Kerns v. GrammerKerns v. Grammer
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- Before:
- Caporale
The court below sustained the demurrer of appellee, Gary Grammer, warden at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, denied the motion of appellant, Sandy Patrick Kerns, Sr., to amend his petition “to present action as both habeas corpus and post conviction,” and dismissed Kerns’ petition, which sought a writ of habeas corpus. Kerns’ 10 assignments of error merge to question the (1) denial of his motion to amend, (2) determination that the rule enunciated in
State v. Ellis,
214 Neb. 172, 333 N.W.2d 391 (1983), was not applicable to him, and (3) failure to hold the Nebraska habitual criminal statute,
According to the petition Kerns was sentenced in 1975 to concurrent prison terms of 10 years on a rape conviction and 5 to 10 years on a robbery conviction. The convictions resulted from one continuing criminal episode taking place during a single day and were the subject of a single arrest and information. Later, in 1978, and while serving the aforesaid sentences, Kerns was treated as a habitual criminal under the provisions of
The relevant portion of
(1) Whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other state, or by the United States, or once in this state and once at least in any other state, or by the United States, for terms of not less than one year each, shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this state, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the Department of Correctional Services adult correctional facility for a term of not less than ten *167 nor more than sixty years; Provided, that no greater punishment is otherwise provided by statute, in which case the law creating the greater punishment shall govern.
We determine first whether the
Ellis
rule, discussed later in this opinion, applies to Kerns, and if not, whether
In considering the applicability of the
Ellis
rule to the situation presented in this case, it is useful to bear in mind the chronology of related opinions of this court and of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The first of these is
State
v.
Kerns,
201 Neb. 617, 271 N.W.2d 48 (1978)
(Kerns I),
in which Kerns appealed his 1978 sentence and unsuccessfully argued that the loss of “good time” in an administrative proceeding and the subsequent criminal conviction constituted double jeopardy in violation of provisions of the U.S. Constitution and that his sentence of 12 to 15 years under
Some years later, the eighth circuit court considered
Kerns
v.
Parratt,
672 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1982)
(Kerns II),
which challenged
The following year we, in
State v. Ellis,
214 Neb. 172, 333 N.W.2d 391 (1983), rejected the rule announced in
Pierce I
and reinterpreted
the purpose of enacting the habitual criminal statute is to *168 serve as a warning to previous offenders that if they do not reform their ways they may be imprisoned for a considerable period of time, regardless of the penalty for the specific crime charged. . . . “ ‘Recidivist statutes are enacted in an effort to deter and punish incorrigible offenders. * * * They are intended to apply to persistent violators who have not responded to the restraining influence of conviction and punishment.’...”
Id. at 175, 333 N.W.2d at 394. We did not at that time consider whether the Ellis rule and rationale would be applied retroactively to persons whose sentences had been enhanced under the rule applied in Pierce I.
Pierce himself invited us to consider that question in State v. Pierce, 216 Neb. 792, 345 N.W.2d 835 (1984) (.Pierce II). Contrary to Kerns’ apparent misunderstanding of Piercell, we declined that invitation. Although we noted that “it has been stated in federal law that there is no constitutional objection to overruling a case purely prospectively as we did in Ellis,” 216 Neb. at 795, 345 N.W.2d at 836-37, we said, “While many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have struggled with the question of retroactivity, this court does not have to tackle such a matter of judicial policy and past precedents, because the statutory requirements for relief under the Post Conviction Act have not been met.” Id. at 795, 345 N.W.2d at 837. Under the apparent erroneous assumption that Pierce II specifically refused to grant retroactive application to the Ellis rule, Kerns devotes a considerable portion of his brief in an attempt to distinguish the situation presented by this appeal from that presented by Piercell. Kerns argues that
applying the Ellis ruling to the facts of his case would not be a retroactive application of Ellis. Plaintiff is still serving the time imposed upon him under the terms of the habitual criminal law. If the Court were to grant him relief at this time, that would not be a “retroactive” application of the rule in Ellis. Quite clearly, it would be a prospective application. All the Court need do is reverse this case and return it to the trial court for a determination of whether or not defendant qualified under the statute, as interpreted in Ellis, to be classified as an habitual criminal. *169 And if he should not have been found to be an habitual criminal, relieving him from serving his penal term or the balance thereof in the future is very simply a prospective application of Ellis.
(Emphasis in original.) Brief for Appellant at 9-10. This is an interesting use of words, but an utterly meaningless argument. In asking this court to apply the 1983 Ellis decision to declare his 1978 sentence void, Kerns is obviously asking this court to give Ellis retroactive effect.
Kerns also argues that
[w]hen the Court interpreted the statute in Ellis, the ruling of the Court and that interpretation became a part of the statute just the same as if the legislature had put the ruling into the statute in the first place. The Court was simply saying what the intent of the legislature was when it passed the habitual criminal statute.
Plaintiff submits that his case is one in which the trial court lacked the authority to punish him in the manner of an habitual criminal____
Brief for Appellant at 10-11. That argument seems to suggest that
As this court noted in Pierce II, “retroactive operation of an overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited by constitutional provisions.” Pierce II, supra at 795, 345 N.W.2d at 836. Retroactive application of a new rule of law is appropriate when it is aimed at enhancing the accuracy of criminal trials, when there has not been justifiable reliance on a *170 prior rule of law, and when retroactive application will not have a disruptive effect on the administration of justice. State v. Clark, 217 Neb. 417, 350 N.W.2d 521 (1984). In Clark, this court reasoned that the rule requiring that a defendant pleading guilty be informed of certain rights and that a voluntary and intelligent waiver of those rights affirmatively appear on the record was not aimed at the evil of mistaken determinations of guilt, but at the uninformed relinquishment of constitutional rights, and consequently would not be applied retroactively. Similarly, the retroactive application of Ellis which Kerns seeks is not aimed at correcting any deficiency in the trial which determined him guilty of first degree sexual assault, but would go only to the manner in which his sentence was calculated. We therefore conclude that the Ellis rule is not to be applied retroactively and is not to be applied to Kerns.
Kerns’ argument that
Habeas corpus is available as a remedy to a person held pursuant to a judgment of conviction only upon a showing that the judgment, sentence, and commitment are void; persons lawfully convicted of crime are excepted from the benefits of the statutory right to the writ.
Anderson and Hochstein
v.
Gunter, 226
Neb. 724, 414 N.W.2d 281 (1987). Similarly, postconviction relief is available only when a constitutional right has been infringed or violated.
State v. Jackson, 226
Neb. 857, 415 N.W.2d 465 (1987);
State v. Lytle,
224 Neb. 486, 398 N.W.2d 705 (1987);
Affirmed.