Plaintiff, Kent Furnish, brought a suit against his ex-employer, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Defendant, SVI Systems, terminated plaintiffs employment on July 25, 1996, for the stated reason of “unsatisfactory work performance.” Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because he suffered from cirrhosis caused by chronic Hepatitis B. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on the grounds that plaintiff failed to show that he was disabled under the ADA. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled, and therefore affirm.
I. History
Defendant SVI Systems (“SVI”), based in Peoria, Illinois, provides real time video services to hotels and motels in the eastern and midwestern portions of the United States. SVI salespeople enter into contracts with individual hotels and motels, and then SVI technicians go onsite to install the equipment in the facility. After installation, SVI monitors the equipment from its offices in Peoria.
In January, 1995, plaintiff accepted a position with SVI as Director of Technical Operations. Plaintiff was 44 years old with 23 years’ experience in the cable television and transmission systems industry and had a degree in electrical engineering. Plaintiff was responsible for pre-installation technical work and for installing SVI’s video systems in hotels. Plaintiff was also responsible for hiring and training new installers. In September, 1995, Eric Goldberg, plaintiffs supervisor, gave plaintiff a favorable job performance review. *447 Goldberg further recommended that plaintiff receive a 4% raise, rather than the 3% raise that most employees received.
On August 29, 1995, gastroenterologist Dr. Ben Dolin diagnosed plaintiff with chronic Hepatitis B. Dr. Dolin later took a biopsy of plaintiffs liver, and, on January 9, 1996, a pathologist analyzed the tissue sample and concluded that plaintiff suffered from chronic Hepatitis B and severe septal fibrosis suggestive of liver disease. Hepatitis B damages liver cells so that there are fewer cells to perform the liver’s detoxification function and to produce glucose. Fibrosis is liver scarring, which affects the liver’s ability to perform its blood filtering function.
On January 26, 1996, plaintiff began treating his disease with the drug Interferon. The Interferon treatment caused plaintiff to experience flu-like symptoms such as fatigue, nausea, and achiness. By May, 1996, Dr. Dolin concluded that the Interferon treatment was not working and referred plaintiff to the University of Iowa Medical School for treatment. On June 17, 1996, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Douglas LaBreque, a professor of Internal Medicine and Director of Liver Services at the University of Iowa Medical School. Blood tests taken by Dr. LaBreque that day detected liver enzymes that indicated that plaintiff’s liver was functioning normally. Dr. LaBreque testified at his deposition that as of June, 1996, plaintiffs liver functioning was “adequate,” meaning that he had enough normal liver cells “to do the job.” Dr. LaBreque placed plaintiff on an experimental drug called Lamivudae, and by December, 1997, plaintiffs liver disease was dormant.
In January, 1996, soon after he was diagnosed with Hepatitis B, plaintiff met with his new supervisor, Don Decker, and with Beth Salmon, SVT’s president. Plaintiff informed them about his disease and warned them that in the coming months, he may suffer from a failure to sleep, nausea, mood swings, and irritability because of the disease and its treatment. He also explained to them that these same symptoms may require him to miss some work. Soon thereafter, plaintiffs wife, a registered nurse, also informed Salmon that plaintiff may need to miss some work in the future because of his flu-like symptoms and because of doctor appointments. She also told Salmon that she was worried that plaintiff would be unable to travel. At his deposition, however, Dr. LaBreque testified that plaintiff was not under any work or travel restrictions.
In March, 1996, after plaintiff told his supervisor that his health prevented him from traveling to locations far from Peoria in order to complete installations, Decker responded that plaintiff was to do whatever was necessary to complete the jobs. That same month, Decker reprimanded plaintiff for missing a scheduled meeting with an installer. Plaintiff claimed that he missed the meeting because he had vomited and had to go home to rest.
When Decker became plaintiffs supervisor in January, 1996, SVI had hundreds of outstanding installations that needed completion. In order to complete these installations, Decker wanted the installers to complete twelve installations per week. By June 1, 1996, plaintiff had fallen behind on these installations, and, by that time, SVI had contracted with hundreds of additional properties for installations. Because he had fallen behind on these installations, on July 1, 1996, plaintiff was directed to focus solely on pre-installation technical work and was relieved of his duties with respect to installations.
Plaintiff was fired on July 25, 1996. Decker prepared a memorandum memorializing the reasons for plaintiffs discharge, stating that he was being fired for “unsatisfactory work performance.” This memorandum listed problems with plaintiffs *448 work performance including: frequent installation failures, failure to reprimand employees or establish controls that would make them accountable, and plaintiffs weak communication skills and lack of organization. Further, the memorandum gave three rationales for plaintiffs termination: 1) plaintiffs current responsibilities did not justify his salary; 2) there were no additional responsibilities that plaintiff had shown an ability to assume; and 3) defendant was not willing to offer plaintiff a reduced salary that matched the duties he was performing. At that time there were still properties that awaited technical attention from plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted that he did not meet Decker’s new installation goals, but claimed that the goals were unreasonable, and that his failure to meet the goals resulted from incorrect advance work done by others and from misinformation concerning the installation sites.
