34 N.W.2d 327 | Minn. | 1948
The ground asserted by each official in refusing the fees and affidavits was that there would not be a state senatorial election in the general election of November 2, 1948.
Minn. Const. art.
"The senators shall also be chosen by single districts of convenient contiguous territory, at the same time that members of the house of representatives are required to be chosen, and in the same manner; and no representative district shall be divided in the formation of a senate district. The senate districts shall be numbered in a regular series. The terms of office of senators and representatives shall be the same as now prescribed by law until the general election of the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight (1878), at which time there shall be an entire new election of all senators and representatives. Representatives chosen at such election, or at any election thereafter, shall hold their office for the term of two years, except it be to fill a vacancy; and the senators chosen at such election by districts designated as odd numbers shall go out of office at the expiration of the second year, and senators chosen by districts designated by even numbers shall go out of office at the expiration of the fourth year; and thereafter senators shall be chosen for four years, except there shall be an entire new election of all the senators at the election of representatives next succeeding each new apportionment provided for in this article." *91
The question presented by petitioners is whether § 24, properly construed, requires the election of senators from odd-numbered districts at the coming election on November 2, 1948.
Whatever may or may not have been the purpose of the legislature which proposed the amendment of Minn. Const. art.
Because for 20 years the original § 242 was erroneously interpreted in practice as if it contained a provision to the effect that at the "entire new election," following a legislative apportionment, the senators from odd-numbered districts should be elected for a short term and those from even-numbered districts for a full term, the petitioners earnestly contend that, notwithstanding that that clearly unauthorized practice, on the advice of the attorney general, has been discontinued for 65 years in the interpretation of like language in § 24, as amended in 1877, this court should now read into the constitution a like provision which is not there and never was there. The plain language of the constitution cannot be amended in such manner.
Where the language of a constitutional provision is clear, there is no room for the application of rules of construction. See, Fairbank v. United States,
Petition denied.
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following resolution, passed by your honorable body, viz.: 'Resolved, that the Attorney General of this State be and is hereby requested to furnish his opinion for the use of this Senate upon the question as to the length of the terms of the Senators elected at the last general election in 1882.' The terms of the Senators elected in 1882 is [sic] fixed by the amendment to the constitution adopted in 1877. By this amendment the terms of the Senators were to be the same as theretofore prescribed,until the general election in 1878, at which time an entire new election of such officers was to be had. It then goes on to provide that 'the Senators chosen at such election, by districts designated by odd numbers,' should hold for two years, and those designated by even numbers, for four years; 'and thereafter Senators shall be chosen for four years,' except that there shall be an entire new election after each apportionment. It will be seen from this amendment that it is only such senators as are chosen by odd-numbered districts at the election of 1878 who are to hold for two years. Thereafter there is to be no difference in the term: all hold for four years. The language of this amendment is too plain to admit of doubt. The Legislature in proposing, and the people in adopting, this amendment, must be deemed to have meant just what the language used clearly imports. 'Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently, no room is left for construction. Possible and even probable meanings, when one is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.' Cooley, Const. Lim. 68, 69. 'We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language,' says Mr. Justice Bronson in People vs. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35. Mr. Justice Johnson, in Newell vs. People,
"February 27th, 1883. W.J. Hahn, Atty. Gen." *95