182 S.W.2d 27 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1944
Reversing.
The appeal is from a judgment for $909.30 for loss of baggage of a hotel guest.
The appellee, E.J.T. Cinotti, had been substantially a permanent resident in the Kentucky Hotel in Louisville, for about a year, occupying a large and spacious room. He left on November 8, 1942. When he returned on December 6th, he asked for his old room but it was not available. The best the Hotel could do for him was to offer a small room in which there was no closet. Cinotti was told by a clerk on duty at the desk that if he would take the room his baggage would be kept safely in the check room. He expected to go to his mother's home in Chicago during the approaching Christmas season and agreed. He had considerable luggage, which the Hotel placed in the check room and for which it gave him three claim checks. On December 24th he presented these checks and called for his baggage. It could not be found. The assistant manager, helping in the effort to locate the luggage, noted that Cinotti had only a short time to get his train, told him to go ahead and it would probably be located by the time he returned. Cinotti responded something to the effect that as they were so nice about the matter he would just leave his light topcoat also. He delivered it at the check room without taking a check for it. When he returned on January 9th and again called for his baggage it could not be found and was never delivered to him.
The claim checks given the guest bore the inscription "Positively not responsible for articles left in the check room." The appellant relies on this as an absolute *90
relief from liability. Considering the early English decisions and analogous cases in this country, the Tennessee Supreme Court held, in Maxwell Operating Company v. Harper,
Nor is the contract unenforcible because of indefiniteness merely because the guest was not able positively to give the name of the clerk he made the contract with. He thought it might have been Stodgill, the Assistant Manager, or Tottem, a clerk. The one testified it was not he, but the other did not testify. We think the terms of the agreement are definite and specific.
Nor can the defendant escape liability because of his failure to prove that the clerk had the authority to make such an agreement. Whoever it may have been, he was in a position of authority in assigning rooms and looking after the comfort of the guests. By virtue of that position he was empowered by the proprietor to do any act which his duties necessitated and which the guests could reasonably understand he possessed. The agreement to accept and keep the baggage safely was within his actual authority, or, certainly, within his ostensible authority, the difference, being immaterial. 28 Am. Jur., Innkeepers, Secs. 43, 80; Annotations, 37 A.L.R. 316.
There is, of course, no question raised as to the relationship of guest during the several days in which the plaintiff occupied the room. His topcoat, as we have said, was left as he was departing for the holidays. *91
The assistant manager had assured him his other baggage would be found during his absence, and when Cinotti left this coat, he testified, "They said we will keep it safely." Stodgill testified he didn't "know about that." As the absence was to be temporary and the guest intended to return shortly and secure personal accommodations, the relationship of innkeeper and guest continued during the interval in so far as liability for the safekeeping of the property is concerned: 28 Am. Jur., Innkeepers, Secs. 21, 28, 88; Parker v. Dixon,
We think the plaintiff made out a clear and complete case against the defendant. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs Hotel Co.,
Kentucky Revised Statutes
Paragraph (b) relates to merchandise. Paragraph (c) is as follows: "In no event shall the liability provided for in this subsection exceed two hundred dollars, unless the proprietor has contracted in writing with the guest to assume a greater liability."
By an amended petition the plaintiff withdrew his allegation that the loss of his baggage was due to the negligence of the defendant and rested his action upon the contract. Paragraph (c) of the statute quoted seems to embrace actions rested upon negligence, excepted from the provisions of Paragraph (a), so that in the absence of negligence the statute limits the recovery of a guest for loss of his personal property, not placed in the hotel safe, to $100. It may have been the intent *92
of the Legislature in enacting KRS
The appellee undertakes to show that this statute violates Section 54 of the Constitution of Kentucky, which declares: "The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property."
We have construed this constitutional limitation of power to prohibit the Legislature from enacting a statute barring the right of action for death or personal injury of a guest in an automobile against his host unless the accident resulted from an intentional act. Ludwig v. Johnson,
We are of opinion, therefore, that the court should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $100.
The judgment is reversed.