68 Wis. 674 | Wis. | 1887
In this case the plaintiff moved for judg- • ment upon the special verdict. The court denied this motion, and gave judgment dismissing the complaint upon the merits. If the facts found in the special verdict are in-' sufficient to warrant a judgment for the plaintiff, this ruling must be affirmed. The action is brought upon a parol exec-utory contract for the sale and delivery of a quantity of pine cord-wood. The price of the wood amounted to $500 or $600, and the court undoubtedly considered that the contract was within the statute of frauds and the facts found in the special verdict failed to show that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. In that view of the case, we think the court was entirely correct. The jury failed to find upon the question of acceptance. Indeed, that issue was not submitted, probably because there was no evidence of an acceptance of the wood by the defendant. In its answer the defendant put its refusal to accept upon the ground that the wood was purchased for the manufacture of wood pulp for making paper, and that the wood furnished was unfit for that purpose. The jury, however, found that the plaintiff cut, hauled, and banked at the place designated on the Fox river, 230 cords of dead wood, of the quality specified in the contract. The jury also found that after 200 cords of wood had been banked the defendant paid $250 towards the wood, but that it did not then know the quality of the
Upon the special verdict, then, the plaintiff was clearly not entitled to have judgment for the value of the wood, since no acceptance was shown so as to complete’ the sale. It cannot well be said that the payment of the $250 some weeks after the contract was made would have the effect to validate the agreement or take the case out of the statute. The earnest money to bind the bargain must be paid
The same counsel makes the further point that the agreement is valid under ch. 81, Laws of 1883, relating to the sale of personal property. To our minds it is very evident that this law refers to written contracts, because it enacts that “it shall be incompetent to show in defense, by any extrinsic evidence, that such contract had any other intent or meaning than expressed or stipulated thereby.” _ As the counsel on the other side suggests, this law was doubtless passed to obviate, in a measure, the decisions in Barnard v. Blackhaus, 62 Wis. 593, and Everingham v. Meighan, 55 Wis. 354, and to validate “options or dealings in futures, or betting on the rise and fall of stocks and produce.” It has no application to the contract before us. According to the view of counsel, it has the effect to repeal the statute of frauds. We do not think it was ever intended by the legislature to have any such sweeping effect.
It follows from these views that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
By the Gourt.— Judgment affirmed.