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Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark
923 S.W.2d 582
Tex.
1996
Check Treatment

*1 582 attorney’s client. Savings See Bank v. specifically who are identified on the face of Ward, 195, (1879). 100 U.S. 25 L.Ed. 621 an As invalid will or trust to assert a claim. notes, majority although Texas courts Recognizing a limited cause of action consistently accepted this re subject attorneys prepare who wills context, striction in planning the estate most and trusts documents to the same standard other states addressing this issue have low governing attorneys of care generally. Be- privity ered the barrier in this area. See I believe that public this is sound Hamm, 583,

Lucas v. 56 Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d 15 policy, I dissent. 821, 825, 685, (1961), 364 P.2d 689 cert. de- nied, 987, 603, 368 U.S. 82 S.Ct. 7 L.Ed.2d (1962); Smith, 194,

525 Stowe v. 184 Conn. 81, (1981);

441 A.2d 83 Needham v. Hamil

ton, 1060, (D.C.1983); 459 A.2d 1062 DeMar (Fla.Dist.Ct. 1153, is v. 426 So.2d 1154 Asti Fuiten,

App.1983); Ogle 356, v. 102 Ill.2d 80 772, 774-75, 224,

Ill.Dec. 466 N.E.2d 226-27 (1984); Lawson, 968, Walker v. 526 N.E.2d HOSPITAL, KERRVILLE STATE (Ind.1988); Scoville, 968 v. Schreiner 410 Petitioner, (Iowa 679, 1987); N.W.2d 682 Pizel v. Zus 54, 42, pann, (1990); 247 Kan. 795 P.2d 51 (La. Killingsworth, 536, re So.2d James O. CLARK and Genevie 1973); Groce, 281, Hale v. 304 Or. 744 P.2d Clark, Respondents. 1289, 1292-93 (1987); Liederbach, Guy v. No. 95-0773. 47, 744, (1983);

Pa. 459 A.2d 751-53 Auric v. Co., 507, Continental Cas. Wis.2d Supreme Texas. 325, (1983). N.W.2d 12, Argued Dec. 1995. I recognizing believe that such a cause of Decided 1996. public action would policy by requir- further Rehearing July Overruled 1996. ing attorneys imple- to exercise due care in menting plan. a testator’s estate Under cur- law, only attorney’s

rent client has

standing negligent preparation sue for Although

the will or trust. the testator’s representative would succeed to upon

this cause of action the testator’s

death, may the estate damage itself suffer no

from an invalid orwill trust that frustrates Heyer

the testator’s intentions. 225, 228,

Flaig, Cal.Rptr. 70 Cal.2d (1969); Guy,

449 P.2d 459 A.2d at Consequently, attorney negli- who

gently drafts a orwill trust that is discover-

ed to be invalid after the testator’s death is

accountable no one.

I go would not so far as to hold that

attorneys who draft wills and trusts have a persons who are not beneficiaries Recognizing

named the will or trust. such likely

a broad cause of action is as to frus- carry

trate the testator’s as it is to it intent would, however, I

out. beneficiaries ¡allow *2 in ex- damages

A awarded the Clarks court, trial million dollars. The cess two judgment MHMR n.o.v. for entered against for judgment and rendered $250,000, un- maximum amount allowable the Act. the Tort Claims der Texas Tex.Civ. 101.023(a). PRAC. & Rem.Code The court For the appeals affirmed. 900 S.W.2d 425. below, judg- the reasons reverse stated appeals render and ment the court judgment for KSH.

