136 Ga. 857 | Ga. | 1911
The firm of Kent & Downs filed a petition against the Wadley Southern Kailway Company, to recover, the value of 25,000 feet of lumber, which the plaintiffs alleged they were unable to deliver to a customer, because of the failure and refusal of the railway company to furnish cars for its transportation. It was alleged that the plaintiffs, on January 10, 1907, offered the lumber for shipment at Kite, Ga., which is one of the places on the defendant’s line of road at which it receives such goods for shipment; that the same was to be carried to Wadley, Ga., which is the terminus of said railway, and there to be delivered to a connecting carrier to be carried to Michigan Citjq Indiana,.for delivery to the HaskellBarker 'Car Company; that the plaintiffs requested the railway company to place at Kite two 40-foot cars on which to load the lumber, such ears being the ordinary and usual cars in carrying lumber of the dimensions offered; that the defendant company failed and refused to furnish the cars and refused to accept the lumber; that the Haskell-Barker Car Company were to pay $18.50 per thousand feet for the lumber, but, owing to the failure of the railway company to furnish cars for its transportation, the car companjq on May 10, 1907, canceled its order ; and that the plaintiffs being unable to use or sell the lumber, it became a total loss. On the trial, at the conclusion of the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiffs, the court granted a nonsuit; and the plaintiffs excepted.
The plaintiffs were not entitled to recover in this ease without proof of the execution' of the letters from Daugherty, Morrison & Co., which contained the orders for the lumber to be shipped to Haskell-Barker Car Co. The basis of their action was their inability to fill these orders or delay in filling them, which it is alleged. resulted from a failure of the defendant railway to furnish cars on which to transport the lumber. It is true that in the record there appears a general statement by a member of the plaintiffs’ firm, that “he had a verbal order for this lumber,” but the terms of the verbal order and from whom it came were unstated; and-besides, as remarked above, the suit was predicated upon certain definite, precise orders for a certain number of pieces of lumber of specific dimensions. When the letters referred to above, which
Judgment affirmed.