61 Misc. 2d 142 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1969
The trial of these actions against the City of Buffalo for false arrest, false imprisonment and assault and battery and against WBEN, Inc., for libel and for damages pursuant to section 51 of the Civil Rights Law resulted in verdicts of no cause of action on all of the claims against the city, a dismissal by the court of the cause of action based on the Civil Rights Law and a verdict against WBEN, Inc., for $5,000 punitive damages in the libel action.
The defendant, WBEN, Inc., moves for an order setting aside the verdict and dismissing the complaint or, in the alternative, granting a new trial.
It is the defendant’s contention, inter alia, that since the jury awarded no actual or compensatory damages, the verdict for punitive damages only may not stand.
Defendant cites as authority for its position the statement in Kiff v. Youmans (86 N. Y. 324, 331 [1881]) that exemplary damages when given 1 ‘ are superadded ’ ’ to actual damages and that “ one who by reason of his fault ” cannot have actual .damages “ must be destitute of any legal right to” exemplary
The court has not found, nor has its attention been directed to, any case in this State in which it has been held that in an action for libel, actual damages must be awarded as a predicate for an award of punitive damages.
The cases in this State which hold, or seem to hold, that there can be no award of punitive damages without an award of actual damages involve cases of fraud, false imprisonment and assault, none of which are bottomed on the legal philosophy which justifies punitive damages in a libel case. That philosophy was stated in 1896 in Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle (16 Misc. 186, 190) where the court said that “ A person may be of such high character that the grossest libel would damage him none; but that would be no reason for withdrawing his case from the wholesome, if not necessary, rule in respect of punitive damages.” In Reynolds v. Pegler (123 F. Supp. 36, 37-38, affd. 223 F. 2d 429, cert." den. 350 U. S. 846) the principle enunciated in Prince (supra) was restated. The court rejected defendant’s contention that the “ giving of punitive damages is dependent upon, and must bear relationship to, the allowance of actual damages ’ ’ stating that1 ‘ the applicable law is to the contrary ’ ’ and that “ It has long been the law of New York * * * that the jury may award substantial exemplary damages even though no financial injury has been suffered.” (Cf. Udell v. Josephson, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 866.) To adopt a contrary view “ would mean that a defamer gains a measure of immunity no matter how venomous or malicious his attack simply because of the excellent reputation of the defamed; it would mean that the defamer, motivated by actual malice, becomes the beneficiary of that unassailable reputation and so escapes punishment. * * * The doctrine advanced by the defendants would nullify one of the underlying objectives of punitive damages and has consistently been rejected by New York and federal authorities, although recognized in a few states. * * * Punitive or exemplary damages are intended to act as a deterrent upon the libelor so that he will not repeat the offense, and to serve as
Since it is the mere performance of the libelous act and not its consequences that warrant punitive damages why should any finding of actual damages be necessary? It has been repeatedly held that an award of nominal compensatory damages will sustain substantial verdicts for punitive damages. (Cf. Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, supra [$1. compensatory, $175,-000 punitive damages].) Is it not pure sophistry to say in one breath that punitive damages are not dependent upon and need bear no relationship to actual damages and in the next breath, require that at least nominal damages be awarded, (not necessarily found) before an award of punitive damages may stand? Is not a finding of 64 or $1 compensatory damages, in fact and in truth, a finding of no actual damages ? If such a legal fiction exists, it should be abandoned and the philosophy of Prince, Reynolds and Toomey (supra) should be taken at its plain word that punishment of the libel er not actual damage to the defamed, is the sole foundation for punitive damages. It is what is said, not what is suffered, that warrants punitive damages and a jury should not be required to find what does not exist before it may award punitive damages to an otherwise undamaged defamed person.
Just as a person who stands at the zenith of public trust and esteem, unassailable in character and position, may suffer no actual damage by a libel so may a person who is obscure, unknown and of low estate and perhaps at the nadir of his fortunes suffer no actual damage from a libel. The latter person, however, like the former, may recover punitive damages without having suffered actual damages. To hold otherwise would permit the defamer to select and defame persons of the latter type or any person unlikely to suffer actual damage by a libel, without fear of monetary punishment.
On these facts the telecast by the defendant at 11:00 p.m. on the day of the incident, 2% to 3 hours after the plaintiff’s release and again at noon the following day without an exculpating change of script or picture destroyed whatever privilege, qualified or otherwise, defendant had as a public disseminator of news. The defendant had ample opportunity both in time and sources of inquiry to correct or explain the damaging implications of the combination of the picture and accompanying audio script. As plaintiff’s, counsel acknowledged in his summation, there was no proof of actual malice on the part of the defendant but legal malice may be created by wanton and reckless conduct. On that premise there is ample support for the jury’s verdict.
Defendant further contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence citing in support of that contention the no cause verdicts in favor of the city. That plaintiff’s actions against the city for false arrest, false imprisonment and assault required a totally different type of proof, involved a completely different set of facts, different witnesses, different principles of law and entirely different requirements for plaintiff’s success seems too obvious to require comment. Much of the plaintiff’s direct case against the defendant, WBEN, Inc., was based on the testimony of the employees of WBEN, Inc. The court agrees, as argued by defendant, that their testimony was “ clear, convincing and completely believeable.” The difficulty from defendant’s point of view is that the very same ‘ ‘ believeable ’ ’ testimony taken collectively also indicated such wanton and reckless actions on the part of the defendant’s employees as to justify both the finding of legal malice and a verdict predicated thereon.
The defendant WBEN, Inc. ’s motion is in all respects denied.