I. Rebecca, mar- daughter, was The Clarks’ history of Gary Ligón, who had a ried to problems. April after mental arrest, Li- threatening resisting and his wife gón for treatment. was taken to KSH Review Board determined Institutional dangerous” Ligón “manifestly and there- was he be fore transferred recommended security at unit State a maximum Vernon However, Hospital. because State Vernon vacancy, Ligón Hospital no remained for one month. The Institutional about again met and deter- Review Board then manifestly longer mined that was no began an com- dangerous. Ligón outpatient KSH, or- pursuant to a court mitment with der, his medi- so could monitor regimen included cation. medication intake, lithi- his alcohol Antabuse to control Smith, Austin, Allan for David Petitioner. carbonate, Tegretol, um Boerne, Sydney Ewing, B. S. Randall antipsychotic given that was medicine Richards, Boerne, Respondents. gón in an form. oral 22, 1990, Ligón voluntarily May On GONZALEZ, Justice, delivered ap- It checked treatment. into KSH HECHT, opinion of Court which drinking and had peared Ligón had been ENOCH, BAKER, Justices, join. OWEN and proper taking his medication at not been wrongful brought by This is a death action Ligón at On KSH released levels. to recover dam- and Genevie Clark James request, reinstating outpatient com- his daughter, ages for the death of their Rebecca 1, Ligón brutally mur- mitment. June On Ligón, who murdered her hus- was Clark wife, decapitating, dis- estranged dered band, Gary Ligón. sued The Clarks Kerr- membering, burning body. her He then (KSH) Hospital negligently ville State attempted her remains in a field.1 to hide Gary, releasing patient, from its mental earlier, the trial rendered Department court They As stated care. also sued the KSH, against judgment for the Clarks Health and Mental Retardation of Mental now (MHMR) court affirmed. KSH adequately for failure to ensure judgment to reverse the petitions compliance MHMR standards. with KSH’s murder, security Vernon charged unit at but de- ferred the maximum Hospital. incompetent State trial and was trans- clared to stand (1) appeals, claiming of the court of that: the Texas Tort Claims Act. Kassen v. Hat Clarks’ by sovereign immunity; suit is barred ley, 887 S.W.2d We have (2) (3) Clarks; KSH owed no to the recognized for “use” of actions proximate of KSH were not the to occur under the terms of the “ death; (4) of Rebecca Clark’s venue was ‘put bring property] one must or [the into *3 proper County. in Travis Because we service; employ apply action or for or to a conclude that the Clarks’ action was barred given purpose.’” Indep. Mount Pleasant by sovereign immunity, judg- we reverse the Lindburg, Sch. Dist. v. Estate of ment of the court of and render 208, (Tex.1989) (quoting Beggs 211 v. Texas judgment for KSH.2 Dept. Mental Health & Mental Retarda of tion, 252, (Tex.Civ.App. 254 —San II. 1973, refd)). Antonio writ The decisions of governmental KSH is a entity enti Court, however, always this have fallen However, sovereign immunity. tled to under neatly applying within this definition when entity Texas Tort Claims a state can difficulty the terms of the Act. The of inter sovereign immunity waive its under limited preting provisions the Act’s waiver has led circumstances. The Act did not sov abolish request this Court on several occasions to ereign immunity, and we must look to the guidance Legislature interpreting scope terms of the Act to determine the of its See, provisions. e.g., these Salcedo v. El University waiver. Texas Medical of Dist., (Tex. 30, Hosp. Paso 32 York, 175, Branch v. 177 1983); Univ., Lowe v. Texas Tech 1994). Specifically, sovereign the Act waives (Greenhill, C.J., 303 concur- “personal injury and death so however, ring). Legislature, The has re- caused condition or use of result, mained silent on this issue. As a our property or real governmental attempts provi- to construe the Act’s waiver would, private person, unit were it a be liable “long sions have resulted in a and arduous according to the claimant to Texas law.” history” University of cases. Texas Medi- 101.021(2). The Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code York, cal Branch v. S.W.2d KSH, by giving Ligón Clarks claim that (Tex.1994). cases, in particular, Two of these oral form of Thorazine when he left difficulty interpreting illustrate the hospital, injectiona- rather than an available provisions. drug Haldol, ble such as Prolixin or used or Univ., In Lowe v. Texas Tech tangible personal property misused under (Tex.1976), alleged that he Lowe They the terms of the Act. claim that KSH injured playing his knee while football injectionable should have administered an university. injury allegedly occurred because KSH knew that had not him when a coach ordered to remove his been his oral Thorazine and that he brace, previous knee worn because of a knee Thus, became violent when not medicated.3 injury, game and reenter a without it. Id. at the issue is whether KSH’s administration of (Greenhill, C.J., concurring). This Court an oral form rather than an concluded that the knee brace was as inte- injectionable drug, constitutes use or misuse gral part of Lowe’s uniform as his helmet tangible personal property under pads. or shoulder Id. at 300. The Court terms of the Texas Tort Claims Act. We immuni- therefore held that the State waived hold that KSH’s failure to administer an ty by providing with a football uniform Lowe injectionable drug tangible per is non-use of that was defective due to its lack of a knee property sonal and therefore does not fall brace. Id. provisions under the waiver of the Act. applied

