*1 v. AMERICAN ADMINISTRATOR, KERNAN, DREDGING CO. February 3, 1958. Argued 21, 1957. Decided No. November Abraham E. Freedman the cause argued and filed brief for petitioner.
T. E. Byrne, argued respondent. Jr. the cause for With Alspach. him on the was Mark D. brief opinion the of the delivered Mr. Justice Brennan Court.
In
proceeding brought by
respondent
this limitation
the
Act,
of
Liability
§§
under
183-186
the Limited
R. S.
4281-4289,
181-196,
S. C.
the
§§
§§
U.
Pennsylvania
District Court for the Eastern District of
petitioner’s
damages
denied the
claim for
behalf
filed on
dependents
the widow
other
of a seaman who lost
of
his life on
fire
viola-
respondent’s tug
caused
the
of a
rule. 141
navigation
Supp.
tion
F.
582. The Court
Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed. 235 F. 2d
rehearing
The his tug seaman lost life Arthur the N. which, on the November night towing while Schuylkill scow on the caught River fire Philadelphia, open-flame when an kerosene lamp on the deck ignited highly vapors scow lying inflammable above an extensive accumulation petroleum products spread over the surface of the river. Several oil refineries and facil- ities for oil storage, and for loading unloading petro- leum products, are located along Schuyl- banks of the kill River. trial court lamp found not more than three feet above the water. Maintaining lamp height at a of less than eight feet violated navigation promulgated rule by the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.1 The trial court found that (h).
1 33 CFR provided “Scows not otherwise for in this §80.16 section on paragraph (a) waters described of this shall section if had lamp ignited have been vapor not would height. the required
been carried rule, held that the violation The District make be said to . called . . “whether [it] impose did because unseaworthy,” the flotilla solely navi- had to do regulation “the Coast Guard collisions, prevention and was intended gation present case there was purpose. and for no other True, origin navigation. no fault of collision and no regulation, violation of the the fire be traced can viola- but whether the question not causation but imposes regulation, itself, liability.” tion Supp., at 585. F. *3 statutory petitioner urges
The first that violation unseaworthy, creating without made flotilla remedy to fault. for unseaworthiness regard But maritime and law law, derives from recognizes wrongful no cause of action for death whether carry light scow, except a white at each end of each that when such tiers, abreast, are massed two or more each the outside scows carry light bow, shall a on the outside scows scows white its outer and carry, addition, light in the last shall each a white on the outer tier light part than stern. The white shall carried not less water, placed shall show 8 feet above the surface of the be so as to light horizon, all be of a char- an unbroken around shall such night atmosphere as to on dark with a at a acter be visible a clear 5 distance at least miles.” empowered by 102, as
The Commandant 30 Stat. 157, lights . S. C. rules “as to the to be . . 33 U. establish carried may necessary . . . as he . deem for . . .” This was section 7, 1897, in the Act was to contained of June codify governing navigation the rules waters to con- inland nearly practicable them form revised international rulesv preventing adopted collisions at sea at the International Marine 42, Cong. 1394; Conference in October . 30 Rec. H. R. Doc. No. 1889 Cong., Sess., p. 55th 1st 1.
429 by negligence. occasioned unseaworthiness or The Harrisburg, 199;2 S. Fuel Co. U. see Western v. Garcia, S. 240. Before 233, Act,3 U. the Jones fed- admiralty courts of resorted to the various eral state death Hamilton, give remedy acts to death. The wrongful 398; 207 U. S. The F. 364; No. see Transfer Garcia, supra, Western Fuel Co. v. at Great 242; Lakes Dredge Kierejewski, & Dock Co. v. S. 479. The U. Jones Act created a federal right of action for the wrong- ful death of a statutory seaman based on the action under Employers’ the Federal Liability Lindgren Act. States,
United 281 U. S. the Court held that the Jones remedy Act for wrongful death pre- exclusive and any remedy cluded for wrongful death within territorial Harrisburg disapproved cases, among lower federal court them a decision of Chief Circuit, Gull, Justice Chase at The Sea 21 Fed. 12578a, given right Cas. No. which had of action for wrongful placed death. English Reliance was on the fact that ad miralty recognize although law did not the cause of action continental By English statute, admiralty maritime law did. courts now entertain wrongful Halsbury’s England cause of action for death. 23 Laws of (2d 1936) ed. 3“Any personal who seaman shall suffer in the course of employment may, election, his damages at his maintain an action for law, right by jury, with the of trial and in such action all statutes modifying extending right United States or the common-law *4 remedy personal injury in railway employees apply; cases of to shall any any and in case of the of per death seaman as a result of such personal representative may sonal the of such seaman main damages right tain an action for with the jury, law of trial conferring such all action statutes of the United States or regulating right the of railway action for death in the case of applicable. e., Employers’ Liability shall Federal [/. Act, 65, amended, 35 Stat. as 45 S. C. U. Jurisdiction in §§ 51-60.] such actions shall be under the court of the district which the employer principal defendant resides or in his officeis located.” 1007, 41 Stat. 46 U. S. C. 688.
