Aрpellant Kenneth Coker, Sr. appeals from the district court’s 3 decision in favor of appellees Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) and Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) on cross-motions for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I.
Coker was an insurance agent for Allstate for thirty years. As an Allstate employee, Coker was a рarticipant in the company’s employee welfare benefit plan, for which MetLife serves as the insurer and claims administrator. The Allstate plan was established and is administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Coker applied for long-term disability benefits on August 26, 1996. MetLife denied coverage because Coker failed to prove that hе was “totally disabled” to its satisfaction. The plan defines “totally disabled” as follows:
Totally Disabled or Total Disability means that due to Sickness or Injury: ! you are unable to perform the material duties of your occupation with your Employer during the Waiting Period and during the next 24 months; ! thereafter, you must be totally incapable due to Sickness or Injury of performing the material duties of аny gainful occupation for which you are reasonably fit based on training, education, or experience.
App. at 11.
Coker was diagnosed with diabetes mel-litus in 1985. Beginning in the spring of 1996, he reported several near-fainting, presyncopal episodes to his family physician, Dr. Stanley Teeter. Dr. Teeter referred Coker to a neurologist, Dr. ■ Scott Schlesinger, who suspected that the episodes might be a symptom of subclavian steal syndrome, a condition where blood that should flow to the brain is diverted to a limb. Dr. Schlesinger in turn referred Coker to a cardiologist, Dr. Andy Henry. Dr. Henry found no evidence of cardiac abnormality, other than “mild mitral valve prolapse.” Dr. Henry also assessed Coker for subclavian steal syndrome, based on Dr. Schlesinger’s suspicion, but сoncluded that the patient did not have the typical symptoms of that disorder. Dr. Henry’s tentative diagnosis was left subclavian stenosis (cut-off of blood flow) with asymptomatic reversal of flow in the left vertebral artery.
Following Coker’s application for long-term disability benefits in August 1996, he submitted a form and a letter from Dr. Tеeter outlining his condition. Dr. Teeter stated a primary diagnosis of “vascular headaches related to stress syndrome caused by his work situation and employer/employee relationships.” App. at 45. Dr. Teeter identified “insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus” as a secondary medical problem. Id. Dr. Teeter noted that Coker’s health had improved since May 15, 1996, when he begаn his medical leave, and expressed the opinion that Coker’s health would deteriorate if he returned to work. “It seems to me that it would be in his best interest to obtain a medical retirement or disability retirement at this time.” App. at 48.
At the request of MetLife, Coker met with a psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Sunder-mann, Jr., on October 11, 1996. Dr. Sun-dermann found no need for psychiatric treatment. The psychiatrist nоted that Coker’s “diabetes, proclivity for headache and sleep were severely adversely effected by the stress of his particular work situation and when working he suffered additional complications of insomnia, impaired concentration, and depressed mood.” App. at 69. Dr. Sundermann concurred with Dr. Teeter that Coker “was dibilitated [sic] by his medical conditiоn and other psychological [sic] while he was working and such in all probability would recur if he returned to this particular work situation.” Id.
MetLife referred Coker’s claim to its in-house Disability Nurse Specialist on November 4,1996. The referral indicated the opinion that no objective information supported Coker’s application for long-term disability benefits. The nurse agreed, and a MetLife letter of November 18, 1996 denied Coker’s claim. Coker promptly requested a review of the denial; MetLife responded on December 11, 1996 with a letter stating that a review was not warranted because Coker had not submitted any new information. That letter gave Coker thirty days to submit new information in support of his claim. On January 13, 1997, MetLife sent a second letter, granting Coker аn additional thirty days. Coker responded on January 14, 1997, with clinical notes from Dr. Teeter dating from May 1996 to December 1996. On January 21, 1997, MetLife referred Coker’s claim to an independent medical review company, Network Medical Review. Two physicians at National Medical Review, Dr. Paul Caulford and Dr. Robert Porter, respectively certified in family medicine and occuрational medicine, reviewed Coker’s medical records and concluded, in a report dated February 7,1997, that Coker “does not substantiate a claim for total disability.” App. at 107. On February 11,1997, MetLife denied Coker’s claim for long-term disability benefits.
II.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. See Riedl v. General American Life Ins. Co.,
The plaintiff raises five issues on appeal, alleging that: (1) the district court erred in applying
Fletcher-Merrit v. NorAm Energy Corp.,
A.
“A plan administrator’s discretionary decision is not unreasonable merely because the reviewing court disagrees with it. Because the plan administrator offered a reasonable explanation for its decision, it ‘should not be disturbed even if another reasonable, but different, interpretation may be made.... Because substantial evidence supported the plan administrator’s decision, the district court erred in its review for abuse of discretion.”