This Court has never held that mere non- This rationale was also to invoke support provisions use of can a claim under the Act’s waiver Robinson presented expert testimony 2. Because we hold that the Clarks’ claims are 3. The Clarks that in- by sovereign immunity, jectionable barred can be effective need con- Prolixin and Haldol grounds alleged up injection. sider KSH’s other for reversal. to one month after the initial Center, apply, we assume MHMR must Central MHMR (Tex.1989). Robinson, if it sovereign immunity even MHMR have its waived Robinson, patients, including provided preserver several Robinson life took employees that MHMR should swimming. Id. at 169. The of Robinson could show Thus, provided epileptic knew that him with better one. MHMR Robinson seizures, occasionally those causing facts case are different than suffered of this him Id. MHMR and in Lowe Robinson. to lose consciousness. provide employees, failed to III. preserver, with a life and he subse-

Robinson quently drowned. Id. This concluded parallels cáse The factual scenario preserver just life as much a “[a] Hatley, Kassen swimming attire of Robinson’s as the *4 a Kassen, patient to In a mental admitted in was the uniform knee brace of Lowe." taking hospital medication state was seen her The Id. at 171. Court therefore held that Hospital quantities. in Id. at 7. excessive immunity. its Id. MHMR waived medi- employees patient’s took the therefore hospital away cation from her. Id. The represent perhaps the These cases outer pa- refused to return the medication to the of what we as bounds have defined use of hospital, the and she tient when she left tangible personal property. did not in- We a short later. Id. committed suicide time tend, eases, deciding in to allow both patient’s parents hospital sued The the property use and non-use of to result in death, claiming employees wrongful its for immunity Act. waiver of under the Such a pro- employees’ the failure to hospital that abolishing result would be tantamount to the when she patient vide with medication contrary governmental immunity, to lim- hospital left the caused her Id. We death. Legislature clearly waiver the ited intended. sequence concluded of events “[t]his precedential The value of these is cases injury allege arising an does limited to in a plain- therefore claims which ‘use’of It states a claim the medication. alleges provided that a has tiff state actor trigger property non-use of that does not property integral safety that lacks compo- an immunity sovereign of the Tex- waiver under integral compo- nent and that the this lack of Here, as Tort Act.” Id. at 14. Claims plaintiffs injuries. For nent led to exam- gave Ligón form of employees KSH’s an oral ple, hospital provided patient if a a awith just hospital, left the as Thorazine when he lacking bed the lack of bed rails and this they Ligon’s beginning had since the done protective equipment patient’s led to the in- outpatient The Clarks commitment order. jury, provisions the Act’s waiver would be an allege have that KSH should administered Lowe, implicated. injectionable drug compli- to ensure case, present facts of the are ance, They given. oral than the form rather distinguishable from Lowe and Robinson. injectionable had claim that if an medication alleged have not that KSH The Clarks failed used, murdered Ligón been would have Ligón provide property lacking an to with pleadings and evidence wife. The Clark’s fact, safety they integral component. ac- any do not that oral Thorazine caused show knowledge prescribed gave to is gravamen complaint harm. The their anti-psychotic Ligón an medi- injectionable drug an non-use of KSH’s contrary, argue To the the Clarks cation. daughter’s of their death. prescribed the treatment just drug a form of as This failure to use as not as effective an alternative