430 derived from unseaworthiness, whether based on
waters,4 petitioner assumes that under The law. federal or state personal representative law the today’s maritime seaman himself may elect, as the a seaman deceased FELA on the an action based may elect, between Osceola, 175, 158, in The 189 U. S. recognized action, disposition In view of the unseaworthiness. upon based the we need consider making case, of this we are assumption. soundness this the that, also since the violation of petitioner urges The above the water lights eight to be feet requiring rule insufficiency lighting a or in the flotilla’s in defect resulted death, liabil- equipment which fact caused seaman’s regard to under ity was created without the FELA line of of this Court actions under decisions upon based violations of either Inspection line of deci- Acts5 or the Boiler Act.6 That 1 45 C. interpreted FELA, sions clause 51, employer “by reason imposes § which insufficiency, due its negligence, defect roadbed, cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, its works, boats, equipment.” or other The cases wharves,
4
shores,
beyond
league
a
death occurs
marine
from state
Where
761-768,
High
Act,
on the
41 Stat.
46 U. S. C.
Death
Seas
§§
any claims,
remedy
wrongful
Presumably
provides a
death.
unseaworthiness,
damages
prior to the
based on
accrued
decedent’s
survive,
pertinent
if a
death would
at least
state statute
effective
bring
right.
v.
about a survival of
seaman’s
See Holland
Steag, Inc.,
203;
207;
Supp.
Roth,
v.
143 F.
cf. Cox v.
348 U. S.
Just
Chambers,
cure survive
lighting equipment to death question resulted the for seaman. whether, any showing our of decision is the absence of incorporates Jones terms negligence, the Act—which for provisions recovery permits FELA — death from of a resulting seaman a violation statutory duty. We hold that it does. claim denying upon courts relied their lower
views of tort is at com- doctrine. It true that liability mon law the the master to his servant was wholly general applicability founded tort rules and granted assump- master was the effective defenses of tion contributory negligence. of risk and This limited public from a to policy, designed give derived maximum to enterprises, freedom infant industrial “to employer possible insulate the bearing much the 'human overhead’ which part inevitable doing cost—to someone —of the industrialized busi- Co., ness.” Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. U. S. 54, 59. But recognized it came' that, whatever to rights persons among generally, duties the industrial employer special responsibility had a workers, toward his daily exposed who were to the risks of the business largely helpless provide who were to adequately safety. industry their own Therefore, as and commerce sufficiently became strong burden, the law, bear an evolving public policy, reflection of came favor compensation dependents their losses occasioned the inevitable deaths and employment, industrial shifting industry thus “human of doing overhead” business. For most indus- *6 in Com- been embodied Workmen’s has change this
tries shipping industries, and In the railroad Acts. pensation provide the framework Act FELA Jones however, the But liability industrial accidents. for determining for prin- codifying common-law statute of a detailed instead a of the most fit enact statute saw to Congress ciples, to large measure the leaving thus general terms, injured em- for fashioning of remedies duty the courts development to analogous in manner the ployees But clear that the common law. it is tort remedies at provide to liberal recov- intent was general congressional Co., R. injured workers, Rogers v. Missouri ery Pacific Congress also 508-510, and it is clear 352 U. S. one of no static but which remedy, the creation intended enlarged changing to meet con- developed would duty changing concepts industry’s ditions toward its workers. impose upon employer
The FELA and the Jones Act the duty paying damages injury when to the worker the caused, part, by employer’s is or in fault. whole duty may care, This fault consist of breach analogous no identical to the com- but means statutory mon-law or of a duty, duty. breach some imposes The tort doctrine which lower applied courts liability statutory violation of a duty only where injury is one which the statute designed to prevent.7 However, has'repeatedly this Court refused apply limiting to such a doctrine in FELA cases. upon FELA based Safety cases violations Appli- upon Restatement, Torts, trial court relied Com (c), may ment on h: “A Clause statute or ordinance be construed as give protection to against particular intended form of harm to a particular so, the interest. If cannot be actor liable another for a violation of the enactment unless harm violation causes protect which it was of the enactment other.” has held Inspection Act, Boiler
anee Acts or the statute creates that a violation of either under insufficiency equipment resulting FELA if the defect or injury suit, the death or without contributes fact to injury flowing from the breach was regard to whether the appears Since it sought prevent. the statute insufficiency of the flotilla’s in this case that the defect or from the of 33 lighting equipment resulting violation actually death, C. caused the seaman’s this *7 compels and a result in favor of the principle governs petitioner’s claim. a Layton, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. S.U. employee freight on one of five cars loaded with
railroad injured engine when an coal was thrown the track pushed a car into the last of the loaded cars stock against standing drove five cars a train. Neither the the equipped stock car nor the car which it was struck couplers, required by Safety automatic the Federal Appliance Act. Had the cars been equipped so they coupled they together and the would have when came cars not run train. against standing five would have the coupler purpose requirement stated automatic necessity to avoid “the of men the going was between and the railroad cars,” ends of contended that this showed Congress requirement only the intended the for the injured benefit of for the when between cars coupling uncoupling or them. The Court rejected argument judgment the and affirmed a for the plaintiff. Gotschall,
In Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. walking along tops a brakeman the of the cars of a moving train was off and killed the train thrown when separated a opening coupler because of the which setting emergency resulted an automatic brakes the a a jerk sudden of the train. This Court sustained although railroad against judgment prevent. Appliance aims Safety Act which the not one aof Wolfe, 239, the conductor 263 U. S. In Davis v. directly over grab iron holding on to train moving grab iron fell because the he stood sill-step on which grab contended that It was and defective. was loose coupling employees engaged aid required to iron was therewith, not a connected cars or service uncoupling The Court transportation employees. in the to aid Layton and and held that rejected this contention “. . . can employee cases had settled Gotschall comply requirements if with the the failure to recover proximate act cause [Safety Appliance] discharge him in the resulting injury to while accident, in an although engaged operation duty, of his specifically designed are safety appliances Id., him protection.” furnish at P., Co., Chicago, St. M. & O. R. S. In Swinson v. U. tightly hand freight releasing brakeman was set end of a tank car. Release of the hand brake brake to the brake required application of considerable force put running wheel. The brakeman his left foot on the *8 right grab board and his foot on the iron set himself to put pressure better to on the brake wheel. The foot pressure exerted on the iron to grab plank caused split which it was attached to and one of bolts secur- ing grab pulled iron to be a result the through. As in seriously injured brakeman lost his balance and was a fall in front of the car. The moving contended, railroad unsuccessfully, grab that it was not liable iron because by had been used the brakeman for a for which it intended, arguing duty supply grab was not that to irons in Congress provide was intended order to appliance with an grasp hands, with the provide support a foot brace or in leverage to secure releasing a hand brake. Co., 335 an Coray v. Southern Pacific a motor-driven track car
employee railroad, riding freight killed a of the moving train, behind was crash freight stopped suddenly into the train track car braking when brakes locked of a defect in its because its system. Supreme Court of affirmed the state Utah upon trial court’s direction of for the railroad verdict object far ground that, concerned, so as brakes were protect employees Act was not to standing trains, but from trains. The moving Utah Supreme stopping Court also reasoned that consequence train in precisely of the leak the valve was what, as a it device, designed to do. This id., said, Court reversed and at 524: language by Congress “The selected to fix in cases of this kind is simple and direct. Considera- meaning by tion of its the introduction of dialectical interpretative subtleties can serve no useful purpose. The statute respon- declares that railroads shall be for their employees’ sible deaths 'resulting whole or in part’ from appliances defective such as were here maintained. 51.§ U. S. C. And to make its purpose crystal clear, Congress provided has also employee 'no such . . . shall be held to have been guilty of contributory case’ where Safety violation of the Appliance such Act, as the here, one 'contributed to . . . death of such employee.’ 45 Congress U. S. C. 53.§ has thus for its own imposed extraordinary reasons safety obliga- upon tions railroads has commanded if a breach obligations of these part contributes in employee’s death, pay railroad damages. must These defective; were air-brakes this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; *9 motor track car following at about the same rate of speed and operated by an employee in looking train; all of into crashed direction
another to one inseparably related were circumstances these have jury The could space. time another all or death resulted that decedent’s found circumstances.” foregoing the Court Thompson, 337 U. S. in Urie v. Finally, of an upon alleged violation a claim based considered regulation promul- Commerce Commission Interstate regulation Act. The Inspection the Boiler gated under equipped proper with “Locomotives shall be provided: shall be maintained safe sanding apparatus, which trip. service, and tested before each condition for suitable securely line must fastened pipes Sand Id., requirement was at 195. The rails.” by the provide employed for traction. A fireman sand thirty years damages railroad for almost sued to recover sil- allegedly contracted from the inhalation of silicosis by allegedly faultily adjusted icate dust emitted broken many sanders into decks and cabs of the locomotives on he had railroad contended that worked. The designed rule was to ensure an aux- adequate ICC iliary braking protect against not to system, employees employee and therefore the could recover for silicosis, an injury guard not of the kind the rule sought ICC against. rejected argument resting inapplicable tort doctrine to this case. question then,
The decisive this is case, whether principles developed permit in this line of FELA cases recovery navigation for violation this or are statute opinipn dissenting as the would to cases limited, it, have involving and Boiler Inspection Acts. provisions Our attention is directed to the of 4§ FELA, “any which makes reference to statute enacted for the . . . ,” and it urged phrase, unexplained this some manner, *10 between the FELA and the special relationship creates Inspection Safety Appliance and Boiler Acts. Several given may answers be to this contention.
