Kenneth M. Spires v. Haley Reece SimpsonKenneth M. Spires v. Haley Reece Simpson
HOLLY KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, SHARON G. LEE, and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined.
OPINION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Charity Felicia Spires and Plaintiff/Appellee Kenneth M. Spires married and had one child born during the marriage, a son named Uriah (born in March 2009). In April 2009, a month after Uriah was born, Mr. Spires abandoned Mrs. Spires and the child. Though Mr. and Mrs. Spires did not divorce, Mr. Spires never returned to the marital home. He did not contribute to the financial support of either his wife or his son, Uriah.
In October 2010, when Uriah was about eighteen months old, Mrs. Spires died in a tragic automobile accident involving seventeen-year-old Defendant Haley Reece Simpson. The next month, in November 2010, the Juvenile Court of Monroe County awarded custody of Uriah to his maternal grandmother, Constance Ogle. Ms. Ogle also qualified as administrator of the estate of Mrs. Spires.
On November 18, 2010, Mr. Spires filed this wrongful death lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Tennessee, against Ms. Simpson and her parents, alleging that their negligence resulted in the death of Mrs. Spires (hereinafter “Decedent“). Mr. Spires
Over a year later, in March 2012, Ms. Ogle sought to intervene in the wrongful death lawsuit by filing a “Motion to Intervene, to Appoint Guardian, to Dismiss Plaintiff[,] and to Substitute New Plaintiff.” In the motion, Ms. Ogle asserted that she should be appointed Uriah‘s guardian for purposes of the lawsuit and that she should be substituted as the representative plaintiff in Mr. Spires’ stead. Ms. Ogle acknowledged Mr. Spires was the Decedent‘s surviving spouse. She argued, however, that he was disqualified from prosecuting the wrongful death lawsuit in his individual capacity and from recovering any proceeds in the lawsuit because he had failed to contribute any support for Uriah and because he owed child support arrearages to four other mothers for four other children. Ms. Ogle also alleged that Mr. Spires should be disqualified based on his abandonment of the Decedent.
In August 2012, while Ms. Ogle‘s motion to intervene in the wrongful death lawsuit was still pending, the Chancery Court of Blount County, Tennessee, entered an order of adoption, permitting the Decedent‘s brother, Captain (now Major) Dana Trent Hensley, Jr., M.D., to adopt Uriah. The adoption order terminated Mr. Spires’ parental rights as to Uriah based on abandonment for failure to visit or support Uriah during the four-month period preceding the termination petition.1 See
In November 2013, even though the trial court had not yet entered an order on Ms. Ogle‘s motion to intervene, Mr. Spires filed a motion asking the trial court to dismiss her from the wrongful death lawsuit for failure to prosecute. Mr. Spires’ motion asserted that he had agreed with Ms. Ogle to allow her to join the lawsuit as a plaintiff to represent the Decedent and Uriah but that he would not agree to dismissal of his individual claim.2 He said in the motion that Ms. Ogle had since refused to correspond with him about moving forward with the lawsuit on those terms. Mr. Spires asked the trial court to dismiss Ms. Ogle from the lawsuit and allow it to proceed with him as the sole plaintiff.
In June 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing in the matter. At the hearing, counsel for the Simpson defendants announced that their insurance company, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers“), and all other parties had agreed to settle the matter for insurance policy limits of $100,000. Tennessee Farmers said it was prepared to tender the $100,000 to the trial court to be divided in any manner the court determined.3 The parties told the trial court they had agreed to accept the $100,000 settlement regardless of the outcome of the other issues pending before the court.
At the same hearing, Mr. Spires stipulated to an assertion in Ms. Ogle‘s initial motion to intervene—that he has four children (other than Uriah) by four other mothers unrelated to the Decedent. He further stipulated that he was under child support orders as to the other four children and owed child support arrearages in amounts totaling almost $72,000: $15,945; $27,590; $14,865; and $13,532.4 It was undisputed that there had never been a formal child support order requiring Mr. Spires to pay child support for Uriah, and in fact he had never paid any support for Uriah.
