delivered the opinion of the court:
Plаintiff-appellant, Thomas Kennedy, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County declaring that defendant-appellee, Health Care Serviсe Corporation (sued as Hospital Service Corporation), had properly denied his claim for payment of hospitalization benefits for that part of a hоspital stay exceeding a 120-day limitation contained in the Health Services Plan Certificate (the contract) issued to plaintiff by defendant. On appeal plaintiff cоntends (1) that there exists an ambiguity in the contract with respect to the existence of any limitation on the duration of hospitalization coverage and that such ambiguity should be resolved in his favor by a determination that no such limitation exists; (2) that in any event any such limitation was waived when defendant paid for a 60-day hospitalization period which had оccurred after plaintiff had previously been hospitalized for more than 120 days.
We affirm.
The evidence at trial established the following: Plaintiff was hospitalized at Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Hospital (Rush) in Chicago from April 12, 1981, until June 6, 1981, and again from June 16, 1981, until August 23, 1981. On August 24, 1981, plaintiff was admitted to a Hartford, Connecticut hospital, the Institute of Living, where he remained at the time this action was brought оn March 23, 1982. There is no contention that the nature of plaintiff’s ailment was not covered under the contract.
Emma Luster, a supervisor in defendant’s direct account department, testified that the bill for plaintiff’s first stay at Rush was received August 5, 1981, and was paid August 26, 1981. Her department would compute the available days of coverage by subtracting the number оf days for which payment had previously been made from the available days of coverage provided in the contract. The bill for plaintiff’s second stay at Rush was not received until December 9, 1981, and was paid December 23, 1981, to cover hospitalization until August 20, 1981, a period which together with the earlier Rush hospitalization was computed to be 120 days. According to Luster no other billing for hospitalization for defendant had been received by her department at that time.
Also testifying at trial was Angelo Fraticola, а supervisor in the defendant’s Interplan Bank, which handled billing for members confined to out-of-State hospitals. According to Fraticola when his department was notified by an out-оf-State hospital of a patient’s admission the computer file would be checked and it would notify them of the number of days of coverage available. His departmеnt received notice of plaintiff’s Connecticut hospitalization on September 2, 1981, and the next day sent back approval of 60 days’ coverage. According to their practice payments were subsequently sent to the Connecticut hospital in October and November of 1981 for the 60 days that had been authorized. Fraticola testified that the computer would contain a history of hospitalization, including dates of admission and discharge. However when further questioned by defendant’s attorney he clarified this by sаying that although the date of admission would be listed, the date of discharge would only be shown if defendant had made a payment for that period. If no such payment had been mаde then only an open admission would be contained in the computer entry. He had also testified that his department determined the number of days available to a pаtient in the same manner as Emma Luster’s department (by subtracting days paid from contract days available). However upon further examination by plaintiff’s attorney he also tеstified that “[t]here is something in the computer that they are utilizing the number of days” and that there was a continuing computation of days in the computer.
The contract itself prоvides in article 1(A)(1) that as to benefits:
“For admissions on and after the Effective Date and during the Benefit Period (see Article VIII(G)), a Beneficiary is entitled to ***
(a) INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICE ***.”
Article VIII(G) states:
“ ‘Benefit Period’ means thе number of days specified in Article VIII(A) for all inpatient service in a Hospital ***.”
Article VIII(A) states:
“ ‘Subscriber’ means the individual under 65 years of age who has applied for this Certificate and to whоm Blue Cross and Blue Shield have issued an Identification Card bearing the same number as this Certificate.”
However article IX states in bold capital letters “EXTENT OF BENEFIT AND RATE.” and then provides:
“(A) Benefit Periods
1.120 days
2.120 days
(B) Percentage Payment by Blue Cross and Blue Shield
1. Blue Cross 80%
2. Blue Shield 80%
* * * > >
When plaintiff sought payment of hospitalization charges for the period in Chicago in excess of 120 days and for the period in Connecticut beyond the initial 60 days defendant refusеd, contending that the contract provided a 120-day limitation (with certain exceptions not relevant to this dispute) and that it had paid for that period and had erroneously paid for an additional 60-day period. Plaintiff then brought this action for a declaratory judgment.
I
Plaintiff first contends that the contract provisions we have set out created an ambiguity as to the existence of any limitation on the duration of coverage for hospitalization and that because ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be construed against the insurer (Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974),
In his reply brief before this court plaintiff for the first time has contended that even if a limited duration period is contained in the contract, that period is 240 days, because the 120-day period is listed twice in article IX(A). Because plaintiff did not raisе this issue below no proof was adduced as to the reason for the dual listing. Having failed to raise the issue in the trial court plaintiff cannot now properly raise it for the first timе in a reply brief on appeal, accordingly we will not consider it further. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1981),
II
Finally plaintiff contends that because defendant extended coverage for the initial 60 days of his Connecticut hospital stay even though plaintiff had been hospitalized for more than 120 days in Illinois defendant waived the 120-day limitation. But in order to find such a waiver by an insurer it must be shown that the insurer had knowledge of all material facts before it acted. (Home Indemnity Co. v. Allen (7th Cir. 1951),
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
JOHNSON and LINN, JJ., concur.