KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, CHINO MINES DIVISION, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION of New Mexico, Respondent-Appellant, All Claimants Listed in Commission Exhibit I in Cause No. 508-LD-COM before the Employment Security Commission of New Mexico, Respondent-Claimants-Appellants.
No. 8089.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
July 31, 1967.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1967.
432 P.2d 109
“Under the circumstances here appearing, a finding of full use and the exercise of dominion over this car is equivalent to a finding of ownership within the meaning of this provision of the policy. We think these findings were sufficient to support the judgment. The court found that Everly acquired possession of the Ford prior to August 25 and that he had possession with full use of it and exercised dominion over it at all times thereafter up to the date of the collision. It was also found that it was not true that he had purchased and acquired this car within thirty days of the accident. A clear intent appears from the findings as a whole to find all the material facts against the plaintiff, and the findings are sufficient for that purpose. * * *”
Appellee notices our holding in Clovis Finance Company v. Sides, supra, and Schall v. Mondragon, supra, but argues that naked possession without documentary evidence of title cannot constitute ownership, citing Bustin v. Craven, 57 N.M. 724, 263 P.2d 392 (1953). This is not the situation before us. Under all of the facts which appear in this case, we are here called to determine whether the question of ownership of the automobile involved should have been presented to the jury for its determination.
Under the circumstances present here, we feel that it was for the jury to determine, from all of the evidence, whether or not appellant was the owner of the automobile in question. The trial court was in error in holding that, as a matter of law, appellant was not the owner of the automobile.
In view of our holding, it is not necessary to consider other points raised on this appeal.
The cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction that the judgment heretofore entered be set aside and to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
COMPTON, J., and WOOD, J., Court of Appeals, concur.
Foy & Sprecher, Silver City, for certain claimants-appellants.
White, Gilbert, Koch & Kelly, Santa Fe, for certain claimants-appellants.
Shantz & Dickson, Silver City, for appellee.
OPINION
SPIESS, Judge, Court of Appeals.
Appellants, some 370 employees of Kennecott Copper Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Kennecott, filed and prosecuted claims for unemployment benefits before the Employment Security Commission of New Mexico, herein referred to as the Commission.
Appellants’ claims for unemployment benefits arise out of a strike situation in Grant County by the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, hereinafter called Mine-Mill, against Kennecott. The strike by Mine-Mill appears to have had its beginning in failure to negotiate satisfactory contracts between Kennecott and its employees’ unions before the old contracts expired on June 30, 1964. On July 9, 1964, Mine-Mill struck the Kennecott operations in New Mexico and three other western states following a strike by the United Steel Workers in Utah. Mine-Mill posted pickets at all entrances to the company properties.
Claimants were employees of Kennecott but were not members of nor represented by Mine-Mill, which was the dominant union at Kennecott. Nevertheless, beginning July 9, 1964, and until the strike was terminated on August 14, 1964, claimants did not attempt to cross the Mine-Mill picket lines or enter the company‘s properties to report to their jobs. Throughout the strike period work was available to all of the appellants and they were so informed by radio announcements, newspaper notices and letters mailed by the company to each of the employees.
Appellants’ claims were assigned by the Commission to a deputy for the purpose of conducting a hearing and to make and transmit to the Commission findings of fact. All interested parties and their counsel were present and participated in the hearing before the deputy.
Kennecott opposed payment of the claims on the ground that appellants were ineligible to receive benefit payments under
In accordance with the Act benefits are not denied to one who neither participates in nor is directly interested in the labor dispute, or to one not belonging to the grade or class of workers participating in or directly interested in the labor dispute.
Following the hearing the deputy transmitted findings of fact to the Commission and on or about August 13, 1964, a decision was rendered holding appellants’ claims to be valid and payable. To avoid confusion we will refer to this decision as the “first decision“. On the date the decision was rendered all interested parties, including Kennecott, were formally notified of the decision and reasons therefor. No appeal was taken from the first decision to the district court but on the 15th of August, 1964, Kennecott gave notice of appeal from the first decision to the Commission itself. On March 10, 1965, the Commission rendered a further decision affirming the validity of the claims. From this decision Kenne-
The appellants contend that since an appeal to the district court was not taken within fifteen days after notification of the first decision it became final and neither the Commission nor the district court had jurisdiction to further consider or decide the validity of the claims.
The question presented requires an interpretation of the procedural provision of the unemployment compensation act.
The Commission is composed of three (3) members,
An exception is contained in the article as to the procedure applicable in a situation where payment or the denial thereof will be determined under the provisions of
Under
The decision of the Commission upon any disputed matter decided by it may be reviewed both upon the law and the facts by the district court.
Kennecott argues that the first decision is a deputy‘s decision as distinguished from a Commission decision and consequently an appeal at this point to the district court is not maintainable.
In view of the language of
Kennecott further contends that the first decision was an intermediate step in the required or allowed procedure at the administrative level; that further proceedings before the Commission would be required to exhaust administrative remedies. The appeal taken by Kennecott and entertained by the Commission from the first decision we feel more closely resembles a proceeding for reconsideration of the first decision. An appeal usually pre-supposes a decision by a lower authority. It is difficult to conceive of an appeal from a decision of the highest administrative authority to itself.