method hospi- as much a of a was the non-use would been. For Lowe to treatment have in patient give tal’s its her medicine failure claims, must apply to the Clarks’ assume Kassen. university have would waived sovereign immunity provided if it Lowe a There cannot waiver even every medical long case which as Lowe could show that knee brace as facility. public provided treatment type of knee brace would better another Likewise, use some Doctors in medical facilities protected him. for Robinson to state tangible personal form of property nearly of medications.” KSH was aware that every they patient. time treat a Because of was not his medications and that he fact, patient suing negligence could became violent not medication-compli- when always complain Nonetheless, that a different prescribed form of ant. the oral employed medication, Thorazine, treatment than the one would have Ligón. and released Schultheis, been more effective and still claim waiver Dr. physician who treated under If complaint KSH, Coons, the Act. such a gón were expert and Dr. an enough KSH, to constitute tangible per- the use of testified that Haldol and Prolixin are sonal injectable under the antipsychotic the doctrine of medications which sovereign immunity would be rendered a nul- could be used instead of Thorazine and could lity. imagine “It is difficult to a tort case up be effective for to one month. Dr. Rosen- use, nonuse, thal, Clarks, expert does not involve the or an for the testified that some item of property; long lasting injections real or of Prolixin or Hal- me, if there is waiver all cases where dol should have been used instead of the oral personal property some item of is either used form of Thorazine. Dr. Rosenthal further used, virtually or not there is long lasting, inject- unrestricted testified that the use of a immunity.” medication, waiver of antipsychotic Lowe v. Texas Tech able rather than Univ., medication, inappropriate oral *5 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring). Abolition kept Ligón medication-compliant of have immunity release, Legislature is not what the preventing tragic intend- safe for the mur- enacting evidence, ed in the Texas Tort Claims Act. Ligón. der of Rebecca This indi- cating sovereign misuse of waived prescribe Because the failure to a certain immunity. Similarly, the condition of the drug simply form of does not fall within .the injectable— medication —oral rather than definition of use under the did not sovereign immunity. causes a waiver of sovereign immunity. waive its For the fore- reasons, going judgment we reverse the I. judgment the court of and render for (Act) KSH. The Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity “personal injury ABBOTT, J., by death so caused or dissenting opinion filed a condition use of PHILLIPS, J., tangible personal property gov- which or real C. and CORNYN and would, SPECTOR, JJ„ join. private per- ernmental unit were it a son, according liable to the claimant ABBOTT, Justice, PHILLIPS, joined by Texas law.” & Rem.Code Tex.Civ.PRAC. Justice, SPECTOR, Chief CORNYN and 101.021(2). tangible The “use” of Justices, dissenting. property property occurs when the is incorrectly I dissent because brought employed the Court into action or is interprets precedent. the facts and abandons given purpose. Indep. Mount Pleasant Sch. (Tex. erroneously Lindburg, classifies this as a Dist. 1989). “non-use” case under the Texas Tort Claims sovereign immunity Act and concludes that Clearly, prescription drugs tangible are reality, not waived. In this case involves a personal property. Hatley, See Kassen drugs. “misuse” of Evidence showed that (Tex.1994) C.J., (Phillips, (KSH) Hospital prescribed Kerrville State dissenting). Sovereign immunity was waived drugs inappropriate pur- which were for the Ligon’s psy drugs when used to treat

