Lead Opinion
Kerotest Manufacturing Company, the plaintiff in the instant proceeding, sued C-O-Two Fire Equipment Company for a declaratory judgment to have two patents owned by C-O-Two, Re. 23,142 and 2,454,621, declared invalid. The suit at bar was commenced on March 9, 1950. Kerotest is a manufacturer of valves for use in portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. C-O-Two manufactures similar extinguishers.
On January 17, 1950, C-O-Two sued Acme Equipment Company, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, charging Acme with infringing the two patents previously referred to by “making * * * and selling * * * squeeze grip valves and discharge •heads for portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers * * * ”
Kerotest did not intervene in the Chicago action and apparently did not offer to defend Acme; instead according to an affidavit exеcuted by Roush, Kerotest’s president, it brought the instant suit for a declaratory judgment. Thereafter, on March 22, 1950, C-O-Two moved to have Kero-test made an actual party defendant in the Chicago litigation. Two days 'later Acme filed a motion in the Chicago action to stay that proceeding because the instant suit had been brought by Kerotest. On March 25, C-O-Two moved for a stay in this proceeding pending the prosecution of the Chicago action. On March 29, Kerotest made a motion in the instant suit to enjoin prosecution of the Chicago litigation either as a whole or as to it.
C-O-Two’s motion for a stay and Kerotest’s motion for an injunction came on for hearing before Chief Judge Leahy on April 21, 1950. Kerotest argued that it had not been properly joined in the Chicago action but that even if it had been so joined, that joinder had not taken place until after it had filed the instant suit. Kerotest pointed out that the Chicago litigation was filed first; that it involved the same controversy as the suit at bar, viz., the same patents and the same infringing devices, even if the parties were not the same. C-O-Two insisted that unnecessary duplication of litigation would be avoided by staying the instant case. Judge Leahy held that the court below could not enjoin C-O-Twо from seeking a final adjudication against Acme in the Chicago suit and, further, that it would be an abuse of discretion to do so. E[e stated that inasmuch as the Chicago suit was scheduled for an early trial it would be more economical “of judicial time” for Kerotest to contest the issues in Illinois as a codefendant rather than consume the time of the United States District Court in Delaware in “duplicate litigation.” Judge Lеahy also pointed out that there was no vested right in a litigant to have a case tried by one judge rather than by another.
Kerotest appealed to this court which affirmed the judgment.
When the ninety day period provided by Judge Leahy’s judgment had expired, Acme’s motion in the Chicago suit for a stay because of the pendency of the instant case had been denied and Acme had filed an answer. Kerotest had moved to quash the service and to dismiss the case as to‘ it. These motions had been denied and the Illinois Court had entered an order on May 29, 1950, nunc pro tunc as of March 24, 1950 making Kerotest a party-defendant as of March 24, 1950, C-O-Two having amended its complaint to that end. Kerotest also' had filed an answer. The trial date had been reset for September 28, 1950 by agreement of counsel since the original trial date of July 8 could not be adhered to.
On July 21, 1950 Kerotest moved for a рreliminary injunction to restrain C-O-Two from proceeding with the Chicago litigation and on that day also C-O-Two moved for a stay of the instant suit pending disposition of the Chicago litigation. These motions were heard by Judge Rodney in the court below. He concluded, D.C.,
The court below based its decision on Crosley Corporation v. Hazeltine Corporation, 3 Cir.,
We cannot agree with the conclusions reached. To the end that our position may be made plain we state again that the parties to the action at bar are Kerotest and C-O-Two; that the parties to the Chicago suit are C-O-Two and Acme and Kerotest, but that Kerotest did not become a party to the Chicago action until as of March 24, 1950, whereas the instant suit was brought on March 9, 1950. We do not think that the rule of the cited decisions requires the order made by the court below. Our reasons follow.
In Crosley v. Hazeltine, after litigation in which Hazeltine had sued Crosley in Ohio alleging infringement of two out of twenty-two possibly pertinent patents, Crosley brought a declaratory judgment suit against Hazeltine in the Delaware District Court to determine the validity of the remaining twenty patents.
In Crosley v. Westinghouse, Crosley filed a suit for a declaratory judgment against Westinghouse in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to have sixteen patents, which Westinghouse asserted Crosley had infringed, declared invalid and not infringed.
It is primarily on the intervening case of Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National that Kerotest relies. In this case, early in 1941, Triangle sued National in the District of Delaware seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that eleven patents owned by National were invalid. Eighteen days later National filed suit in the Eastern District of Michigan against Triangle аnd Sears, Roebuck & Company, by which it sought judgment that Triangle had infringed by manufacturing, selling and using articles in violation of all the patents and that Sears, Roebuck had infringed by reselling articles manufactured in violation of six of the seven patents. We held that the Delaware District Court, having first obtained jurisdiction of the éntire controversy, should proceed to adjudicate the rights of Triangle and National.
Again it will be observed that there are substantial differences between the facts of the Triangle case and those of the case at bar. In the Triangle case the Delaware litigation for a declaratory judgment was the first action and embraced all the patents which were or became the subject matter of any suit. The two principal antagonists were in- the Delaware theatre when the declaratory judgment suit wаs filed. Only the retailer, Sears, was outside the Delaware arena. Obviously, National’s attempt to transfer the struggle to Michigan for no other purpose than to enable National to compel Sears to take part in it could not meet with success. In the instant case the suit brought by C-O-Two against Acme in Illinois long antedated the declaratory judgment suit in Delaware brought by Kerotest, D.C.,
In the instant case the whole of the war and all the parties to it are in the Chicago theatre and there only can it be fought to a finish as the litigations are now cast. On the other hand if the battle is waged in the Delaware arena there is a Strong probability that the Chicago suit nonetheless would have to be proceeded with for Acme is not and cannot be made a рarty to the Delaware litigation. The Chicago suit when adjudicated will bind all the parties in both cases. Why, under the circumstances, should there be two litiga-tions where one will suffice? ■ We can find no adequate reason. We assume, of course, that there will be prompt action in the Chicago theatre.