There is no express language in the act which requires the Commission in a
It likewise follows that a power not expressly granted is implied only where it is necessary to carry into effect powers expressly granted. Commonwealth ex rel. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40 A.2d 30, 33, 155 A.L.R. 1088 (1944); Lawrence Const. Corp. v. State, 293 N.Y. 634, 59 N.E.2d 630 (1944); People ex rel. City of Olean v. Western N. Y. and Pa. Traction Co., 214 N.Y. 526, 108 N.E. 847 (1915).
The express power granted the Commission by the legislature which is relevant to this appeal, is quasi-judicial in its nature and authorizes the Commission to decide issues submitted under the labor dispute section,
Our research has revealed a lack of uniformity of judicial opinion upon the question whether an administrative agency in the absence of specific authority has implied power to reconsider its final decision. A number of the authorities supporting different views are collected in the annotation 73 A.L.R.2d 939.
It is relevant to consider the difference in procedural steps authorized in a labor dispute case from those permitted in other types of situations. Where a labor dispute issue is involved intermediate appellate proceedings within the administrative process as authorized by
Kennecott further argues that an appeal in this instance from the first decision to the district court would have been an impossibility for the reason that the proceedings before the deputy were not transcribed due to mechanical difficulties. In support of this contention we are referred to the following statement made by counsel for the Commission at the outset of the appeal or reconsideration proceedings entertained by the Commission. Counsel identified and introduced certain exhibits and as to a particular exhibit which appears to have been withdrawn he said:
“It is an attempt to transcribe the proceedings at the hearing before the Deputy. Because of mechanical difficulties, the transcription was not of the quality to be placed in this record, insofar as the Commission‘s interests are concerned.”
This statement, to our mind, would not justify a conclusion that the record was incomplete or illegible or that it would not have been sufficient for appeal. We are not called upon to determine what procedure would have been available to Kennecott had no record or an insufficient record been made at the deputy‘s hearing.
It is our opinion that the first decision became final no appeal having been taken from it to the district court consequently neither the Commission nor
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the proceedings.
It is so ordered.
CHAVEZ, C. J., and COMPTON, J., concur.
MOISE and CARMODY, Justices (dissenting):
In connection with the determination of whether a timely appeal was taken, we disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority. Involved is an interpretation of
“(a) * * *
“(b) Initial Determination. A representative designated by the commission, and hereinafter referred to as a deputy, shall promptly examine the claim and, on the basis of the facts found by him, shall either determine whether or not such claim is valid, and if valid, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable and the maximum duration thereof, or shall refer such claim or any question involved therein to an appeal tribunal or to the commission, which shall make its determinations with respect thereto in accordance with the procedure described in subsection (c) of this section, except that in any case in which the payment or denial of benefits will be determined by the provisions of section 5(d) (sec. 57-805(d) [59-9-5(b)]) of this act, the deputy shall promptly transmit his full finding of fact with respect to that subsection to the commission, which, on the basis of the evidence submitted and such additional evidence as it may require, shall affirm, modify, or set aside such findings of fact and transmit to the deputy a decision upon the issues involved under that subsection. The deputy shall promptly notify the claimant and any other interested party of the decision and the reasons therefor. Unless the claimant or any such interested party, within fifteen (15) calendar days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision, files an appeal from such decision, such decision shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith. If an appeal is duly filed, benefits with respect to the period prior to the final determination of the commission, shall be paid only after such determination: Provided, That if an appeal tribunal affirms a decision of a deputy, or the commission affirms a decision of an appeal tribunal, allowing benefits, such benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which may thereafter be taken, but if such decision is finally reversed, no employer‘s account shall be charged with benefits so paid.”
The language of the section leaves much to be desired. However, the only issue necessary to be resolved in this case is as to the nature of the notification by the deputy of the determination of the issues which arose when problems incident to
First, the subsection heading describes the proceedings as the “Initial Determination.” Ordinarily, appeals are not taken piecemeal, or until all administrative procedures are exhausted. To so interpret this section, in our view, would result in a manifestly time-consuming and wasteful procedure. We cannot believe that the legislature intended such an outcome.
Second, no hearing where the interested parties may be heard is required for the initial determination. The section provides only that the deputy transmit his findings concerning rights to benefits under
Third, reason and common sense tell us that it was never intended that a decision by the commission concerning the payment or denial of benefits as affected by
Fourth, the history of the provision supports our conclusion. The section is unchanged in any material respect from the form in which it was adopted in 1936 (ch. 1, § 6, N.M.S.L.1936). An examination of the laws of Arizona (ch. 13, § 6, Ariz. S.L.1936) and of Colorado (ch. 1, § 6, Colo. 3rd Ex.Sess.1936) discloses that in 1936 unemployment compensation laws adopted in those states contained a provision identical with our
Fifth, and finally, although the Utah statute specifically provided that the decision was a “decision of the deputy“—the language omitted from our statute—the discussion and rationale in National Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 102 P.2d 508 (1940), to our minds supports the reasoning and conclusion advanced by us. No decision passing on the language as it appears in our statute has
The majority having come to a conclusion contrary to that which we consider correct, and not having examined the appeal on its merits, we disagree and respectfully dissent.