pose prece- intended. Under this Court’s Quinn chotic behavior. See v. Memorial dent, inappropriate drug use of an consti- Ctr., Medical tangible personal property tutes misuse of 1989, writ); App. Corpus no see also Christi — sovereign immunity. and waives Kassen, C.J., (Phillips, at 15 dis Quinn, plan Gary senting). In that the The treatment KSH created for the court held Ligón required dispensing tangible him to meet with a KSH staff of a is the use of delivery personal property immunity at un- member least once a month “for and waives Lowe, the failure held that In In this Court this der the Act. S.W.2d a foot- providing a knee brace when case, include delivery by of medications a KSH tangi- or use of a condition ball uniform was member likewise constitutes use staff Lowe, personal property. medications, ble immunity waiving under that the fail- Similarly, this Court held majority in Act. The Court’s reliance on the preserver, life as an available ure to furnish since, ease, the misplaced in that Kassen uniform, MHMR swimming to an part of a away patient hospital took medicine from a immunity sovereign when patient waived pre- misusing medicine it was rather than epileptic from patient suffered staff knew scribing patient. to a pass out. Rob- him to which caused seizures inju “Liability imposed has been when inson, circum- at 171. The alleged proximately are to have resulted ries supporting a waiver stances negligent use of in some stronger in Lowe than here are even respect inappropriate or for the deficient Robinson, drugs specifi- furnished as KSH Hopkins v. purpose for it was used.” It Ligon’s psychotic behavior. cally treat Dist., Indep. Spring Sch. S.W.2d inap- furnished an as if the would be State 1986), aff'd, (Tex.App. [14th Dist.] Lowe, inappro- or an propriate —Houston knee brace (Tex.1987); also LeLeaux 736 S.W.2d 617 see Even the priate preserver Robinson. life Dist., Indep. Sch. v. Hamshire-Fannett justices recognized dissenting in Robinson (stating that use per- misuse of this would constitute apply bring means to into action or to (Hecht, at 175 property. sonal case, is evi- given purpose). there (“[H]ad J., dissenting) the state mental use of Thorazine KSH was dence that the negligently supplied Robin- ... health center pur inappropriate for the both deficient preserv- a defective life grandson son’s safely releasing Ligon, triggering a pose of death, er, liability would resulting in his *6 immunity. Tech waiver of See Lowe v. Texas thus man- beyond question.”). Precedent be (Tex.1976) (defi Univ., 297, 300 denying sovereign dates a decision uniform); Memorial cient football Overton to KSH. (Tex. McGuire, 528, Hosp. 518 529 S.W.2d distinguish Lowe struggles to The Court 1975) (deficient bed); hospital Dep’t of “difficulty of says that the and and Robinson Jackson, 154, 158 Corrections v. provisions has interpreting the Act’s waiver 1983, (Tex.App. [1st Dist.] writ —Houston request to on several occasions led this Court n.r.e.); refd see also Robinson v. Central interpreting in guidance Legislature from Ctr., Tex. MHMR The Court provisions.” Ante at 584. 1989) J., (Heeht, “a dissenting) (agreeing that however, consistent previous ignores, governmental may unit liable for furnish- be legislative inaction follow- proclamation that pre- ing property.”). The defective interpretation legisla- ing judicial evidences drug evidence that the KSH furnished sented interpretation. adoption such See tive Ligón was defective because KSH knew to 4; Robinson, n. Allen at 170 Ligón not his medication. Servicenter, Ryan, Inc. v. Sales (Tex.1975); 863, Marmon v. S.W.2d Admittedly, or failure to use an non-use Inc., Aviation, Mustang alone, not, standing a use of drug available is Gibbs, (Tex.1968); Moss to waive tangible personal property sufficient Legislature’s refusal 458-59 Kassen, 887 immunity under the Act. the Act provisions waiver to revise the case, does not at 14. This S.W.2d implies that it following and Robinson Lowe necessary provide failure to involve the mere adopted those decisions. has Rather, prescrip- medicine. it involves Ligón had drug KSH knew tion of a II. past probably taken in the duty to that it had no also claims of an available KSH in the future. Non-use take W.C.W., Relying Bird v. on there is Rebecca. proper not the focus when is (Tex.1994), a argues that medication. prescription also misuse duty recognizing duty, In we have relied in professional mental health owes a (Sec- the Restatement on section 319 of only patient. care to his or her Alternative ond) provides: Torts which ly, duty non-patient that a to a KSH insists Duty Charge § only specific of Those of Per- arises there are threats