18 F. 312 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1883
(charging jury.) 1. The judgment against M. L. Meacliam & Go. in the attachment suit before the justice of the peace is conclusive of the right of the plaintiff to secure the actual damages resulting to him from the wrongful suing out of the attachment. The only possible question for you, on this branch of the case, is the amount of the actual damages. That he is entitled to recover the expenditure of money for coming from his home in Arkansas to Memphis, when called here by the telegram to give atention to the attachment suit, there can be no doubt. This expenditure was not covered by costs, as it sometimes is in other states, where it is allowed as costs, and of course not recoverable as damages. But here such expenses are not included in the costs of suit, and therefore all money necessarily expended for traveling expenses and in defense of the suit, not included in the costs, are a fair proof of damages which you may award. Of course, money expended outside of and not necessarily as expenses in the suit cannot be recovered, nor can counsel fees be recovered. The plaintiff may also recover such other sum as will com-pensato him for any injury done to his credit, by which the law does not mean only a credit based on solvency, as shown by the relative comparison of debts and assets to meet them. A merchant who owns property in excess of his debts, who has abundant assets and small debts, may enjoy mercantile credit, and usually does, if besides he has integrity of character, business capacity, and that sense of obligation which causes him to scrupulously protect his credit by prompt payment of his debts and honest dealings in his business. The relative amount of debts and assets is undoubtedly an important element in estimating the extent or value of any merchant’s credit, and cannot be overlooked by you in determining the injury that has been a.llegod4to have been the result of the wrongful suing out of the attachment. But the law does not confine its protection in this respect to a credit based on property in hand, or available to secure that credit. It extends also to that credit wieh is based on integrity and business capacity, and the trusting confidence which relies on them. Be it great or small, no one has any right to injure it without liability to pay damages that will ■compensate for the injury. The value of such credit, and indeed ail credit, varies according to the circumstances in the case. Therefore,
2. Juries may sometimes, where there is wanton disregard of the rights of others and a spirit of mischief actuated by malicious motives, or flowing from a reckless and inconsiderate disregard of consequences to the rights of others, punish a defendant for the wrongful abuse of process, if he had no probable cause of action. But I have, after a most mature deliberation upon all the facts and circumstances of this case, concluded that it is my duty to assume the responsibility properly belonging to the court, and say to you that this is not a case for the application of that principle. There is no proof authorizing you to punish the defendants in this case by giving exemplary or punitive damages, and, as I understand the undisputed facts of the case, the court should not be content with any verdict in wdiich the idea of punishment entered as an element of calculation. The plaintiff is entitled to a sum that will fully compensate him for the injury, under the instructions already given, but no more, on the facts of this case. I would like to take time, by a review of the facts, to justify this judgment, but it is not necessary and time presses us. It is sufficient to say that Kennedy was a non-resident, and the right to proceed by attachment was clear if Meacham & Co. had a reasonable ground to believe and did honestly believe that Kennedy was in their debt for a balance due by account, whether for interest or what not. The judgment of the court where the attachment was sued is conclusive that they had no debt against Kennedy; but this is not the question. They indisputably claimed to have a debt. There were transactions out of which such a claim might arise, however unfounded in law or in fact it may appear to be, and has been by a competent court decided to be. It is not a question whether Kennedy owed Meacham & Co. in law and in fact, but did they honestly believe so, under facts and circumstances that were reasonably to be relied on as a basis of that belief? I do not think that any proof in this case, when impassionately considered, tends to show that the defendants did not entertain such a belief, or that they might not on the facts as they understood them — not as we might or as the justice of the peace has understood them — reasonably claim that Kennedy owed them. They were unfortunate in that belief; they acted inconsiderately, and it would be better in cases of such doubtful claims to proceed in the regular way, than by an attachment which may injure the debtor needlessly; but this is not the question. They had a
The rulings in this case were based on Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. Rep. 266, which case was approved by the supreme court of Tennessee in Renkert V. Elliott, (not yet reported,) April term, Jackson, 1883. H.