First, entirely assumption 4 relates to the defense of abolishing risk, of this defense where the employer’s by by caused the “violation . . . any safety of statute enacted for the of . . . .” It is FELA § of which creates the cause of action the and this on its section, face, any suggestion is barren of injuries by that caused of are violation statute to be In formulating treated specially. the rule violation that the Safety Appliance Inspection Boiler Acts creates resulting injuries proof negli- without gence, judicially the Court relied on principles evolved designed carry out the general congressional purpose providing appropriate injuries remedies incurred employees. railroad For in Congress, 1908, did not crystallize application by enacting specific the Act the guide rules to Rather, by the courts. using generalized language, only it created a framework within which the in courts were left to evolve, much the manner of the system principles compen- common law, providing sation for employees consistent the changing in employment industry. realities the railroad argued
Second, it is that Inspection Boiler Acts special safety are statutes may easily thus assimilated to the FELA under principles. magic common-law But there is no “safety.’' word In cases we have discussed it was regarded irrelevant that defects appliances performing did disable them from their safety intended function. instance, For Gotschall coupling parting defect the cars resulted setting automatic emergency safety brakes as Coray measure. In stopped the train due opera- to the very safety required by tion mechanism sanders which caused the defect Urie statute. impaired in no cabs wise into the locomotive come sand to provide the sanders —to function of designed the irrelevance think traction. We sand for the basis demonstrates in these cases safety aspect *11 regard statutory duty without a violation of liability is of the violation was flowing from the injury the to whether It must guard against. to sought statute injury the of Acts violated that the nature the be concluded therefore liability is consideration; the basis of controlling is not FELA.8 the FELA with a view to developing in the courts,
The corporate the worker and his adjusting equitably between railroad have industry, risks inherent the employer the neces- rejected many of the refined distinctions plainly of allo- sary purpose in common-law tort doctrine for the persons nearly risks who are more cating between capacity ability as to financial to avoid equal footing developed Among the hazards involved. the refinements by limiting the common law for the the risk that liability arising wrongful conduct is the rule statutory duty liability only violation of a creates when protect the was position statute intended those the plaintiff type from the fact incurred. limiting approach long This has been discarded from the FELA. Instead, theory the of the FELA is that where employer’s high conduct falls short of the standard argue Safety Appliance dissenters that and Boiler In spection by prefaced Acts were each the statement: “An Act to promote safety . . we are and travelers . .” But persuaded depend under FELA should on the alleged. rely title of the Acts whose violation is we Were on such point empowered indicia we out the statute here could involved the Commandant of the Coast to establish rules Guard “as to lights may necessary to be . . . as he . . . deem carried for added.) (Emphasis . . . 30 Stat. 33 U. S. C. 157. by or in required fault, of him this and his whole Act, injury, liability causes ensues. And this result fol- part, statutory duty lows whether fault is a violation of a duty acting care, more with employer duty much as the of act- employee, owes the ing duty statutory with his care, complying obligations.
We difficulty principles, find no these applying developed present under the under FELA, to action Act, the Jones expressly for the Act provides latter seamen the consequently cause of action —and entire judicially developed rail- liability granted doctrine of — road workers the .FELA. The deceased seaman here in a position perfectly analogous to that the rail- road recovery workers allowed in the line of we cases have discussed, principles governing clearly and the those cases apply should here. *12 judgment Appeals Court of is reversed with
direction to remand to the District further Court for proceedings not this opinion. inconsistent with
Reversed. of Mr. Memorandum Frankfurter. Justice my Since it has general-practice been for on to decade refrain to from in the participating disposi- substantive of arising tion cases under the Federal Lia- Employers’ bility brought Act and the Jones Act have here been writ certiorari, on explaining my participation word today is in order.
