183 Ga. 410 | Ga. | 1936
Alfred D. Kennedy and certain other owners of real estate incorporated as a part of Georgia Militia District No. 1226, known as Grogan’s District, sought to enjoin H. H. Howard, tax-commissioner and tax-collector and ex-officio sheriff of DeKalb County, and J. R. Hall, sheriff of DeKalb County, from proceeding with the levying of tax fi. fas. on their property for the years 1928 to 1933 inclusive, or some of those years, from selling their property thereunder, and to have the tax fi. fas. levied on their property by the DeKalb County officials declared null and void, because their property had already been returned for taxation to the tax-receiver of Eulton County and the taxes on some of said property had already been paid to the tax-collector of Eulton County for the years for which the defendants were seeking to collect taxes thereon. The petition alleged substantially the following facts: Petitioners’ lands are located in Georgia Militia District No. 1226, known as Grogan’s District, which was established in 1861 in Milton County by the inferior court of that county. In 1926, upon petition filed with the ordinary of Eulton
Petitioners contend that their property was in Fulton County during the period 1926 to 1934; that during that period the tax officials of that county demanded that petitioners’ property be returned for taxes in Fulton County; that during that period the tax officials of DeKalb County, including the defendants," did not object to petitioners’ returning their property in Fulton County, and they took no action to compel petitioners to make their returns in DeKalb County; that they had consented by their acts to Fulton County’s exercising jurisdiction over their lands as be-' ing in Fulton County; that it would be. unconscionable and inequitable to make them pay their taxes twice.
Among the facts agreed upon by the parties are the following: (1) “Petitioners are the owners of certain lands lying in the extreme northern part' of DeKalb County, Georgia, adjoining or in close proximity to the boundary line between DeKalb County and Fulton County.” (2) “Some doubt had existed in the community regarding the exact location of this boundary line which separated DeKalb County and Milton County. On August 18,
Hnder the agreed statement of facts, the lands on which the fi. fas. have been levied were all in Grogan’s District, Milton County, until August 18, 1926, and on that date became a part of Grogan’s District, Fulton County. In 1933, on petition of DeKalb County, according to the Code, §§ 23-401 to 23-408 inclusive, the line between Fulton County and DeKalb County, where it touched Grogan’s District, was surveyed, established, and, on appeal, fixed by the Secretary of State in 1934. The taxes sought to be collected by DeKalb County all were levied for one or more years between 1926 and 1934, but not including either of those years. It is conceded that all of the property on which the taxes are sought has been regularly returned in Fulton County, and that all of the taxes have been paid or will be collected. The sole question is whether the facts just stated will prevent collection for the same years by DeKalb County, or whether the payments and returns to Fulton County will be held full payment of all taxes required of the taxpayers. The court held that no State taxes could be collected which had already been collected by Fulton County. To hold that DeKalb County may collect would subject all of the petitioners to the necessity of paying the county taxes to two counties. No bad faith or any negligence is charged to the petitioners. It is merely urged that they were bound to know in which county their lands were situated and what was the law. The tax officials of DeKalb County made no claim during those years for taxes on petitioners’ lands. Petitioners did nothing to mislead them. In 1927 DeKalb County could have demanded these taxes, and thus promptly put these petitioners on notice and inquiry. This is not to say that the mistakes or ignorance of the tax officials would estop the county from asserting legal rights. The agreement of facts, it is repeated, states that the lands be
Will a court of equity interfere with a levy for county taxes ? The Code, § 92-7901, declares: “No replevin shall lie, nor any judicial interference be had, in any levy or distress for taxes under the provisions of this Code, but the party injured shall be left to his proper remedy in any court of law having jurisdiction thereof.” The decision in Harris Orchard Co. v. Tharpe, 177 Ga. 547 (170 S. E. 811, 88 A. L. R. 1212), shows that there are instances where efforts to collect taxes may be enjoined. In this case the fi. fas. on which the levies were made are void. Moreover, equity lias jurisdiction “where a multiplicity of suits would render a trial difficult, expensive, and unsatisfactory at law.” Code, § 37-301. In Smith v. Dees, 92 Ga. 549 (supra), injunction was the remedy afforded under facts somewhat similar to, but not identical with, those in the present case. The question of jurisdiction was not raised in that case.
Judgment reversed.