Kennett v. ChambersKennett v. Chambers
'delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from the decree o,f the District Court- of the United States for the District of Texas.
The contract, after stating that it was entered into on the day and year above mentioned, between General T. Jefferson Cham: bers, of the Texan army, of the first part, and Morgan Neville and six others, who are named in the agreement, of the city of Cincinnati, of the second part, proceeds to recite the motives and inducements of the parties in the following words: —
“ That the said party of the second ,part, being desirous of assisting the said General T. Jefferson Chambers, who is now engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas, and who is in want of means therefor; and, being, extremely desirous to advance the cause of freedom and the independence of Texas, have agreed to purchase of the said T. Jefferson Chambers, of his private estate, the lands hereinafter described.”
And after this recital follows the agreement of Chambers, to sell and convey to. them the land described in the agreement, situated in Texas, for- the sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars, which he acknowledged that he had received in their notes, payable in -equal instalments of four, six, and twelve months, and he covenanted that he had a good title to this land, and would convey it with general warranty. There are other stipulations, on the part of Chambers, to secure the title to the parties, which it is unnecessary to state, as they are not material to the questions before the court.
After setting out the contract at large, the bill avers, that the notes given, as aforesaid, were all paid.; and sets forth the manner in which the сomplainants, who' were not parties to the original contract, had acquired their interest as assignees; and charges that, notwithstanding the full payment of the money, Chambers, under different pretexts, refuses to convey the land, according to the terms of his agreement.
It further states, that they are informed and believe that.he received full compensation, in money, scrip, land, or other valuable propеrty, for the supplies furnished by him, and in arming and equipping the Texan army referred to in the said contract, and which it was in part the object of the said parties of the second part to assist .him to do, by the said advances made by them-, as before stated, and -which said advances did.enable the said Chambers so to do.
The District Court decided that the contract was illegal and .void, and sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill; and we think that the decision was Ught.
The validity of this contract deoends upon the relation in which this country then stood to Mexico and Texas; and the duties which these relations imposed upon the governxnent and citizens of thе United States.
Texas had declared itself independent , a few months previous to this agreement. But it had not been acknowledged by the United States ; and the constituted authorities charged with our foreign relations, regarded the-treaties we had made with Mexico-as still in full force, and' obligatory upon both nations. By the treaty of .limits, Texas had been- admitted by our .government to be a part of the Mexican territory; and by the first article'of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, it was declared, “ that there should be a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship betwéeh the United States of America and the United Mexican States, in all the extent- of thgir possessions and territories, and between their people and citizens respectively, without distinction of persons or place.” These treаties, while they remained in force, were, by the Constitution of the United' States, the supreme law, and binding not Only upon the government, but upon ¿very citizen. No contract could lawfully be made in violation of their provisions.
Undoubtedly, when Texas had achieved her independence, no previous treaty could bind this country to regard it as a part of the Mexican territory. But it belonged to ’the government, and not to individual citizens, to dеcide when that event had taken place. And that decision, according-to the laws of nations, depended upon the question whether she had or had not a civil government in successful, operation; capable of performing the duties arid fulfilling the obligations of an independent power. It depended upon the state of the fact, and not upon the right which was in contest- between the parties. And the
Acting upon these principles, the independence of Texas was not acknowledged by the. Government of the United States until the beginning of March, 1837. Up to that time, it was regarded as a part of the territory of Mexico. The treaty which admitted it to be. so, was held to' be still in force and binding on both' parties, and every effort made by the government to fulfil its neutral obligations, and prevent our citizens from taking part in the conflict. This is evident, from an official-communication from the President to the Governor of Tennessee, in reply to an inquiry in relation to a requisition for militia, made by General Gaines. The despatch is dated in August, 1836; and the President uses the following language: “ The obligations of our treaty with Mexico, as well as the general principles which govern our intercourse with foreign powers, require us to maintain a strict neutrality in the contest which now agitates a part of that republic. So long as Mexico fulfils her duties to us, as they are defined by the treaty, and violates none of the rights which are secured by it to our citizens, any act on the part of the Government of the United States, which would tend to foster a spirit of resistance to her government and laws, whatever may be their character or form, when, administered within her own limits and jurisdiction, would be unauthorized and highly improper. Ex. Doc. 1836, 1837, Yol. 1, Doc. 2, p. 58.
And on the .very day on which the agreement of which we are speaking, was made,-(September 16, 1836,) Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, in a note to‘the Mexican'Minister, assured him that the -government had taken measures to secure the execution df the laws fоr preserving the ^neutrality of the United States, and that the public officers were vigilant in the. discharge of that duty. Ex Doc. Vol. 1, -Doc. 2, page 63-64.