After persistent protest against granting petitions for certiorari to judgments review in the state courts United States of Appeals Courts involving application the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, I it deemed neces- sary to register my unjustifiability conviction granting petitions such by noting that the petitions were Rogers my opinion See granted.
improviolently All these Co., S. 352 U. R. Missouri Pacific on what evidence of evidence: evaluation involved cases concep- e., i. common-law “negligence,” constitutes subject adopted, Congress negligence tion and withdrawal “causation” regarding qualifications statutory remains defenses, and which common-law practice has become It liability. requisite courts have trial evidence where review this Court juries or to duty to take cases it their considered have courts appellate or where jury verdicts, aside set are ver- as to what allowable trial court decisions reversed func- to be the manifestly ceased juries. This dicts September by the Act of Congress, after of this Court tion appeals abolished 6, 1916, Stat. cases and restricted Liability Act
Federal Employers’ con- in such cases to the court decisions review of lower jurisdiction. certiorari scope fined of our cases, that these at least suggestion I am aware involve a con- Appeals, from the Courts of coming those namely, application of the Seventh stitutional issue— suppose, equally I would be That, Amendment. should in which the claim every case in the federal courts true jury, is made that a case should have been left to the cases, non-FELA equally, course, (in such claims any rate) denied, except flagrant are here the most again again, instances. This Court has said other FELA cases, questions of fact —and that than essentially what these cases involve—afford *13 by inadmissible for review Court. this for this And basis the conclusive reason that deliberate consideration and adjudication of the concededly ought wise cases that to be reviewed here make a demand greater than the thought possessed resources of time and by no Court, this matter how ably constituted, reasonably afford. See Peru, Ex parte (dissenting 318 U. S. 602-603 opinion). in different kind from I
This case is those which my duty it have felt to abstain from consideration on the merits. This is case which involves a serious question of construction of a statute of importance. nationwide questions of /among Such construction are the most final important by issues for determination this Court. I therefore reach the and on I merits, join the merits opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan. whom Harlan,
Mr. Justice Mr. Justice Frank- furter, and Mr. Justice Whit- Burton, Mr. Justice join, dissenting. taker
I share the view of the Court that under existing law a cause of action for wrongful death does not lie prin- ciples of unseaworthiness, and that therefore respondent’s liability for the death caused this unfortunate accident depends entirely on the Jones Act, Stat.
U. S. C. 688, incorporates provisions Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Stat. as amended, 51-60, §§ U. S. C. and thereby reflects the principles negligence upon which the FELA explicitly based. granted District Court exoneration respondent upon findings that the accident attributable to kind on part, particular its respondent was not negligent carrying the kerosene signal lantern, which ignited the fumes from the petro- products leum on the surface of the at a river, height of part three feet the river which had never been danger considered a area. Although the District Court found that the accident was traceable respond- fact to ent’s violation of a Coast Guard regulation, 33 CFR 80.16 (h), which required a light white to be carried *14 water,1 feet above eight height minimum
aat rise give not of itself did violation this held that court purpose sole because negligence to 102, 30 Stat. regulation, authorizing the the statute collisions guard against 157, was S. C. 33 U. here type of accident prevent not resulted. inwas recognize, seems to Court holding, as the
This law of in the common principle the familiar accord aof from violations resulting injuries negligence liability unless rise to statutory duty give do not Indeed that prevent. designed the statute was kind rule of aspect is but principle, which must to be actionable in order law that a defendant’s conduct risk harm which be within 56 Harv. L. Principles Torts, Seavey, see created, has ago as long established as (1942), was 72, 90-92 Rev. Scott, L. R. 9 case, Gorris v. by leading English a country almost followed in this Ex. and has been 286; Prosser, Restatement, Torts, § exception. without Liability 34; Lowndes, Civil (2d 1955), § ed. Torts Minn. L. Legislation, 16 Rev. Criminal Created Moran, 212 Eugene F. S. (1932); 372-377 cf. U. admiralty law). (under finding assumption 1 This must rest on the District regulation carry any signal light respondent to at that the forbade However, height eight it is of less than feet above the water. questionable regulation proscribing whether the had the effect of height requiring light light feet, well as at a minimum at three may eight is, regulation feet. That the violation of the have con solely light eight water, in the absence of a feet above the sisted presence light water, of a three feet above the in which case in the regulation. not be attributed to violation of the the accident could assume, opinion, of this I shall as the District Court For necessarily concluded, respondent that the violation of consisted in light carrying the three feet and was thus the factual cause of the accident.
The Court neither casts doubt on the District Court’s *15 finding respondent negligent carry- was ing tug’s lantern at feet above the water three disputes surface nor the sole of the Coast regulation guard against Guard was to the risk of col- but it lision, nevertheless decides that violation of the of itself regulation respondent rendered the liable all injuries flowing from it. holding This is said to follow from the decisions of in a this Court series of FELA cases on Safety based violations of the Appliance Act, 27 Stat. amended, 45 S. C. 1-16, §§ U. Inspection the Boiler Act, 36 Stat.
