Aрpellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of rape and aggravated assault. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on the verdict.
1. Appellant enumerates as error the exclusion of evidence concerning the victim’s prior alcohol and drug abuse treatment. Appellant contends that the evidence was erroneously ruled inadmissible under the Rape Shield Statute, OCGA § 24-2-3. Our review of the record shows that the evidence was not ruled inadmissible under the Rape Shield Statute, which deals only with the past sexual behavior of a victim. Rather, it was excluded as irrelevant and as improperly tending to “blacken” the victim’s character. Although appellant asserts that a logical connection еxists between prior treatment for alcohol and drug abuse and present ability to remember whether one consented tо have sex, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that the victim’s previous treatment for alcohol and drug abuse was absolutely irrelevant to the issue of consent. The evidence was therefore properly excluded. See generally
Lively v. State,
If appellant wished to impeach the victim with proof of her bad character, the introduction of evidence of specific acts was not the proper method of doing so. “ ‘[A] witness whom it is sought to impeach because of bad character must be shown to be of general bad character; special acts are not admissible. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]”
Ailstock v. State,
2. Appellant moved to suppress evidence seized during a search *523 of his residence. He urges that the supporting affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. The denial of the motion is enumerated as error.
“[B]efоre a warrant may issue, the issuing magistrate must have sufficient reasons to believe that a crime was. committed, that the items sought are connected with the crime, and that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched. [Cit.]”
Williams v. State,
The affidavit stated that, within the preceding two days, a rape had been investigated, that appellant had been arrested at his home, and that the affiant had reason to believe and did believe that the described knife was being stored at appellant’s home. “Under certain circumstances it is reаsonable for a police officer to infer that items will be found in a specific place.”
Murphy v. State,
3. Appellant asserts as error the trial court’s denial of a motion in limine wherein he sought to exclude evidence concerning a certain “test” that the sheriff had determined that he would perform upon the victim. While interviewing the victim, the sheriff, suddenly аnd without any warning, had intentionally removed a knife from his pocket and opened it in front of her. Ruling on appellant’s motion in liminе, the trial court held that the sheriff would not be permitted to testify as to what he had personally concluded from the victim’s reаction, but that he could describe the victim’s reaction for the jury and let it make its own determination. The sheriff described the victim’s rеaction for the jury as “almost hysterics . . . she screamed, she cried, she threw up her hands; she tried to get away from me. There wаs a tremendous reaction.”
Appellant’s attempts to analogize the admission of this testimony to the erroneous admissiоn of evidence concerning various scientific
*524
or pseudo-scientific methods of testing credibility are unavailing. The “test” аt issue is in no way analogous to the polygraph, hypnosis, truth serum, and the like. However, appellant’s objection to the rеlevancy of the evidence is more compelling. The only possible import of the testimony was that, based on the state of mind of the victim when subsequently confronted with a knife, appellant undoubtedly had raped her earlier at knifepoint. Howеver, anyone who is suddenly confronted by a knife-wielding stranger, even if he happens to be the sheriff, is quite likely to react emotionally to that situation, independently of his or her previous experiences. Moreover, “the victim’s [subsequently induced] statе of mind was not relevant or necessary in determining whether or not appellant [raped] the victim; hence, it was not admissiblе. [Cit.]”
Sanborn v. State,
In the instant case, as in
Sanborn v. State,
supra, the “state of mind” of the victim was that externally induced by the actions of the testifying witness at some remote point following the incident in question. It was not a part of the сontinuation of the main transaction, and was not relevant to elucidate it. It was, therefore, error to admit the sheriff’s testimony. Compare
Scott v. State,
Judgment reversed.