Fletcher,
The record reflects that the administrator gathered the medical records documenting plaintiffs claim, was the moving force in obtaining a psychiatric evaluation, received a review of the records and evаluation conducted by two physicians, and even sua sponte extended thetime to permit Coker to submit additional records after the deadline had passed without response. The analysis of the medical records by the two certified doctors contained in the report to MetLife addressed the tests performed, those results, the consultations, the evaluations, the diagnoses and the oрinions as to objective medical evidence in light of the plan’s definitions.... While plaintiff might point to certain date discrepancies in the report that resulted due to the left margin of the copies of the medical records [sic], the Court simply cannot say that a reasonable person could not have reached the same interpretation or decision as the plan administrator based on objective medical evidence.
Order at 22.
Coker argues that Fletcher was misapplied because the medical facts underlying his claim are substantially different than the claimant in Fletcher. However, the district court relied on Fletcher only to recite the appropriate standard for review of an ERISA plan administrator’s denial of long-term disability benefits, without drawing any comparisons between the two plaintiffs to resolve the substantive question of Coker’s entitlement to disability benefits. There is no error here.
B.
Coker argues that MetLife’s denial of benefits is unreasonable because Administrative Law Judge Francis Mayhue found that the appellant “meets the disability insured status requirement of the Social Security Act” on the basis of disabling pain. App. at 130-131. Although plaintiff acknowledges that Judge May-hue’s decision has no
res judicata
or other controlling effect, he claims the similarity between the Social Security Administration’s definition of disability and MetLife’s definition of disability highlights the irrationality of MetLife’s decision to deny benefits. The determination that Coker suffers from a pain-based disability under Social Security regulations does not require MetLife to reach the same conclusion.
See Schatz v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
Additionally, this Circuit’s decision in
Polaski v. Heckler,
C.
Appellant contends that MetLife’s dеnial of benefits is not supported by substantial evidence. Coker points to the conclusions of Dr. Teeter, his treating physician, the conclusions of Dr. Sundermann, a board certified psychiatrist, and the findings of Dr. Henry, a board certified cardiologist, as evidence of his disability. According to appellant, the record indicates he suffers from diabetes and syncopal eрisodes.
MetLife’s reviewing physicians, Drs. Caulford and Porter, agree that Coker is an insulin-dependent diabetic, but MetLife found nothing in the record to indicate that Coker’s diabetes renders him unable to perform the material duties of his job or any other occupation. As for Coker’s vascular headaches and blackouts, tentatively
D.
As an extension of his argument that the denial of benefits is not based on substantial evidence, appellant claims Met-Life abused its discretion in utilizing reviewing physicians who employed medical records rather than a physical examination to determine that hе was ineligible for long-term disability benefits. Plaintiff relies on our earlier decision in
Donaho v. FMC Corp.,
However, our holding in
Donaho
does not lead to a conclusion that MetLife abused its discretion here. Where there is a conflict of opinion between a claimant’s treating physicians and the plan administrator’s reviewing physicians, the plan administrator has discretion to find that the employee is not disabled unless “the administrative decision lacks support in the record, or ... the evidence in support of the decision does not ring true and is ... overwhelmed by contrary evidence.”
Donaho,
E.
Appellant’s final argument is that the reviewing physicians misconstrued his medical records and history. He points to
Woo
is not pаrticularly helpful to plaintiff, because the plan administrator’s decision in that case was reviewed under a more exacting standard than mere abuse of discretion.
See
MetLife is also able to explain satisfactorily the factual errors alleged by Coker. Although the report incorrectly gives a date for the onset of Coker’s diabetes in one instance, the correct date is noted еlsewhere in the report. As the district court observed, the erroneous dates cited in the report are the result of poor quality photocopies, rather than medical carelessness by the reviewing physicians. See Order at 22. The report’s summary of Nurse Buchanan’s examination notes state that appellant “[c]omplains of difficulty controlling his blood sugars.” App. аt 96. Her original notes are not in the record on appeal, making it impossible for us to determine whether that summary description is accurate. In any event, the reason for Coker’s visits is clearly not central to the reviewing physicians’ conclusion. The report offers a clear explanation why the reviewing physicians declined to diagnose Coker as insulin-dependent: “According to the documentation, Mr. Coker is actually a Type II diabetic, who was switched to insulin in an effort to obtain better control of blood sugars, rather than because his status had changed from Type II to Type I [insulin-dependent].” App. at 100 (brackets added). A review of the substance of the report shows that the reviewing doctors considered all of the mеdical records appellant ■ provided to MetLife. The reviewing physicians’ report is sufficiently thorough and specific in its substantive conclusions to enable MetLife’s decision to survive an abuse of discretion test.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
. The Honorable George Howard, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.