45 22-34. decisions, §§ U. S. C. These as the here Court properly states, have FELA created under the an absolute liability- is, liability regard negli- “without —that gence” injuries resulting violations of the other —for Acts. From this, Court concludes that there is no liability reason not to extend this absolute to cases based on the of a statutory duty violation which are brought under the Jones Act.
This conclusion I cannot share. A reading of the cases upon by beyond relied the Court dispute demonstrates that the underlying reasons those decisions have no appli- cation the context of this regulation Coast Guard Jones liability impressed Act. It follows that can be respondent only negligence, theory because of upon which the Jones Act is founded.
In the course of its development liability absolute under the FELA for traceable to violations of Inspection Act, Act or the Boiler problems. faced First, has two distinct was it nec essary plaintiff to show that the violation of either of these statutes due negligence? Louis, been “no.” St. Iron Moun has uniformly
answer Taylor, tain & So. R. Co. v. San Antonio & 210 281; 444 St.& Minneapolis Wagner, 476; 241 S.
A. P. R. Co. v. U. Co. v. Gotschall, Southern R. 66; 244 U. S. L. R. Co. v. Co., Trunk R. Lilly v. Grand Lunsford, 398; S.U. for the defendant’s Second, was the S. 481. U. within the character limited to those injuries suffered designed to eliminate? statutes were which these risks Conarty, 238 S. S. F. R. Co. v. U. St. Louis & Except for followed, has never since been alone and 243, which stands & N. has been “no.” Louisville here also answer Wolfe, v. 617; Davis Layton, v. S. R. Co. U. Co., P., M. O. R. Chicago, St. & Swinson 239; S.U. Assn., 303 Brady v. Terminal Railroad 529; S.U. S.U. *16 entirely clear, not earlier cases is
The rationale these finally uncertainty it became good but after a deal suf railway employees in and 1949 that established 1948 consequence in of a violation fering under either the promulgated found in or regulations Inspection or the Boilei Act could Safety Appliance Act under the without maintain an action FELA reference 163; v. S. Thompson, Urie U. negligence. the law of Co., 384; Elgin, J. & E. R. U. S. O’Donnell Co., A. B. R. 338 U. S. Atlanta & St. Carter v. FELA, 1 of the cases, scope of these As a result en 51,, C. has been Stat. injuries “result making compensable only not larged by carrier, part negligence” or in from the in whole ing regu violation of the two resulting those from but also give rise, through in these Acts so that effect latory Acts, (O’Don a FELA, “non-negligence” medium of to the nell, 391) Referring action. cause.of supra, Carter, in this Court said that kind of action nature of 434): p. supra (at Safety Appliance that violation
“Sometimes [of we ‘negligence per ; se’ . . . but is described as Act] that that have made clear the O’Donnell term case is confusing simply label for what violation duty. an absolute established, only
“Once the violation is causal rela- Congress tion is issue. And has directed part' if the 'in resulted whole Safety defendant’s or its violation Appliance (Italics added.) Act.” broad certainly These cases then do not establish “negligence” rule under the FELA that the term as used subject limiting that Act is not to the doctrine of Scott, supra, applied. Gorris v. which the District Court they are Rather, theory liability wholly based on divorced from negligence. fact, today And the Court invokes these decisions support its conclusion that a “non-negligence” action based on violation of this Coast regulation Guard lies under the Jones Act. Its reasons for this conclusion are that “incorporates the Jones Act FELA” provisions of the and “expressly provides for seamen the cause of consequently action —and the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability granted to rail- — road FELA.” workers The Court thus reads these decisions to establish a doctrine under FELA injuries following any violation of any statute, simply and Boiler Inspection Acts, are *17 actionable without any showing of negligence, and it is this doctrine which, argues, the Jones Act absorbs.