The intervenors argued at the hearing that Mr. Spires’ failure to support Uriah or satisfy the child support arrearages for his other four children disqualified him from prosecuting the wrongful death action under
In response, Mr. Spires argued that he, as the Decedent‘s surviving spouse, is entitled to prosecute the wrongful death action unless he waives his right or is statutorily disqualified from bringing suit. He argued that the wrongful death statutes in effect at the time of the Decedent‘s death did not preclude him from prosecuting the lawsuit, they only barred him from “recovering” any proceeds until he satisfied his child support obligations. See
On March 12, 2015, the trial court granted the intervenors’ motion; it dismissed Mr. Spires from the lawsuit and substituted Ms. Ogle and Major Hensley as plaintiffs on behalf of the Decedent and Uriah, respectively.6 The trial court agreed with the intervenors’ interpretation of the statutes and held that Mr. Spires was disqualified from either prosecuting the wrongful death lawsuit or recovering any of the settlement proceeds because he never contributed to Uriah‘s financial support and still “owe[d] substantial arrearages and court-ordered child support payments for his other children with other women.” The trial court held that Uriah was the proper party to recover for the wrongful death of his mother and that Major Hensley was the proper party to
The Court of Appeals reversed.8 Spires v. Simpson, No. E2015-00697-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1697832, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2016), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2016). It held that, although Section 20-5-107(b) prohibits a surviving spouse with outstanding child support debt from recovering in a wrongful death action until his child support obligations are satisfied, it does not disqualify the surviving spouse from commencing and maintaining a wrongful death action. Id. at *7. The appellate court also addressed newly enacted statutes that prohibit a surviving spouse from bringing a wrongful death action for the death of his spouse if the surviving spouse had abandoned the deceased spouse. The Court of Appeals held that those statutes were not applicable because they were not in effect at the time of the Decedent‘s death and were not intended to apply retroactively. Id. at *11. Because Mr. Spires was not statutorily disqualified from bringing the action, the Court of Appeals held that he was the proper plaintiff and that Mr. Spires and Uriah were each entitled to half of the settlement proceeds ($50,000 each) under the laws of intestate succession. Id.
The Court of Appeals then went further. Although it had held that Mr. Spires was entitled to half of the proceeds of the wrongful death lawsuit, the appellate court also determined that Mr. Spires could not recover any of those proceeds for his own benefit “until his child support obligations, plus applicable interest, are paid.” Id. (quoting
Mr. Spires filed a petition to rehear on the issue of his attorney fees. He argued that, because the Court of Appeals had held that he was entitled to prosecute the wrongful death action, he was entitled to recover his attorney fees from the proceeds of the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals denied the petition to rehear because Mr. Spires had not raised the issue of his attorney fees in his initial appeal, despite ample opportunity to do so.
We granted Major Hensley‘s application for permission to appeal.
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this appeal, Major Hensley argues that Mr. Spires is statutorily disqualified from maintaining this wrongful death lawsuit. In addition, regardless of the identity of the named plaintiff, Major Hensley contends that Mr. Spires is precluded from recovering any of the proceeds from the wrongful death lawsuit. In response, Mr. Spires argues that he is entitled to bring the wrongful death lawsuit for the death of the Decedent and that the statutes upon which the lower courts relied are not applicable in this case. Alternatively, Mr. Spires claims that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that he is entitled to half of the settlement proceeds, even if his share must go to pay his outstanding child support arrearages.
The issues on appeal in this case require the interpretation of statutes. Such issues present questions of law, subject to de novo review with no presumption of correctness in the lower courts’ decisions. Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 494-95 (Tenn. 2017); State v. Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tenn. 2002); Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998).
ANALYSIS
As background for our analysis, we will briefly review the statutory framework for wrongful death cases. Because wrongful death proceeds are distributed according to the laws of intestate succession, we review the relevant laws on intestate succession as well.