Having Dangerous Propensities son against specific persons. Williams v. Sun Valley Hosp., (Tex.App. 723 S.W.2d 783 charge person who takes of a third One —El n.r.e.). Paso ref d whom he knows or should know to be writ likely bodily to harm to others pro- care The Clarks concede health duty under a to exercise rea- controlled is duty public. fessionals owe no blanket to the person care to control the third to sonable But, they disagree with the assertion that a prevent doing him from such harm. specific against person specific threat a is (Second) of ToRts Restatement required duty non-patient. establish (1965); Eng’g, see Otis Instead, argue the Clarks duty of care in Section establishes duty because KSH had control over Following Ligon’s release from this case. reasonably and knew or should have known August he remained under a readily posed danger to a that he a serious In out-patient commitment. court-ordered person persons. identifiable or class of I order, out-patient commitment the court agree. “mentally findings rendered ill,” that mental illness he that as a result of outset, At the I conclude that Bird does “likely harm to self [t]o ... cause serious Bird, not control this case. In we held that a that, treated, others,” if not he and/or professional negligently mental health who “continue to suffer severe and abnormal will misdiagnoses sexual abuse of a child owes no mental, physical emotional or distress....” may parent of care to the child’s who Hutson, designated Lois a clinical The court legal suffer false accusations and adverse KSH, worker with as individual social consequences misdiagnosis. care, responsible Ligon’s out-patient di- decision, reaching on factors we relied program recting a treatment her to submit setting, as the unique to that factual such incorporated commitment order. into the difficulty diagnosing sexual abuse inherent Safety § 574.037. TexHealth & Code encouraging utility in of a child and the social recognized program This treatment investigation abuse claims. a full of sexual history *7 gón long a of “assaultive and Bird, at 769. Because those “potentially aggressive behaviors” and was bearing a mental health factors have no on treatment very dangerous.” It called for professional’s duty persons of care to third regimen Ligon’s through a to control violent, by psychotic may be harmed a who aggression psy- to alleviate his physical and patient, controlling. Bird is symptomatology, required it chotic hospital periodic gón to return to the Engi- analogous More to this case is Otis compliance. to monitor his Clark, examinations neering Corp. v. by to inform the required statute Hutson 1983). employers In that case held that comply with the treat- court if failed to incapacitated em- who exercise control over Safety program. ment & TexHealth duty care to ployees owe a of reasonable 574.037(c)(1). circum- these Under Code injury from that em- parties who risk third stances, “charge” in KSH was Eng’g, ployee. Otis Restatement. purposes 319 of the of section in duty may analogized to cases “Such a be exercise some mea- which a defendant can Further, knew there is evidence dangerous over a Ligón posed sure of reasonable control a known that or should have recognizable great person proper- there likely when if he was threat to Rebecca Id.; persons.” findings see danger of harm to third to the ly medicated. addition Beard, pro- and treatment v. the commitment order also Graff that indicated gram, Ligon’s medical records (stating right that the to control patient dangerous [type of] was the “most determining duty). he a factor may proven by circum- psychiatric practice.” poten- in a Cause-in-fact seen “He is E-Z Mart tially stantial evidence. Havner v. suicidal homicidal.” “Patient is and/or (Tex.1992). Stores, Inc., intoxicated, attempted violent when has sui- times, negligent to- if the cide several has been assaultive Cause-in-fact is established bringing family police.” poten- factor in wards “Patient is act “was substantial tially injury, suicidal alcohol and without it harm would homicidal and is about and/or Travis, dependent non-compliant taking anti- not have occurred.” Co., 98; patient manic meds.” “This can become ex- Brown v. Edwards see also Transfer (Tex.1988). tremely dangerous if to self or others medication-compliant and abstinent from al- Experts and KSH for both Clarks circumstances, cohol.” Under KSH Ligon’s medical records indicat- testified that clearly owed a to Rebecca to exercise Rebecca ed that he had been violent towards treating Ligón reasonable care in for his medication-compliant when not and that psychotic behavior. properly being released without medicated likely