So unjustifiably broad view of the doctrine this Court is said to have disregards established upon basis which these earlier proceed. decisions In brief, they concen- trate and explicitly upon rest peculiar relationship between the Safety Appliance and the Inspection Boiler Acts, on the one hand, and the FELA, on the In other. view of this the Court, recognizing that relationship,
446 private cause rise to safety gives Acts of these
neither Thompson, g., see, e. Urie force, own of its of action private provide FELA to has read p. 188, at supra, the Court liability absolute remedy to enforce establish. The Court’s Acts to the other considered either that no effort to show makes here opinion was regulation the Coast Guard authorizing statute liability for to an absolute rise give intended to aAct, Jones violation or that from its resulting was intended to be negligence, founded statute a liability. of such enforcement medium of and the Safety Appliance involving In the cases repeatedly empha- Court has Inspection Acts, the Boiler to foster purpose Congress manifest sized that the safety employees particular Acts the through these jobs, secure in their employees and to make each of these prefacing evidenced statements partially “An they originally pro- enacted: Act to Acts as were upon railroads mote the and travelers engaged interstate by compelling common carriers .” 27 commerce to . . follow the rules of each Act. Stat. Williams, 913; Illinois Central R. Co. v. 531; 36 Stat. 462, 466-467; Thompson, supra, Urie v. U. S. keeping purpose, with this 190-191. statement two Safety Appliance expressly refer to sections of the Act liability employers employees by injured the civil abrogating assumption the common-law defense of by preserving liability particular risk and such civil over a payable for fines to the exception to the imposed on carriers for violation States which is United 7; of the Act. 27 Stat. C. provisions § 36 Stat. U. S. C. provision
Paralleling Act of risk referring assumption FELA, is 4 of the 54,§ Stat. U. S. C. which abolishes *18 of risk assumption only respect the defense of with grounded negligence any to actions but “in case also the violation ... where statute enacted for the safety contributed to the or death employee. quoted of” an This clause is included also Act, Stat. C. 53, U. S. for the absolute substitutes common-law defense of con- tributory negligence what is in compara- effect a rule of tive but bars negligence, completely this defense on the actions based violation of such a statute. The phrase “any employees” statute enacted for the of course refers to the Safety Appliance Act, Moore v. Co., Chesapeake & Ohio R. 205, 210, and to Inspection Act, Boiler Urie Thompson, supra, 188-189. The phrase juxtaposition use this the term “negligence” these sections confirms the congressional purpose special to accord treatment employees injured by violations these Acts. express
These indications of congressional intent impose strict liability traceable to violations underlay these statutes the holdings on which the relies. The intimate relationship between the Safety Appliance Act and the FELA up by was summed the Court in San Antonio A. P.& R. Wagner, supra, Co. v. in the following language 484): (p.
“If violated, ques- [the Act] tion of sense of want of care is immaterial. . . . two [Safety statutes [T]he Appliance materia, Act and the are in pari FELA] and where the refers 'any in- defect or [FELA] sufficiency, negligence, due to its in its cars, engines, appliances,’ etc., clearly it legislative is the intent to treat a Safety violation of the Appliance Act as . . .” 'negligence’. (Italics in original.) *19 Thompson, the Court concluded supra, in Urie v. And (p. 189): Appliance Safety Acts, together
“In this view Inspection Act, substantively if the Boiler are to . . . in form amendments [FELA]. [They] wholly sep- regarded cannot statutes They independent from and arate [FELA]. supplemental it, having purpose rather to are recovery .” facilitating employee . . . and effect above, Court Carter v. Atlanta & Finally, noted Co., supra, “Congress St. A. B. R. observed that liability” injuries re- has directed under the FELA for from or from sulting negligence violation these Acts. I short, past it is that this think evident Court’s interpretation provide of the FELA to a cause action liability based on absolute for traceable to vio- particular of these two statutes has rested lations entirely congressional intent, on its view and that liability regard rule of absolute without to no injuries resulting violation of fairly emerge can be said to from these decisions. statute explanations past cases creation Despite liability, asserts that “the this absolute now controlling the Acts is not a considera- nature of violated appear pertinent does be a Indeed, it not even to tion.” opinion makes no consideration, for the effort to show congressional a similar intent to create absolute even afford seamen, favor of or to additional in the to can be either terms of rights seamen, discerned authorizing regulation this Coast statute Guard relationship abundantly with the Jones Act. It is its of the regulation, clear from face and its setting, simply prevent collisions, its rather than such guard against unforeseeable occurrences as explosion in this case.2 This is by confirmed the tenor of the section of the statute under regulation which the issued:
