Kennedy v. Valley Forge Ins. Co.Kennedy v. Valley Forge Ins. Co.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). We respectfully dissent. Supreme Court was correct in holding that "[t]he exclusion B.3 clearly sets forth that the policy did not provide liability coverage for the automobile David was driving”. Because that exclusion from coverage applies, the judgment should be
Additionally, it is well settled that, when a contract is unambiguous, circumstances extrinsic to the contract may not be considered (see, General Phoenix Corp. v Cabot,
Thus, we would deny the cross motions, grant the motion and declare that Valley Forge and CNA are not liable under the policy, without prejudice to the right of plaintiff and Louis and David Mancuso to seek alternative relief. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Chautauqua County, Gerace, J. —Declaratory Judgment.) Present — Pine, J. P., Lawton, Fallon, Davis and Boehm, JJ.
Lead Opinion
—Judgment modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs and judgment granted in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court properly rejected the contention of defendants Valley Forge Insurance Company (Valley Forge) and CNA Insurance Company (CNA) that the automobile liability insurance policy that Valley Forge and CNA issued to defendant Louis C. Mancuso did not provide coverage to David L. Mancuso for the May 23, 1991 accident that resulted in the underlying tort action. David Mancuso was listed in the relevant insurance policy as a "named driver” along with his parents. The failure of the policy to define the term "named driver” or to exclude it from coverage gives rise to an ambiguity that must be construed in favor of the insured (see, Tri Town Antlers Found, v Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.,
Supreme Court, in granting the cross motions of plaintiff and Louis and David Mancuso for summary judgment, should also have declared the rights of the parties (see, Sanchez v Eckstrom,
All concur except Lawton and Davis, JJ., who dissent and vote to reverse in the following Memorandum.