2 Kan. App. 764 | Kan. Ct. App. | 1896
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action brought by the defendant in error, as plaintiff, to recover damages from the plaintiff in error, as defendant, for breach of promise of marriage. The defendant denied the making of the contract. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $2,000. Various errors are assigned for a reversal of the judgment. It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the evidence was not sufficient to show that a contract of marriage was ever entered into ; that there was entire failure to prove %ny substantial damages; that the court erred in its instructions to the jury upon the elements of damages; and that the amount of damages allowed by the jury was excessive, and given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
The first complaint is of such a nature that it can receive but little consideration in an appellate court, unless the record shows an entire want of competent evidence to sustain the verdict. We are free to admit that the evidence is not of a very satisfactory character to sustain the allegations of the'petition. The plaintiff testified to the defendant’s attentions to her for a period of five or six years, and that, in February, 1891, there was a formal engagement made for their marriage the following July; that an engagement ring was at that time presented by the defendant to her and accepted, and that thereafter she made preparations for her marriage with the defendant at the time named.- The defendant admitted his acquaintance
As to the breach of the contract, there is practically no dispute. The plaintiff testified that on the return of the defendant from Oklahoma, in July, he informed her that he would not marry her. This action was
The principal complaint on the part of the plaintiff in error is upon the question of damages. The petition alleged the contract, the breach, the financial circumstances of the defendant, and the resulting damage to the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000. Under such a general allegation damages may be allowed for all injuries which the law presumes are the natural and necessary results of the breach of the contract. It is not necessary, in pleading, to state the formal description of damages which are implied by law. While this is an action arising out of contract, it is, as to the measure of damages, classed with torts ; and the rules applicable to the recovery of damages in an action for tort must be looked to, rather than the ordinary rules which govern an action on contract. Judged by this rule, the allegations of the petition were specific enough to authorize the recovery of all such damages as naturally and necessarily follow from the breach of such a contract. (Harrison v. Swift, 13 Allen, 144; Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339; Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y. 474.) As in most actions founded in tort, so in an action for a breach of a promise of marriage, there is no rule by which damages can be accurately and definitely computed. The several matters which may properly be considered in estimating damages are ordinarily of such a nature that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attempt by direct evidence materially to aid the jury in placing
In the case last cited it is’ said :
“In cases of this character it is almost impossible to lay down any rule by which the measure of the damages can be fixed with any degree of precision. There is no scale by which such damages can be graduated with certainty. They admit of no other test than the intelligence of the jury, governed by a sense of justice. Such injuries are accompanied by facts and circumstances affording no definite standard by which such wrongs can be measured, and, from the necessity of the case, must be judged of and appreciated by the view that may be taken of them by impartial jurors. To the jury, therefore, as a favorite tribunal, is committed the exclusive task of examining these facts and circumstances and valuing the injury and awarding compensation in the shape of damages. The law conferring upon them this power, and exacting of them the performance of the trust favors the presumption that they are governed by pure motives. It therefore makes every allowance for the difference of disposition, capacity, views, and even frailties, in*769 cident to the examination of such matters of fact, when no criterion can be supplied; and not till the result of the deliberation of the jury shocks the understanding, and leaves no doubt of their prejudice or passion, will courts find themselves compelled to interpose. ' The moral worth of the parties, their social position and standing in the community, and a great variety of other circumstances and facts, must necessarily be, and generally are, considered by the jury in estimating the damages in this and all other actions sounding in damages. And in cases of this nature the jury must be left to exercise a large discretion in awarding damages, and courts have rarely felt themselves called upon to disturb their verdicts, and then only where it is apparent from the great disproportion between the offense and the finding that , the jury acted under prejudice, partiality, or gross ignorance or disregard of their duty.”
A marriage engagement is not a mere matter of sentiment, and may properly be considered as in one sense a business transaction entered into with a view, in part at least, to pecuniary advantage. Hence, it is proper in süch a case to prove the financial circumstances of the defendant as tending to. show the plaintiff's reasonable expectations of worldly advantage resulting from the intended marriage. (Collins v. Mack, 31 Ark. 685; Reed v. Clark, supra; Wilbur v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600; Royal v. Smith, supra; Bennett v. Beam, supra.) The evidence tended to show that the defendant, a bachelor, with no one dependent upon him for support, was worth $9,000 or $10,000. We do not think it can be said, under the circumstances of this case, that the verdict for $2,000 must have been given by reason, of influences other than a fair consideration of the evidence. The instructions of the court on the subject of damages, we think, were within the rules of law applicable to this case and the issues
Judgment will be affirmed.