delivered the opinion of the court:
The question on this appeal concerns the effect of a felony conviction upon the pension rights of the late Otto Kemer, Jr., former Governor of Illinois. The facts, which are undisputed, are included in the opinion of the appellate court (
In 1965, during his service as Governor, Otto Kemer aрplied for and was accepted into membership in the State Employees’ Retirement System (hereinafter System) and by paying some $11,000 secured credit for his prior gubernatorial service. Following his 1968 resignation as Governor to accept appointment as a Federal judge, he applied for and was granted retirement benefits and subsequently received monthly pension cheсks. He was thereafter convicted of several felonies under the United States Code (see United States v. Isaacs (7th Cir. 1974),
A hearing officer appointed by the secretary of the System recommended resumption of the pension payments аnd payment of all arrearages and benefits. The board of trustees of the System, however, rejected the hearing officer’s recommendation and voted to refuse any further payments. Furthеr, the board remanded the cause to the hearing officer for a determination concerning the System’s counterclaim. Following Otto Kemer’s death, his representative filed an administrative review proceeding in the circuit court of Sangamon County (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. IO8V2, par. 14 — 200; ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) attacking the board’s termination of the monthly pension payments. The circuit court reversed thе board and ordered payment of all arrearages and benefits accruing prior to Otto Kemer’s death. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District, however, reversed the circuit court (
The primary question presented is the construction of section 14 — 199 of the Hlinois Pension Code:
“None of the benefits herein provided for shаll be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his service as an employee.
This section shall not operate to impair any contract or vested right heretofore acquired under any law or laws continued in this Article nor to preclude the right to a refund.
All future entrants entering service subsequent to July 9, 1955 shall be deemed to have consented to the provisions of this section as a condition of coverage.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108½,par. 14-199.)
In construing this statute, as with any statute, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as determined from the necessity or reason for the enactment and the meaning of the words employed. In re Roberts Park Fire Protection District (1975),
Plaintiff first contends that the phrase “convicted of any felony” refers only to convictions of crimes which are felonies under Illinois law, and that since the convictions were actually violations of Federal lаw, not Illinois law, they are not within the statutory description of “any felony.” We disagree. When faced with an analogous question in the context of a Federal statute, the United States Supreme Court chose a broad interpretation of the word “any”:
“Nor can we hold that the Act bars use of committee testimony in United States courts but not in state courts. The Act forbids use of such evidence ‘in any сriminal proceeding *** in any court’. Language could be no plainer. Even if there could be legislative history sufficiently strong to make ‘any court’ mean United States courts only, there is no such history. The few scraps of legislative history pointed out tend to indicate that Congress was well aware that an ordinary person would read the phrase ‘in any court’ to include state courts. To construе this phrase as having any other meaning would make the Act a trap for the unwary.” (Adams v. Maryland (1954),347 U.S. 179 , 181-82,98 L. Ed. 608 , 612,74 S. Ct. 442 ,445.)
There is similar authority from this court that, absent contextual implications to the contrary, a broad interрretation of the word “any” is to be favored. E.g., Patteson v. City of Peoria (1944),
In our judgment the legislature’s choice of the word “any” evinces an intent to include all felonies, State or Federal, so long as the offense was a “felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with” service as a State employee. “The language of the [Illinois Pension] Code is clear and there is no nеed for this court to construe it so as to give it any meaning other than the one which is clearly stated. It is the duty of the court to enforce the law as enacted according to its plain and unmistаkable provisions.” (Peterson v. Board of Trustees (1973),
Plaintiff also contends that because Otto Kemer’s rights were vested, at least by the time preceding his convictions whеn he began receiving monthly payments, they were “heretofore acquired” within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 14 — 199 and thus could not be impaired by this statute. Our reading of the stаtute, however, indicates the phrase “heretofore acquired” means acquired prior to the enactment of the felony provision and does not refer to the date of vesting or contracting in the case of each individual member. This second paragraph protects the right of employees whose pension rights had vested before the 1955 enactment of this provisiоn. It is not applicable to Otto Kerner, whose pension rights vested long after the section’s effective date. The flaw in plaintiff’s reading of the statute was emphasized by the appellate court when it noted that under plaintiff’s theory, an employee need only retire prior to his conviction of a felony in order to render the entire statute meaningless. (
We believe section 14 — 199 is clearly applicable here and by its terms operated to deny Otto Kerner the retirement benefits to which he would have been entitled, absent the convictions, under the Illinois Pension Code. Plaintiff urges, however, that this conclusion renders the statute unconstitutional under article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides:
“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enfоrceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”
The difficulty with plaintiff’s position is that the very section of the Constitution upon which he relies provides thаt membership in the retirement system is “an enforceable contractual relationship.” Section 14 — 199 was, of course, in effect years before Otto Kerner became a member of the rеtirement system, and it became, by its terms, a condition of the contractual relationship to which he consented by applying for membership. As the commentary accompanying the Constitution stаtes: “Of course, the ‘contractual relationship’ is governed by the actual terms of the contract or pension.” (Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. XHI, sec. 5, Constitutional Commentary, at 302 (Smith-Hurd 1971).) Plaintiff does not explain how enforcement of this condition, to which the parties agreed and which has existed throughout the duration of the contract, can become an unconstitutional impairment of the benefits of that contract. (See In re Roberts Park Fire Protection District (1975),
We have also reviewed plaintiff’s claims relating to corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 11), cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIH), and due process (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV). We hold that the termination of payments here violates none of these provisions.
Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court sustaining the Board’s denial of pension benefits is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WARD, C.J., and CLARK and MORAN, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.