As we observed in Beard, “Tennessee‘s wrongful death statutes form a patchwork of sorts. ‘There are a number of wrongful death statutes which must be considered in pari materia.‘” Beard, 528 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Gilliam ex rel. Gilliam v. Calcott, Nos. E1999-02365-COA-R3-CV, 03A01-9904-CV-00133, 2000 WL 336503, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2000)). Under our statutory scheme, a person‘s right of action for negligence does not abate upon his death. “[T]he right of action that the decedent would have had, but for death, is not extinguished but instead passes to the surviving spouse or, if there is no spouse, to the decedent‘s children or next of kin.” Id. at *498 (citing
The damages provision in the wrongful death statutes has been described as having a “split personality.” Id.; see
Under the wrongful death statutes, “the decedent‘s surviving spouse, if there is one, has ‘the prior and superior right above all others’ to file the wrongful death action and control the litigation.” Beard, 528 S.W.3d at 499 (quoting Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. 1991)). “Once the surviving spouse has asserted his or her right or priority, the statutes give to the surviving spouse complete ‘control over the right of action until he or she waives that right.‘” Id. (quoting Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197, 207 (Tenn. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even though the surviving spouse has the right to file the wrongful death lawsuit and to control it, the proceeds do not belong solely to the surviving spouse if the decedent had children. While the wrongful death statutes do not describe how the proceeds of a wrongful death action are to be distributed, Tennessee courts have consistently held that the proceeds are distributed according to the laws of intestate succession. Id. (citing Kline, 69 S.W.3d at 202 n.3; Foster, 813 S.W.2d at 452). Under our laws of intestate succession, if an intestate decedent leaves both a surviving spouse and children, the surviving spouse receives one-third of the decedent‘s estate or a child‘s share of the estate, whichever is greater.
B. Disqualification for Failure to Support
The parties in this case do not dispute that Mr. Spires is the Decedent‘s surviving spouse. All acknowledge that Mr. Spires would ordinarily have priority to file a wrongful death lawsuit based on the death of the Decedent and that he would ordinarily be entitled to share in the proceeds of the lawsuit.
In this appeal, however, Major Hensley argues that Mr. Spires is statutorily disqualified from bringing a lawsuit based on the wrongful death of the Decedent because he never paid financial support for Uriah and because he had outstanding child support arrearages for four other children unrelated to the Decedent. In support of this argument, Major Hensley relies primarily on Section 20-5-107(b),11 which provides:
(b) In no event shall a parent be permitted to recover through an action commenced pursuant to subsection (a) until all child support arrearages, together with interest on the child support arrearages, at the legal rate of interest computed from the date each payment was due, have been paid in full to the parent ordered to receive the support or to the parent‘s estate if deceased.
Major Hensley also argues that, regardless of the identity of the named plaintiff, Section 31-2-105(b) in the intestate succession statutes bars Mr. Spires from sharing in the proceeds of any wrongful death lawsuit based on the death of the Decedent:
(b) In no event is a parent permitted to inherit through intestate succession or under a will or trust or by contract until all child support arrearages together with any interest owed, at the legal rate of interest computed from the date each payment was due, have been paid in full to the parent ordered to receive support or to the parent‘s estate if deceased.
In response, Mr. Spires argues that the statutes quoted above are applicable only when the parent of a deceased child seeks to recover under the wrongful death statutes for the death of that child. In that context, he contends, the statutes apply only when the child support arrearage is owed for the decedent child, not for children unrelated to the decedent. Therefore, he argues, neither statute applies in this case.12 Alternatively, Mr. Spires argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in determining that he is not disqualified from prosecuting the suit, even if the proceeds that otherwise would have gone to him must go toward his outstanding child support obligations.
We see the pivotal issue as whether Section 20-5-107(b) and Section 31-2-105(b) should be interpreted to apply to disqualify a person who is a “parent” and owes a child support arrearage from prosecuting or recovering from a wrongful death lawsuit either (1) without regard to how the person is related to the decedent and without regard to the identity of the child for whom the arrearage is owed, as argued by Major Hensley, or (2) only where the person is a parent of the decedent child and the child support arrearage is owed for that decedent child, as argued by Mr. Spires.
With the issue so framed, we proceed to consider these statutes under our principles of statutory construction. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to effectuate legislative intent, with all rules of construction being aides [sic] to that end.” Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311; see Beard, 528 S.W.3d at 496. We examine “the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment.” State v. Collins, 166 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tenn. 2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘We must seek a reasonable construction in light of the purposes, objectives, and spirit of the statute based on good sound reasoning.‘” Beard, 528 S.W.3d at 496 (quoting Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tenn. 2001)).
A review of the entirety of Tennessee‘s wrongful death statutes reveals that, in describing a person‘s rights and remedies, all of them use terminology denoting how that person is related to the decedent. For example, we have explained that Section 20-5-106 provides that the deceased person‘s right of action passes to “the person‘s surviving spouse,” meaning, of course, the decedent‘s surviving spouse.
