10 Pa. Commw. 191 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1973
Opinion by
The appellants, who are taxpayers in the Ringgold School District (District), brought this action in equity to enjoin the District school directors from proceeding with the implementation of their Long-Range Development Program, including the building of a new high school.
The District was organized in 1964 and is composed of the third class City of Monongahela, the Boroughs of Donora, New Eagle and Finleyville, and the Townships of Carroll, Union and Nottinghorn. It has a student population of 6,804 pupils, housed in 16 school buildings, which include eleven elementary schools, three junior high schools and two high schools. In July of 1968, the District undertook the preparation and development of a Long-Range Plan, which was
In May of 1972 the appellants brought this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, and, following the taking of extensive testimony, it was stipulated between the parties that, instead of having a preliminary decision by the chancellor, the case would be submitted to the court en banc. This was the same procedure as was followed in Allen v. Uniontown Area School District, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 183, 285 A. 2d 543 (1971), and apparently, as in that case, this “approach was utilized so that any subsequent appeal could be filed immediately before this Court.” 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 185, 285 A. 2d at 544. Following argument, the lower court issued an adjudication finding that the school directors did not commit an abuse of discretion and that there were no legal grounds upon which to base a grant of injunctive relief. The appellants filed exceptions to this adjudication, which were stricken, and this appeal was thereafter brought. The District has not yet accepted any bids nor begun any construction on the proposed high school or any other project.
Pursuant to Sections 501 to 503 of the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P. L. 30, 24 P.S. §§5-501 to 5-503, the board of school directors is given the authority to establish, equip, furnish and maintain schools, including high schools. When a court is asked
The appellants have also, however, alleged that various actions on the part of the directors constituted
An examination of the record indicates that, on May 13, 1971 and on August 19, 1971, the directors unanimously voted to authorize the signing of the contract with the architects, and that the architects were at once encouraged to proceed with their work. The contract itself was approved by a majority of the directors (in fact unanimously) as required by Section 508 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. §5-508.
While there may be no need for a contract with an architect to be in writing as required for contracts under Section 751, 24 P.S. §7-751,
The appellants also contend that the directors expended an additional $9,500.00, without officially act
The appellants contend, too, that the plan will not provide for proper racial balance. The directors contend, however, that completion of the plan will end racial imbalance in the high school and will greatly alleviate the problem of balance in the middle and elementary schools. We see no evidence in the record that the directors acted unlawfully or abused their discretion in reaching their decision, and no such unlawful activity or abuse of discretion may be inferred from the mere fact that the appellants have reached a different conclusion.
The appellants also object to the practice of the District in transferring $90,600.00 to the general fund at the end of each fiscal year, which money had originally been set aside for site acquisition. They contend that, pursuant to Section 692 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. §6-692, money in a capital reserve fund may only be used for certain purposes. This is true, but the $90,600.00 was not part of any capital reserve fund. In fact, the District has never had such a fund, but, because of delay in site acquisition, this money remained unused.
The appellants likewise contend that, pursuant to Section 609, 24 P.S. §6-609, funds which are set apart for a specific purpose cannot be transferred without a resolution approved by two-thirds of the members of the school board. Again, this is correct, but there is
The final allegedly unlawful act cited by the appellants is that the cost of the proposed plan would exceed the debt limitations as set forth in the Local Government Unit Debt Act, Act of July 12, 1972, P. L. , No. 185, 58 P.S. §11-101 et seq. Certainly, if this act is applicable to the District (as the lower court so found), its provisions must be followed. To this date, however, no bids have been solicited or advertised, and, on the present state of the record, it is impossible to decide whether or not the cost of the program will exceed the limitations of the act regarding non-electoral debt. If it is ultimately determined that the electoral debt provisions of the act do apply, and if the District then refuses to follow its procedures, the appellants may at that time seek judicial recourse as provided in the act.
We must emphasize that we are not here considering the wisdom of the District’s plan, but simply its legality, and we note with approval the following statement of the court below: “Prom a search of the voluminous record in the present case, we are unable to discover and confirm the presence of conduct on the part of the Ringgold School Directors so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to an abuse of discretion, as alleged by the Plaintiffs. A school board is required to investigate, to inquire, to study, in order to finally decide and exercise its lawful mandated discretion. All of these things we think the Ringgold Board did here. It had this plan under study for the last several years, and a decision had to be made by the board. They made a final decision and judgment. Even if there exists a better plan, as contended by the Plaintiffs, this does not amount to an abuse of discretion on the part of the Defendant.”
See Eliason v. School District of Springfield Township, 54 Pa. D. & C. 2d 52 (1970), and cases cited therein.