the exception of a few counties, probate courts lack equitable jurisdiction). The omitted children‘s argument fails for several reasons. As explained above, the omitted children commenced the circuit-court action by filing a petition to contest the will. Insofar as the omitted children attempted to join claims challenging the previous execution of deeds and other transactions related to the [decedent‘s] estate, this Court has held that a will-contest action is limited to determining the validity of the will and that other claims, such as those to cancel deeds, are not properly joined in a will-contest action. See Ex parte Walter,
202 Ala. 281, 284, 80 So. 119, 122 (1918) (holding that matters concerning the execution of a deed and the sale of personal property were collateral and immaterial in a will-contest proceeding); and Nesmith v. Vines, 248 Ala. 72, 73, 26 So. 2d 265, 266 (1946)(same); see also Daniel v. Moye, 224 So. 3d at 140 (holding that ‘the circuit court would have subject-matter jurisdiction over properly pleaded claims for an accounting and alleging improper inter vivos transfers as part of the general administration of [a decedent‘s] estate’ only in a properly transferred action to administer an estate).”
In the present case, unlike in Branch, we have determined that the will contest was properly commenced in the circuit court under
Weight of the Evidence With Respect to the Validity of the 2020 Will
Although there is a presumption that a decedent had the capacity to validly execute a will, that presumption may be overcome. Brock v. Kelsoe, 335 So. 3d 624, 627 (Ala. 2021). The jury in this case determined that Beatrice had met her burden, and the applicable standard of review is a strict one:
“The standard of review of an order denying a new-trial motion on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is well established. ‘No ground for reversal of a judgment is more carefully scrutinized or rigidly limited than the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the great weight of the evidence.’ Christiansen v. Hall, 567 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Ala. 1990). ‘A jury verdict is presumed correct, and this presumption is strengthened by the trial court‘s denial of a motion for new trial.’ Med Plus Props. v. Colcock Constr. Group, Inc., 628 So. 2d 370, 374 (Ala. 1993).”
Lloyd Noland Hosp. v. Durham, 906 So. 2d 157, 168 (Ala. 2005). We will not reverse the circuit court‘s denial of the motion for a new trial “unless, after allowing all reasonable presumptions as to the verdict‘s correctness, the preponderance of the evidence is so against it that this court is clearly
“A testator has testamentary capacity when, at the time the will is executed, the testator (1) knows his or her estate and the property to be devised and bequeathed, (2) knows the natural objects of his or her bounty, and (3) understands that he or she is making a will. Smith v. Vice, 641 So. 2d 785, 786 (Ala. 1994). The key inquiry is whether the testator had testamentary capacity on the day the will was executed, which may be inferred from a witness‘s observation of the testator‘s mental and physical condition either before or immediately after execution of the will.”
Brock, 335 So. 3d at 627. See also Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1147 (Ala. 2003) (indicating that testamentary capacity means that a testator can recall what property he or she is devising, understands how he or she desires to dispose of the property, and is aware of the identity of his or her desired devisees).
“Determining whether a testator had testamentary capacity requires a ‘broad evidentiary inquiry.’ Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So. 2d 113, 117 (Ala. 1995). Evidence relevant to that inquiry includes evidence of ’ “the mental and physical condition of the testat[or], either before or immediately after execution of the will“’ and evidence of the testator‘s ‘“‘conversations, deportment, acts, and appearance.‘“’ Allen, 669 So. 2d at 118 (quoting Fletcher [v. DeLoach], 360 So. 2d [316,] 318 [(Ala. 1978)]).”
Taylor v. Hanks, 333 So. 3d 132, 135 (Ala. 2021).
Approximately two weeks before Nancy signed the 2020 will, she had been admitted to a hospital two times in four days. She was diagnosed with dementia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, “failure to thrive,” biventricular heart failure, and chronic kidney disease. The proponents’ expert witness testified that Nancy had “good days and bad days” and suffered from instances of delirium, but not dementia. That expert‘s testimony suggests that Nancy had periods of lucidity. But, during one of her last hospital stays, Nancy scored poorly on a test that is used to evaluate the severity of a patient‘s dementia. A hospice physician who evaluated Nancy‘s condition approximately one week before she signed the 2020 will also testified. According to that witness, all of Nancy‘s health conditions and medications were known to cause cognitive impairment, but it was difficult to determine whether her confusion was solely the result of dementia or if it was the result of a combination of her various health problems and medications. In any
After Nancy was discharged from the hospital for the last time, she entered hospice care. Apparently, Nancy was unable to execute documents relating to hospice care, so Magen executed them for her, noting Nancy‘s dementia as the reason Nancy was unable to sign the documents herself.