Against that backdrop, we consider the issues in this appeal, namely, whether the term, “parent,” as used in Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) is limited to a parent of the decedent child and whether the child support arrearage referenced in Section 20-5-107(b) and Section 31-2-105(b) is limited to an arrearage in support for the decedent child, despite the fact that neither statute says so explicitly. We are mindful that we must construe these two statutes in the context of the entire framework of statutes that govern wrongful death actions:
Statutes that relate to the same subject matter or have a common purpose must be read in pari materia so as to give the intended effect to both. “[T]he construction of one such statute, if doubtful, may be aided by considering the words and legislative intent indicated by the language of another statute.” Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn.2010) (quoting Wilson v. Johnson Cnty., 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn.1994)). We seek to adopt the most “reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious operation of the laws.” Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997).
In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 552 (Tenn. 2015); see also Beard, 528 S.W.3d at 496.
In light of these principles, we conclude that Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) apply only to a “parent” of the decedent child and that the child support arrearage must be owed for the support of that decedent child. There are several reasons for this holding.
First, reading “parent” as being the parent of the decedent is consistent with other sections that describe a person‘s rights and remedies in terms of how they are related to
Second, this construction of “parent” aligns with the apparent purpose and function of the statutory framework for wrongful death cases. As we have mentioned, when a child dies (without a surviving spouse or issue), that child‘s parents have priority to file a wrongful death action (under Section 20-5-106(a)) and share equally in the proceeds of the action under the laws of intestate succession (under Section 31-2-105(b)(2)). With that understanding, it is logical to interpret the statutes at issue in this appeal as applying in situations in which a child has died, the parents are separated or divorced, and one parent owes the other parent child support for the decedent child. In this manner, the statutes are seen as intended to bar the obligor parent from benefitting monetarily from the wrongful death of a child whom he or she failed to financially support. Viewed in this context, it makes sense to infer legislative intent to require the obligor parent to satisfy his or her child support debt to the other parent before he or she will be permitted to benefit monetarily from the death of that child.
Third, “[w]e ‘must presume that the Legislature did not intend an absurdity and adopt, if possible, a reasonable construction which provides for a harmonious operation of the laws.‘” Martin v. Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 951 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn. 1997)). “[W]e will not apply a particular interpretation to a statute if that interpretation would yield an absurd result.” State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000). Respectfully, the interpretation urged by Major Hensley yields just such a result.
The facts in this case illustrate how Major Hensley‘s proposed interpretation leads down a statutory rabbit hole. He contends that both statutes should apply where, as here, the plaintiff in the wrongful death lawsuit is the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, the statutes upon which he relies are expressly limited to situations in which the wrongful death claimant has “child support arrearages.” Parents who are married to one another normally will not have a child support order in force between them as to their children,14 so the statutes by their terms cannot apply to a surviving spouse who did not financially support a child of the marriage but seeks to recover for the death of the decedent spouse. For parents who are not married to each other, there may be a child support order in place for their child, but the other parent in that circumstance is not
Moreover, Major Hensley‘s interpretation would not be limited to wrongful death plaintiffs who are the surviving spouse of the decedent spouse; it would apply to any wrongful death action in which the plaintiff happens to be a parent who owes child support.15 Thus, under this interpretation, where a plaintiff files a lawsuit to recover for the wrongful death of a remote relative such as a cousin or nephew, the statutes on which Major Hensley relies would arguably apply to preclude the plaintiff from recovering if he owes child support arrearages for a child completely unrelated to the decedent. This construes Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) to permit virtual strangers to the decedent to financially benefit from the decedent‘s death.16 This result, which is incongruent with the remedial scheme of the wrongful death statutes, is avoided by limiting the application of the statutes to circumstances in which the wrongful death claimant is a parent of the decedent child and the child support arrearage is owed for that decedent child. See Martin, 505 S.W.3d at 518 (noting that we should presume that the Legislature did not intend an absurdity when a reasonable construction exists).
Major Hensley argues on appeal that legislative history of the statutes supports his assertion that the legislature did not intend to limit Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) to situations in which the “parent” to which the statutes refer is the parent of the decedent. It does not. Respectfully, the legislative history shows clearly that the only circumstance contemplated by the legislature involves a parent who seeks to benefit financially, through either inheritance or a wrongful death action, from the death of a child for whom the claimant owes back child support.