Neither Crosley nor Westinghouse nor Triangle was intended to lay down a rule of thumb. The rule as we conceived it was designed as an aid to the parties and to effect the ends of justice. As was said in Hammett v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 2 Cir.,
The order of the court below will be reversed and the cause remanded with the direction to enter an order staying further proceedings in this action until ten days after the final determination of the Chicago suit. If, however, the prosecution of the Chicago suit be unreasonably delayed, this court will entertain an application for a modification of the order.
Notes
. In the complaint in the instant case Kerotest refers to another earlier action brought against The General Detroit Corporation by C-O-Two. This suit was filed in August, 1949, and settled in January, 1950, by a consent decree. We will make no further reference to it since it is irrelevant to the issues presented by the instant appeal.
. No opinion reported for publication.
. See the authorities contained in note 3 cited to the text,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I am unable to agree that Judge Rodney was guilty of an abuse of discretion in this case. On the contrary I think that he soundly exercised the discretion confided in him by the rule which this court, sitting in banc, laid down in Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. P. Corp., 3 Cir., 1942,
In my opinion, however, the distinctiоn made by the majority is without legal significance. To my mind the significant point is that Kerotest itself was not made a defendant in the infringement suit until after it had brought the declaratory judgment suit. In this respect the case is identical with the Triangle case. The two cases are also identical in that the litigation between the parties to the declaratory judgment suit was first begun by the institution of that suit while, if the controversies between the
The rule which this court laid down in the Triangle case, as well as in Crosley Corporation v. Hazeltine Corporation, 3 Cir., 1941,
In the Cresta Blanca Wine case Cresta had sued Eastern in the Southern District of New York for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of a trade-mark. Thereafter Eastern sued Schenley and Cresta in the District of Delaware for infringement of the same mark. ' Schenley then applied for leave to intervene as a plaintiff in the suit in the Southern District of New York and both Cresta and Schen-ley asked that court to stay further proceеdings in Delaware. The district court denied the intervention and the stay. The Court of Appeals reversed as to Cresta holding that the suit by Eastern in Delaware should be stayed as against Cresta since the suit in New York was prior as to those two parties. As to Schenley, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed, saying,
“It can hardly be said that intervention, had it been granted, would have related back to the filing of Cresta’s cоmplaint. Therefore Schenley’s proposed intervention against Eastern would have been the later action between them and the very principle Schenley invokes would require staying the New York action rather than'the Delaware suit.”
In the Speed Products case, the significant facts were these: Speed had brought suit against the Commissioner of Patents in the District of Columbia for the registration of a trаde-mark. Shortly thereafter Speed sued Tinnerman in the Southern District of New York, seeking registration of the same mark and a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of Tinnerman’s trademarks. Later Tinnerman Was granted permission to intervene in the suit in the District of Columbia and it filed an answer and counterclaim for infringement of its trademarks. Thereafter Speed moved in the District of Columbia for an order suspending the suit there until the case in the Southern District of New York had been tried and Tinnerman moved for an order enjoining Speed from proceeding with the New York action until the suit in the District of Columbia had been tried. The District Court for the District of Columbia denied Speed’s motion and granted that of
“The second question is whether or not the District of Columbiа court had power to enjoin Speed Products from proceeding with the New York action. The law on this question is well settled. Where two cases between the same parties on the same cause of action are commenced in two different Federal courts, the one which is commenced first is to be allowed to proceed to its conclusion first, and an injunction to accomplish this is рroper. This is recognized by three cases: Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. P. Corp., 3 Cir., 1942,125 F.2d 1008 , certiorari denied 1942,316 U.S. 676 ,62 S.Ct. 1046 ,86 L.Ed. 1750 ; Crosley Corporation v. Hazeltine Corporation, 3 Cir., 1941,122 F.2d 925 ; Cresta Blanca Wine Co. v. Eastern Wine Corporation, 2 Cir., 1944,143 F.2d 1012 .”
The majority place much reliance on a later case in the Second Circuit, Hammett v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 1949,
Judge KALODNER joins in this dissent.
. In his opinion, D.C.,
“The question nevertheless arises as to whether this is one of those exceptional cases in which the taking of jurisdiction should be declined in favor of the later suit on the ground that the questions in controversy between the parties can be better settled and the relief sought be more expeditiously and effectively afforded in the Chicago action. The parties with which we are solely concerned are Kerotest and C-O-Two. Nothing is apparent to indicate that the Chicago action will settle the controversy between these parties better or more effectively. A date for the trial of the Chicago action is said to have been set for September, 1950, and this may give some apparent basis for the contention that the litigatiоn there will be concluded more expeditiously. Whether the matter can be heard at that time must be problematical. There is nothing to indicate that with the full cooperation of the defendant, who allegedly is seeking an early trial, the trial in this jurisdiction may not be had expeditiously and some slight delay would seem too slim a basis for departure from recognized principles.”
. Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co., 1 Cir., 1942,