Shortly thereafter, Magen and Culpepper found the 2011 will, and Culpepper called Beatrice and discussed the disposition of the subject property. After that conversation, Magen sent Beatrice a text message
According to Magen, after her text-message correspondence with Beatrice, Nancy asked Magen to consult with an attorney regarding a new will. Magen testified that Nancy specifically asked her to contact the attorney who had drafted the 2011 will and other end-of-life-related documents. According to Magen, however, that attorney did not return her or Culpepper‘s telephone calls, so she instead consulted with the only other attorney she knew, who later drafted the 2020 will, which Culpepper retrieved from the attorney‘s office. Nancy never met with the attorney, although Magen testified that she believed that the attorney had had one telephone conversation with Nancy. Four days after Magen‘s text message to Beatrice, and eight days after Nancy could not execute hospice-care documents because of her dementia, Nancy
One friend of Nancy, who had lived with Nancy for five years until 2018, was asked by Magen to witness the execution of the 2020 will, but she declined because she did not believe that Nancy “would understand what she was signing.” According to that witness, Nancy was usually asleep, would wake for only five minutes at a time, and, while awake, was confused. For example, the witness testified that, two or three days before Nancy executed the 2020 will, she had made outlandish untrue statements, such as that she had taken a three-day train ride home from the hospital and that she had to use a walker because she had been born with her feet pointing in the wrong direction. Hospice records indicate that Nancy was “continuously confused.” A hospice worker testified that Nancy was bedbound and, while awake, was confused. The worker also testified that, had she known about the 2020 will, she would have
For their part, the proponents primarily take the position that Nancy was in a lucid interval when she signed the 2020 will. They note that, “[i]f the challenging party shows the grantor suffers from a permanent type of incapacity, then the defendant party has the burden to show the transaction occurred during a lucid interval.” Proponents’ brief at 47. The proponents point out that the notary public, who also is licensed as a nurse‘s assistant, testified that she was able to obtain certain information from Nancy, including her birthday and the identity of the then-current president. She also testified that Nancy indicated that she was aware that she was leaving the subject property to Magen and Culpepper and that those two people had taken care of Nancy while she was in poor health. A Chaplin working with hospice care testified that Nancy was able to express opinions regarding her spirituality. One of the witnesses to Nancy‘s execution of the 2020 will, who had known
But it was up to the jury to hear this testimony and to weigh it. Cross-examination revealed that the notary public‘s questions to Nancy were “yes or no” questions and that the notary public had been unaware of Nancy‘s diagnoses and her prescribed medications, which included morphine and lorazepam, medications the notary public agreed can affect cognitive ability. See Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d at 1147-48 (holding that evidence indicating that the decedent ingested Lortab before and
It was the jury‘s duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence, Beauchamp v. Coastal Boat Storage, LLC, 4 So. 3d 443, 451 (Ala. 2008), and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Flint Constr. Co. v. Hall, 904 So. 2d 236, 250 (Ala. 2004). Based on the conflicting evidence about Nancy‘s capacity, it was the jury‘s duty to sort through that evidence to make a determination supporting a verdict. It is clear from the record in this case that the jury was presented with ample evidence supporting the conclusion that, when she executed the 2020 will, Nancy lacked the requisite capacity to make a valid will. Thus, we cannot say that the jury‘s decision in this case is so against the preponderance of the evidence that we are “clearly convinced that it is wrong and unjust.” Deal, 362 So. 2d at 218. The circuit court did not err in denying the proponents’ motion for a new trial.
Costs and Fees
“The costs of any [will] contest under the provisions of this article [i.e., Title 43, Chapter 8, Article 7] must be paid by the party contesting if he fails; otherwise, it must be paid by the plaintiff or out of the estate, or in such proportion by the plaintiff or out of the estate as the court may direct; and for the costs directed to be paid by the plaintiff or defendant, execution may be issued as in other cases; and the costs directed to be paid out of the estate may be collected as other claims against an estate are collected.”
The circuit court did not rule on Beatrice‘s motion for costs, resulting in the denial of that motion under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. Beatrice cross-appealed from that denial.
The parties agree that, if this Court affirms the circuit court‘s judgment on the jury‘s determination that the 2020 will is invalid, the circuit court is required to award Beatrice compensation for the costs, in the form of expenses other than attorney fees, that she incurred in prosecuting the will contest. They disagree, however, as to who should pay that award -- the proponents or Nancy‘s estate.
In addition, there is a long-standing line of precedent construing “costs,” as that term is used in
We reverse the circuit court‘s denial of Beatrice‘s motion for an award of costs. We remand the matter for the circuit court to determine the amount of non-attorney-fee costs Beatrice incurred in challenging the 2020 will and to award Beatrice those costs, to consider whether to award Beatrice attorney fees, and to determine who should pay the amounts awarded.
Conclusion
SC-2024-0156 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
SC-2024-0190 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, Mitchell, and McCool, JJ., concur.