On December 18, 1996, plaintiff brought a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of a disability. 1 He brought suit under the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in employment of a “qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). On May 17, 1999, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of SVI. The order concluded that plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA because his disease did not substantially limit a major life activity.
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment
de novo,
viewing all of the facts, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party.
See Cent. States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. White,
B. Was Plaintiff a “Qualified Individual uñth a Disability?”
The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position....”
Id.
§ 12111(8). Further, a “disability” means “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.”
2
Id.
§ 12102(2)(A). Thus, to prevail on his ADA claim, plaintiff must show that (1) he is “disabled”; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.
See Moore
*449
v. J.B. Hunt Tramp., Inc.,
The Supreme Court has devised a three part test for determining whether a plaintiff is “disabled” under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), thereby satisfying the first prong of an ADA discrimination claim.
See Bragdon v. Abbott,
Plaintiff suffers from cirrhosis caused by chronic Hepatitis B. Dr. Dolin testified at his deposition that cirrhosis “is significant scarring [of the liver] to the point where it compromises the liver.” This reduced liver functioning affects the ability of plaintiffs body to eliminate toxins and maintain appropriate glucose levels. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff suffered from a physical impairment.
See, e.g., Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
Plaintiffs ADA claim fails, however, because his alleged major life activity is not a major life activity under the ADA. On appeal, plaintiff alleges that his Hepatitis B impairment affected the major life activity of “liver function.” The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regulations interpreting the ADA (“ADA regulations”) describe major life activities as activities such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2®. While this list is intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive,
see Sinkler v. Midivest Property Management Limited Partnership,
The Supreme Court’s decision in
Brag-don,
This court has interpreted
Bragdon
to mean that a major life activity is something that is “integral to one’s daily existence.”
Lawson,
Plaintiffs argument misses that essential link. He argues that Hepatitis B should be a disability because it is a chronic illness that affects the functioning of a major organ. However, under the ADA, even a serious illness such as Hepatitis B does not equate with a disability. Only when the impact of the illness substantially limits a major life activity — such as working — is an individual considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
Plaintiff, however, has never asserted “working” — or any other activity — as being substantially limited. Liver function is the only alleged “major life activity” that this court can consider, as it was the only one articulated by plaintiff.
See Bragdon,
Even if liver function- served as a major life activity under the ADA, plaintiffs claim would fail because he cannot prove that his disease “substantially limited” the functioning of his liver. The ADA regulations state that a person is “substantially limited” by an impairment if that person is either “ ‘[ujnable to perform a major life activity’ or is ‘significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration’ under which the individual can perform the major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population.”
Skorup,
The record reveals that plaintiffs liver function was not substantially limited. To summarize plaintiffs relevant medical history, Dr. Dolin prescribed Interferon treatment in January, 1996, but by May, 1996, Dr. Dolin concluded that the treatment was not working. In June, 1996, he referred plaintiff to Dr. LaBreque, who concluded that plaintiffs liver function was “adequate.” Although plaintiff suffered from some fatigue due to his disease, Dr. LaBreque placed no work or travel restrictions on plaintiff. In fact, plaintiff only missed 12 hours of work during the entire year in 1996, and there was no evidence demonstrating that plaintiff ever suffered from restrictions on his ability to care for himself or perform manual tasks. 3 Dr. LaBreque placed plaintiff on the drug La-mivudae, and by June, 1997, tests revealed that plaintiffs liver function was “absolutely normal.” Plaintiff ceased taking Lami-vudae in December, 1997, at which time his virus was completely dormant.
Looking at the three factors' — 'the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration, and the long-term effects — it is clear that plaintiffs disease did not substantially limit his liver function. In evaluating the effect of plaintiffs impairment on his liver function, “we must examine the plaintiffs condition as it exist[ed] after corrective or mitigating measures used to combat the impairment” were taken.
Lawson,
III. Conclusion
Because of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the grounds that plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA.
Notes
. Plaintiff also alleged violations of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act ("ERISA’'). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(b). However, the alleged ERISA violations are not at issue on this appeal.
. The ADA also defines "disabled” as "a record of such impairment” or "being regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B) and (C). On appeal, plaintiff relies solely on the definition under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) as the basis for his ADA claim.
. It should be noted, once again, that plaintiff never asserted "working" as his major life activity.