80 Iowa 137 | Iowa | 1890
All the grounds now urged against the validity of the ordinance existed before the commencement of that action, and, if they were not, might have been, litigated therein. It is true, the account or claim sued upon did not then exist, but, in so far as plaintiff’s right to recover or not depends upon the validity of that ordinance, we must hold that that question was adjudicated, and the ordinance held to be valid.
It is contended that there is such uncertainty in the ordinance as to when the rights and privileges of the plaintiff were to terminate that this evidence is proper to be considered, not to contradict or vary the terms of the ordinance, but to enable the court to arrive at the true intent and meaning of the parties in enacting and accepting said ordinance. In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 42 Iowa, 605, the court said: ‘ ‘ The whole contract must be considered in determining the meaning of any of its parts. The first point is to ascertain what the parties meant, and then to put such construction upon their contract as will bring it as near to their actual meaning as the words they saw fit to employ, when properly construed, and the rules of law, will permit. In arriving at this meaning, the subject-matter of the contract, the situation of the parties and of the property, and the purpose of the parties in making the contract, must be considered.” In our opinion, the meaning of the parties, as expressed in this ordinance, is plain and obvious when considered in the light of these rules. The first section declares, in unmistakable language, that the privileges granted to plaintiff are for the term of twenty years from July 1, 1868. If this section stood alone on this subject, it could not be claimed that plaintiff’s privileges extended to a later date. Section 2, after providing how the city might purchase the works at the end of ten years, or. at the end of each succeeding five years thereafter, provides that “said gas company shall continue to possess and enjoy all the aforesaid rights and privileges,” etc., “until such.purchase shall have been- made.” Taking the provision alone, it is obvious that plaintiff’s privileges were extended, not for twenty years, but until the
We think the purpose in following the provisions as to purchase, with the provision that the gas company should continue to enjoy its privileges until the purchase was made, was to avoid any question as to the gas company’s rights before a purchase was made, and not to extend the privileges beyond the twenty years named. We give full effect to both sections by holding that all rights and privileges under the ordinance terminated as to both parties July 1, 1888. This conclusion renders it unnecessary that we notice other points made in the discussion. It is our opinion that the judgment of the district court should be
Affirmed.