115 Iowa 383 | Iowa | 1902
III. The last point made is that the statute construed as contended for by appellee, destroys or abridges, the right of contract, prevents proper and timely performance of contract obligations, and leads to a multiplicity of suits and interminable confusion. Such arguments might properly be addressed to the legislature', but they can be given but little weight by the courts. The statute was in force at the time the defendant made its contracts, and these contract rights and obligations must be subordinated to the provisions of the statute. As said by Chief Justice Shaw in Donahy v. Clapp, 12 Cush. 440: “Such a contract, by force of the existing law when it was made, of which the owner is supposed to be cognizant, gives irrevocable power to his contractor to charge and bind his estate-; and when such power is executed by the actual making of sub-contracts, it is in law the act of the owner hypothecating his own estate to the extent of the price of such'labor.” There is no doubt of the constitutionality of the law.
The decree of the district court is right, and it is aeeirmed.