Kenneth L. Celestine appeals pro se from a final order entered in the District Court 1 for the Western District of Missouri. Celestine v. United States, No. 82-0128-CV-W-0 (W.D.Mo. Feb. 27, 1987). The district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate 2 finding in favor of the United States on his claim for battery and false imprisonment brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.
The facts are fully set forth in the district court’s memorandum opinion. In brief, in February 1982 appellant sought in-patient psychiatric care at the Veterans’ Administration (VA) Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri. He described himself to the staff as suicidal and assaultive. Appellant filled out admission papers and, while he was waiting for the staff psychiatrist to examine him, he became increasingly upset, hostile and argumentative. The nurse on duty summoned hospital security guards. The hospital security guards attempted to talk to appellant, but appellant became belligerent and physically violent. The hospital security guards placed appellant in restraints and detained him for about ninety minutes, under observation, until he could be examined by the staff psychiatrist. Following an examination, the staff psychiatrist diagnosed appellant as a paranoid schizophrenic in need of immediate psychiatric treatment and admitted him. Appellant voluntarily underwent treatment in the hospital for six days and then left the hospital against the advice of his treating psychiatrist.
Subsequently, appellant filed this FTCA complaint against the government, alleging battery and false imprisonment by the hospital security guards. The case was tried to the magistrate by the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Appellant was represented by appointed counsel. The magistrate found in favor of the government. The magistrate found that appellant was not a credible witness, no battery occurred, the hospital security guards used reasonable force in restraining appellant in order to prevent him from injuring himself or others, and, in light of appellant’s behavior, the hospital staff was justified in detaining appellant until he could be examined by a staff psychiatrist. Appellant appealed; the district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we hold that the VA hospital security guards are VA police officers under 38 U.S.C.A. § 218 (West Supp.1987) (former version at 38 U.S.C. § 218 (1982)), and as such, are “investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” within the meaning of the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Under the intentional tort exception, the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to any claim arising out of intentional torts, such as battery and false imprisonment, unless committed by
*853
“investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States government.”
Id.; see generally
Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil,
The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis,
54 N.C.L.Rev. 497 (1976). The intentional tort exception defines “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States government” as “officer[s] of the United States who [are] empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 218(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1987), VA employees who are YA police officers are empowered to make arrests for violation of federal law.
See, e.g., Caban v. United States,
We agree with the district court that the magistrate’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Government liability under the FTCA is determined by the law of the place where the tort occurred; here, Missouri law applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b);
see, e.g., Mandel v. United States,
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court on the basis of the district court’s memorandum opinion. 8th Cir.R. 14.