he would be violent towards Rebecca again, especially considering ongoing sep- his III. Ligón admitted to the aration and divorce. argues KSH next that there is no evidence doctors that he was not his any action on its caused Rebecca’s Rosenthal, expert medication. Dr. for the deciding point death. When no evidence Clarks, testified KSH could have as- only we must consider the evidence and all Ligon’s compliance with his treatment sured support jury reasonable inferences which plan by administering long-acting forms Sander, finding. See Orozco by injection, and antipsychotic medication (Tex.1992). If there is more than a injections the absence of such was a support finding, scintilla of evidence to This, plan. deficiency” “real in his treatment challenge the no evidence must fail. Id. history coupled Ligon’s the evidence of elements, Proximate cause has two fore- antipsychotic when off violent behavior seeability City and cause-in-fact. Travis medication, violent murder of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d days only being Rebecca seven after dis- Foreseeability person is satisfied of ordi- charged, is some evidence from which the nary intelligence anticipated should have hospital’s that the misuse of could infer danger negligent caused act. Id. The medication caused Rebecca’s death. particular injury manner of the need not be IV.

foreseeable to establish this element. Id. “Although the criminal conduct of a third I is some evi- While conclude there party may superseding be a cause which tangible personal dence that KSH misused liability, negligent relieves the actor from meaning within the of the Tort negligence superseded actor’s is not and will correctly that the Claims contends *8 not be excused when the criminal conduct is liability submitting trial court erred negligence.” Id. a foreseeable result of such jury. Question jury issue to the which the affirmatively, provided as follows: answered earlier, discussed there are notes in As Hospital negligent Was Kerrville State discussing file his homicidal medical Gary Ligón discharging on tendencies, his assaultive behavior towards 1990? family, to medication- his failure remain determining that in You are instructed compliant, and his violent behavior when negligence, any, of the officers Further, medication-compliant. Ligón Hospital, employees of Kerrville State con- assaulting originally to committed KSH only of medical sider their use or misuse This is some evidence that KSH his wife. records, discharge docu- admission and should have known that knew or ments, Gary Ligón, medications of and/or being if released assault Rebecca without added). such, objected to this (emphasis As the foresee- properly medicated. “the question, arguing to the trial court that ability prong is satisfied. particular properties attempted that are to question listed 1] do not come within [in tangible personal property,

the definition of the exception of medications.” The objection.

court overruled this argues jury that the should permitted

been to consider the use or misuse documents,

of medical records or other over timely objection. I agree. While the

paper on medical and other records printed are

documents constitutes

personal property, the information contained intangible.

in the records and documents is University Branch Med. v. York, (Tex.1994). The

Tort Act Claims does waive information, intangible

misuse even writing.

information is reduced Id. Be question .erroneously allowed the hospital’s misuse of the consider in Ligon’s

information contained medical rec

ords, KSH is entitled a new trial. See Co.,

Spencer Eagle Star Ins. reasons, foregoing

For the I would reverse judgment of the court

remand cause to trial court for new

trial.

The INDEMNITY COMPA- TRAVELERS Relator, CONNECTICUT,

NY OF MAYFIELD, Alan Honorable

Judge, Respondent.

No. 95-1209.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued April 1996.

Decided 1996. July

Rehearing Overruled

Case Details

Case Name: Kerrville State Hospital v. Clark
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 8, 1996
Citation: 923 S.W.2d 582
Docket Number: 95-0773
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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