“The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shall establish such rules to be observed waters mentioned the preceding by section steam in passing vessels each other lights and as to the be carried on by such waters ferryboats ves- sels and craft of all types when in tow steam *20 ... vessels as he from may time to deem time 3 necessary for . ...” Moreover, although another section of the same statute that violation of indicates this regulation give does rise liability on part absolute of the master mate or particular regulation by respondent, violated 33 CFR (h), appears Subchapter 80.16 CFR, under D of 33 which is § “Navigation Requirements entitled: For Certain Inland Waters.” caption: “Lights barges, Section 80.16 itself bears the boats, canal nondescript scows and other vessels on certain inland waters on the Subchapter Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.” Other sections under D regulate fog signals (§80.12), speed fog (§80.13), navigation (§80.5). (h) near bends and curves Section 80.16 itself states that light height eight be at minimum shall carried feet above the placed surface of the water “. . . and shall be so as to show an light horizon, unbroken all around the and shall of such a char night atmosphere acter as to be visible on a dark with a clear at a distance of at least 5 miles.” 102, section, amended, This 157, appears Stat. 33 U. S. C. § Chapter 33, under 3 of Title “Navigation which bears the title: Harbors, Rivers, Rules for And Generally.” Inland Waters Other Chapter signals (33 sections under 191), 3 refer to sound U. S. C. § fog (33 speed 192), U. S. C. and ascertainment of risk of collision (33 §201). originally S. C. part U. Section 157 was enacted as 7,1897, the Act of simply June clear of that Act was governing navigation to effect a codification of all rules on inland they highest waters so that possible degree would conform in the prevailing prevention international rules for the of collisions at sea. 42, Cong., Sess., p. H. R. Doc. No. 55th 1st tug damages by passengers, suffered that section provides makes no reference to seamen’s remedies and generally of the vessel or owner is not to be affected Finally, statute.4 there are no cross provisions between this statute and the sections of the FELA incorporated into the Jones Act comparable to those found between the FELA, hand, the one and Boiler Inspection Acts, on the other. unlike the short, situation as to those statutes, one can look vain for congressional pur- evidence of a pose to supplement negli- remedies for due to 102, 30 Stat. 33 U. S. C. was also enacted as part 7, 1897, supra. provides part Act of June note It “Every pilot, engineer, mate, that: or master of steam ves every any barge sel .. . and boat, master or mate of or canal who neglects regulations or refuses to the provisions observe of . . . the pursuance 3, supra] established in text at note . . . shall [§ penalty be liable dollars, damages to a of one -hundred and for all by any passenger person baggage by neglect sustained in his or such Provided, nothing or refusal: any vessel, That herein shall relieve owner, corporation any liability’ -by incurred reason of such *21 neglect originally dr'afted, preceding or refusal.” As its enactment 1897, present substantially now, except 158 read it does it did not contain the last “Provided” clause. H. R. Doc. No. Cong., Sess., p. concerning 55th 1st In the House debates part Act of discussion was directed in to this section and question might impose liability was raised whether its effect be to passengers exclusively upon vessels, who officers might financially irresponsible. Cong. To end Rec. 1395. doubts, by these prior the section was amended to its enactment Representative Payne addition of the “Provided” clause. stated that liability the amendment’s was to make clear that of damages entirely vessel or owner the vessel for would remain of by Cong. words, unaffected the section. 30 Rec. 1465. In other liability Act of 1897 was not intended either to define to of extent rights a vessel itsor owner or to advance the remedies or broaden the seamen, simply passengers against of but afforded officers remedies personally regulations. liable because breach gence available to seamen under the aby Jones Act cause liability of action based on absolute for damages suffered in consequence of a violation of this regula- Coast Guard tion. In these circumstances, argument that such cause of action arises because the Jones Act “expressly provides for seamen the cause of action . . . granted to by railroad workers FELA” empty seems to me an one. FELA premise the Court that the was intended duty leave to federal courts the of fashioning remedies
“to . . changing concepts meet . of industry’s duty toward its workers” today’s holding. carry- underlies ing out duty, courts, by this decision, shown this are not by consider themselves confined doctrines deeply ingrained in the common negligence upon law of FELA predicated but instead are to be free to develop other theories of liability. Indeed, particular content with its conclusion that violation of a statutory duty liability leads to FELA absolute under the Act, the Jones the Court goes say on to that “the theory of FELA is that where employer’s conduct falls high short of the him required standard this Act, fault, and his in whole in part, injury, causes . . ensues . whether the is a fault violation of statutory duty general duty acting or the more . . . care .” Thus the Court in effect reads out of the FELA and the concepts Jones Act the common-law foreseeability of harm very and risk which lie at the core of negligence liability, and these as making treats statutes employers this area virtual insurers of the their employees. *22 may
Whatever be adequacy one’s views of the “negligence” liability dealing as the means of with occu- pational hazards in fields, legis- these has not Congress
452 liability liability. “The basis of of absolute
lated in terms negligence.” Wilkerson the Act is and remains under (concurring opinion 53, S. 69 McCarthy, 336 U. by Con- J.). expressly as modified And, except Douglas, 1 it “negligence” appears § term as gress, embody common-law been taken to always FELA has Thompson, supra, one of the in Urie v. concepts. Thus relies, said here it was cases on which principal 182): (at 174, does define
“The not section FELA] [§ leaving question to deter- negligence, . estab- 'by principles mined . . the common law as applied the federal courts.’. . . lished . . recognize Employers’ . that Federal “We Liability concepts Act is founded on common-law subject qualifications negligence injury, to such has'imported into Congress those terms.” agree Congress I cannot intended the federal courts liability new large devising to roam at bases replace which these Acts imposed employers.
I affirm. would qualifications provisions of course refer to those FELA applicable modify abrogate the facts of this case which contributory 3, negligence, 66, common-law defenses of 35 Stat. § assumption risk, U. S. C. 35 Stat. U. S. C. §