Representative Givens’ bill underwent several revisions, accompanied by much discussion regarding its application and scope. The discussion reflects that, at all times, the purpose of the bill was to remedy the situation in which an estranged parent—one who failed to financially support his or her child—attempts to benefit financially from the death of that child, either through intestate succession or in a wrongful death action. In the March 28, 1994 House session, Representative Givens summarized the intent of his proposed bill: “[I]n a situation where a child dies, and actually there is money in an estate, the deadbeat parent, whether it be a mother or a father, cannot benefit until all child support is satisfied and is paid. And that, quite simply, is what this bill tries to do . . . .”17 Hearing on H.B. 1704 Before the House, 98th Gen. Assemb. (March 28, 1994) (statement of Rep. Ken Givens) (emphasis added). The Senate sponsor, Senator Danny
Thus, the legislative history does not support the interpretation of Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) urged by Major Hensley in this appeal. The legislative history indicates clearly that those statutes were viewed by the legislature as applying to situations in which the “parent” who owes child support is a parent of a decedent child, and the child support arrearage is due for the past support of that decedent child. It contains no indication that the legislature intended either statute to apply where, as here, the wrongful death claimant is the surviving spouse of a decedent spouse.
For all of these reasons, we hold that the term, “parent,” as used in Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b), is limited to a parent of the decedent child who owes a child support arrearage for the support of that decedent child.18 Therefore, the lower courts erred in applying those statutes to the facts presented in this case.19 Accordingly, the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed and vacated insofar as they applied Sections 20-5-107(b) and 31-2-105(b) to the instant case.20
C. Waiver Based On Abandonment of Spouse
In the alternative, Major Hensley argues that, by abandoning the Decedent, Mr. Spires waived his right to bring this wrongful death action for her death based on Tennessee Code Annotated sections 20-5-106(c), 107(e), and 110(c). All of these provisions were enacted at the same time, and each includes the following language:
(1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the right to institute and the right to collect any proceeds from a wrongful death action granted by this section to a surviving spouse shall be waived, if the children or next of kin establish the surviving spouse has abandoned the deceased spouse as described in § 36-4-101(a)(13) or otherwise willfully withdrawn for a period of two (2) years.
(2) If the period of two (2) years has passed since the time of abandonment or willful withdrawal then there is created a rebuttable presumption that the surviving spouse abandoned the deceased spouse for purposes of this section.
All of these statutes, enacted as part of the same bill, became effective on May 30, 2011, well after the Decedent‘s accident in October 2010. See Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the “right of action for the defendants’ alleged tortious conduct arose at the time of [the decedent‘s] injuries“). Therefore, they apply only if they were intended to have retroactive application.
The Court of Appeals held that these statutes could not apply retroactively because “the right to recover through a wrongful death settlement is a vested right that cannot constitutionally be affected by retroactive application of a statute.” Spires, 2016 WL 1697832, at *10 (citing Rogers, 807 S.W.2d at 244-45; Cliburn v. Sullivan, No. M2003-02563-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 292360, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005)).21 Consequently, it denied relief to Major Hensley based on these statutes.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 20-5-106(c)(1)(2), 107(e)(1)(2), and 110(c)(1)(2) cannot be applied retroactively in this case. We adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirm this portion of the Court of Appeals’ holding for the reasons stated in its opinion.
In sum, we hold that the prohibitions in Tennessee Code Annotated sections
The decision of the trial court is reversed and vacated; the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed and vacated in part, as set forth above, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are to be taxed to Appellant Major Dana Trent Hensley, Jr., and his surety, for which execution may issue, if necessary.
HOLLY KIRBY, JUSTICE
Notes
[A] parent who has intentionally refused or neglected to pay any support for a child for a two-year period, or for the life of the child, whichever is less, when subject to a court order requiring the payment of child support and who has intentionally refused or neglected to contact the child or exercise visitation during such period, shall not be permitted to recover through [a wrongful death] action. . . .
Hearing on H.B. 1704 Before the House, 98th Gen. Assemb. (March 28, 1994) (statement of Rep. Ken Givens).[S]ometime ago a young lady who was 18 years old had an accident, and sometime after the accident it was discovered that her estate would get an insurance settlement, and very soon after this discovery, a deadbeat parent (in this case, a father) came forward and asked for one half of the insurance proceeds. And according to Tennessee law, he was entitled to that insurance settlement, even though he had never provided any support to this child whatsoever. So, what this bill—what this amendment—seeks to do is to create a situation whereby, in a situation where a child dies, and actually there is money in an estate, the deadbeat parent, whether it be a mother or a father, cannot benefit until all child support is satisfied and is paid.