And still later, the President, in his message to the Senate- of December'22, 1836, before referred to, says : “ The acknowledgment of a new- State as independent, and entitled to' a place in the family of nations, is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility; but more especially so when such a State has
“ It is true, with regard to Texas, the civil authority of Mexico has -been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly organized Government of Texas annihilated within its confines. But, on the other hand, there is,, in appearance at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Mexico. The Mexican republic, under another executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader, and menacing a fresh .invasion to recover its lost dominion. Upon the issue of .this threatened invasion, the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended; and, were there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our aсknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis would scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have heretofore held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions.”
The whole object of this message appears to have been-to impress upon Congress the impropriety of acknowledging the independence of Texas at that time; and the more especially as the American character of her population, and her known desire to become a State of this Union, might, if prematurely acknowledged, bring suspicion upon the motives bv which we were governed.
We have given these extracts from the public documents not only to show that, in the judgment of our 'government, Texas had not established its independence when this contract was made, but to show also how anxiously the constituted authorities were endeavoring to maintain untarnished the honor of the country, and to place it above the suspicion of taking any part in the conflict.
This being the attitude in which the government stood, and this its open and avowed policy, upon what grounds can the parties to such a contract as this, come into a court of justice .of the United States and ask for its specific execution ?• It wаs made in direct opposition to the policy of the government, to which it was the duty of every citizen to conform. And, while they saw it. exerting all its power to fulfil in good faith its neutral obligations, they made themselves parties to the war; by
It might indeed fairly be inferred, from the language of the Contract and the statements in the appellants’ bill, that the volunteers were to be raised, armed, and equipped within the limits of the United States. The language of the contract is : “ That the said party of the second part, (that is the complainants,) being desirous of assisting the said General T. Jefferson Chambers, who is now engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas, and is in want of means therefor.” And as General Chambers was then in the United States, аnd was, as the contract states, actually engaged at that time in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers, and was in want of means to accomplish his object, the inference would seem to be almost irresistible that these preparations were making at or near the place where the agreement was made,-and that the money was advanced to enable him to raise and equip a military force in the United States. And this inference is the stronger, because no place is mentioned where these preparations are to be made, and the agreement contains no engagement on his part, or proviso on theirs, which prohibited him from using these means and making these military preparations within the limits of the United States.
If this be the correct interpretation of the agreement, the contract is not only void, but the parties who advanced .the money were liable to be punished in a criminal prosecution, for a violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. And certainly, with such strong indications of a criminal intent, and without any averment in the bill from which their innocence can be inferred, a court of chancery would never lend its aid to carry.the agreement into specific-execution, but would leave the partiеs to seek their remedy at law. And this ground would of itself be sufficient to justify the decree of the District Court dismissing the bill.
But the decision stands on broader and firmer ground, and this agreement cannot be sustained either at law or in equity. The question is not whether the parties to this contract violated the neutrality laws of the United States or subjected themselves to a-criminal prosecution; but whether such a contract, made at that time, within the United States, for the purposes stated in the contract find the bill of complaint, was a legal. and valid contract, and such as to entitle either party to the aid of the courts of justice of the United States to enforce its execution..
The intercourse of this country with foreign nations, and its policy in regard to them, aré placed by the Constitution of the
But it has been urged in the argument that Texas was in fact independent, and a sovereign state at the time of this agreement; and that the citizen of á neutral nation may lawfully lend money to one that is engaged in war, to enable it to carry on hostilities against its enemy.
' It is not necessary, in the case before us, to deсide how far the' judicial tribunals of the United States would enforce a contract like this, when-two -states, acknowledged to be independent, were at war, and this country neutral. . It is a sufficient answer to the argument to say that the question whether Texas had or
This is not a new question. It came before the court in the case of Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. 272, and again iñ Hoyt
v.
Gelston,
It-was upon this ground that the Court of Common Pleas in England, in the case of De Wutz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore’s C. B. Reports, 586, decided that it was contrary to the law of nations for persons residing in England to enter intp engagements to raise money by -way of lоan for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign state in arms against a government in friendship with England, and that no right of action attached upon any such contract. And this decision is quoted with approbation by Chancellor Kent, in 1 Kent’s Com. 116.
Nor can the subsequent acknowledgment of the independence of Texas, and her admission into the Union as a sovereign State, affect the question. The agreement being illegal and absolutely void at the time it was made, it can-derive' no force-or validity from events which afterwards happened.
But it is insisted, on the part of the appellants, that this contract was to be executed in Texas, and was valid by the laws of Texas, and that the District Court for that State, in a controversy between individuals, was bound to administer the laws of the State, and ought therefore to have enforced this agreement.
This argument is founded in part on a mistake of the fact. The contract was not only made in Cincinnati, but all the stipulations on the part of the appellants were to be performed there and not. in Texas. And the advance of money .which they
But' had the fact been otherwise, certainly no law of Texas then or now in force could absolve a citizen of the United States, while he continued such, from his duty to this government, nor compel a court of the United States to support a contract, no matter where made or where to be- executed, if that contract was in violation of their laws, or contravened the public policy of the government, or was in conflict with subsisting treaties with a foreign nation.
We therefore hold this contract to be illegal and void, and ■ affirm the decree of the District Court.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs.