delivered the opinion of the Court.
This controversy relates to the constitutional validity of the Act of Congress of July 24, 1935, known as the Ashurst-Sumners Act. 49 Stat. 494.
The Act makes it unlawful knowingly to transport in interstate or foreign commerce goods made by convict labor into any State where the goods are intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of its laws. Goods madе by convicts on parole or probation, or made in federal penal and correctional institutions for use by the Federal Government, are excepted. Packages containing convict-made goods must be plainly labeled so as to show the names and addresses of shipper and consignee, the nature of the contents, and the name and *344 location of the penal or reformatory institution where produced. 1 Violation is punished by fine and forfeiture. 2
Petitioner manufactures in Kentucky, with convict labor, horse collars, harness and strap goods which it markets in various States. It tendered to respondent, a common carrier, twenty-five separate shipments for transportаtion in interstate commerce, of which ten were consigned to customers in States whose laws prohibited the *345 sale of convict-made goods within their respective borders, five to States whose laws did not prohibit such sale but required that the goods should be plainly marked so as to show that they were made by convicts, and the remaining ten to States whose laws imposed no restriction upon sale or possession. None of the packages were labeled as required by the Act of Congress and, in obedience to the Act, respondent refused to accept the shipments.
Petitioner then brought this suit for a mandatory injunction to compel the transportation. The District Court dismissed the bill and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree. The District Court declared the Act to be invalid so far as it prohibited transportation of convict-made goods into States which proscribed sale or possession, but sustained the provision which required labeling. 12 P. Supp. 37. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained thе Act in its entirety. 84 F. (2d) 168. This Court granted certiorari.
Petitioner contends (1) that the Congress is without constitutional authority to prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of useful and harmless articles made by convict labor and (2) that the Congress has no power to exclude from interstate commerce convict-made goods which are not labeled as such.
First.
The commerce clause (Art. I, § 8, par. 3) confers upon the Congress “the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.” This power “is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”
Gibbons
v.
Ogden,
*346 Petitioner’s argument necessarily recognizes that in certain circumstances an absolute prohibition of interstate transportation is constitutional regulation. The power to prohibit interstate transportation has been upheld by this Court in relation to diseased livestock, 3 lottery tickets, 4 commodities owned by the interstate carrier transporting them, except such as may be required in the conduct of its business as a common carrier/ 5 adulterated and misbranded аrticles, under the Pure Food and Drugs Act 6 women, for immoral purposes, 7 intoxicating liquors, 8 diseased plants, 9 stolen motor vehicles, 10 and kidnaped persons. 11
The decisions sustaining this variety of statutes disclose the principles deemed to be applicable. We have frequently said that in the exercise of its control over interstate commerce, the means employed by the Con
*347
gress may have the quality of police regulations.
Gloucester Ferry Co.
v.
Pennsylvania,
The anticipated evil or harm may proceed from something inherent in the subject of transportation as in the case of diseased or noxious articles, which are unfit for commerce.
Hipolite Egg Co.
v.
United States,
The contention is inadmissible that the Act of Congress is invalid merely because the horse collars and harness
*348
which petitioner manufactures and sells are useful and harmless articles. The motor vehicles, which are the subject of the transportation prohibited in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,
12
are in themselves useful and proper subjects of commerce, but their transportation by one who knows they have been stolen is “a gross misuse of interstate commerce” and the Congress may properly punish it “because of its harmful result and its defeat of the property rights of those whose machines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions.”
Brooks
v.
United States, supra,
p. 439. Similarly, the object of the Federal Kidnaping Act
13
is to aid in the protection of the personal liberty of one who has been unlawfully seized or carried away.
Gooch
v.
United States, supra;
compare
United States
v.
Wheeler,
On the same general principle, the Congress may prevent interstate transportation from being used to bring into a State articles the trafile in which the State has constitutional authority to forbid, and has forbidden, in its internal commerce. In that view, we sustained the acts of Congress designed to prevent the use of interstate transportation to hаmper the execution of state policy with respect to trafile in intoxicating liquors. This was not because intoxicating liquors were not otherwise legitimate articles of commerce. On the contrary they were recognized as such “by the usages of the commercial world, the laws of Congress and the decisions of courts.”
Leisy
v.
Hardin,
By the Wilson Act of August 8, 1890,
14
intoxicating liquors transported mto any State were subjected upon arrival to the operation of state laws to the same extent as though they had been produced within the State, although still in the original packages. This act was upheld in
In re Rahrer, supra.
But the statute did not apply until the transportation was completed by actual delivery to the consignee.
Rhodes
v.
Iowa, supra,
p. 426;
Adams Express Co.
v.
Kentucky,
The ruling in
Hammer
v.
Dagenhart,
The course of congressional legislation with respect to convict-made goods has followed closely the precedents as to intoxicating liquors. By the Hawes-Cooper Act of January 19, 1929,
17
the Congress provided that convict-made goods (with certain exceptions) transported into any State should be subject upon arrival, whether in the original packages or otherwise, to the operation of state laws as if produced within the State. In
Whitfield
v. Ohio,
The Ashurst-Sumners Act as to interstate transportation of convict-made goods has substantially the same provisions as the Webb-Kenyon Act as to intoxicating liquors and finds supрort in similar considerations. The subject of the prohibited traffic is different, the effects of the traffic are different, but the underlying principle is the same. The pertinent point is that where the subject of commerce is one as to which the power of the State may constitutionally be exerted by restriction or prohibition in order to prevent harmful consequences, the Congress may, if it sees fit, put forth its power to regulate interstate commerce so as to prevent that commerce from being used to impede the carrying out of the state policy.
*352 In the congressional action there is nothing arbitrary or capricious bringing the statute into collision with the requirements of due process of law. The Congress in exercising the power confided to it by the Constitution is as free as the States to recognize the fundamental interests of free labor. 19 Nor has the Congress attempted to delegate its authority to the States. The Congress has not sought to exercise a power not granted or to usurр the police powers of the States. It has not acted on any assumption of a power enlarged by virtue of state action. The Congress has exercised its plenary power, which is subject to no limitation other than that which is found in the Constitution itself. The Congress has formulated its own policy and established its own rule. The fact that it has аdopted its rule in order to aid the enforcement of valid state laws affords no ground for constitutional objection.
Second.
As the Congress could prohibit the interstate transportation of convict-made goods as provided in section one of the Act, the Congress could require packages
*353
containing convict-made goods tо be labeled as required by section two. The requirement of labels, disclosing the nature of the contents, the name and location of the penal institution where the goods were produced, and the names and addresses of shippers and consignees, was manifestly reasonable and appropriate for the carrying out of the prohibition.
Seven Cases
v.
United States, supra; United States
v.
Freeman,
The decree is
Affirmed.
Notes
Sections 1 and 2 are as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport or cause to be transported, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for or in transporting any goods, wares, and merchandise manufactured, produced, or minеd wholly or in part by convicts or prisoners (except convicts or prisoners on parole or probation), or in any penal or reformatory institution, from one State, Territory, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country, into any Statе, Territory, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, where said goods, wares, and merchandise are intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise in violation оf any law of such State, Territory, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous but subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Nothing herein shall apply to commodities manufactured in Federal penal and correctional institutions for use by the Federal Government.
“Sec. 2. All packages containing any goods, wares, and merchandise manufactured, produced, or mined wholly or in part by convicts or prisoners, except convicts or prisoners on parole or probation, or in any penal or reformatory institution, when shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce shall be plainly and clearly marked, so that the name and address of the shipper, the name and address of the consignee, the nature of the contents, and the name and location of the penal or reformatory institution where produced wholly or in part may be readily ascertained on an inspection of the outside of such package.”
Id., §§ 3 and 4.
Act of May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. 31;
Reid
v. Colorado,
Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963;
Champion
v.
Ames,
Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584;
United States
v.
Delaware & Hudson Co.,
Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 768;
Hipolite Egg Co.
v.
United States,
Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat, 825;
Hoke v. United States.
Act of Marсh 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 699; Act of March 3, 1917, 39 Stat. 1069;
Clark Distilling Co.
v.
Western Maryland Ry. Co.,
Act of March 4, 1917, 39 Stat. 1165;
Oregon-Washington R.
&
N. Co.
v.
Washington,
Act of October 29, 1919, 41 Stat. 324;
Brooks v. United States,
Act of June 22, 1932, 47 Stat. 326; Act of May 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 781;
Gooch
v.
United States,
See, also, Act of May 25, 1900, 31 Stat. 187;
Rupert
v.
United States,
See Note 10.
See Note 11.
26 Stat. 313.
37 Stat. 699.
39 Stat. 1069.
45 Stat. 1084.
Act of June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 689.
In the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, recommending the passage of the Ashurst-Sumners Act, the Committee said (Sen. Rep. No. 906, 74th Cong., 1st sess.):
“For many years the Congress has considered bills relating to the sale of prison-made goods. Extensive hearings have been held оn these measures which have thoroughly revealed the evils attending the sale of such goods, in the open market, in competition with goods manufactured and produced by free labor. These evils impelled the Congress in 1929 to enact the Hawes-Cooper law, by virtue of which prison-made goods, upon their entry and delivery into a Stаte, became subject to the laws of that State.
“At- present 21 States, with a population in excess of 75 millions, have enacted laws prohibiting the sale, in the open market, of prison-made goods. This bill is designed to prohibit the transportation of such goods into the States which have thus legislated, in cases in which such goods are to be received or used in violation of the State law. The principle involved in this bill has been frequently sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.”