Appellant Relators Mr. Kennard and Mr. Wright brought this qui tam аction on behalf of the United States Government against Appellees Comstock Resources, Inc., et al., (“Comstock”) pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (“FCA”). The allegations center around oil and gas leases between Comstock and an Indian Tribe. The Indian leases are subject to regulation by the Secretary of the Interior who acts as a fiduciary for the Tribe. Comstock pays royalties owed to the Tribe to the Mineral Management Service (“MMS”), an agency under the Secretary. The MMS is responsible for (1) collecting royalties, (2) ensuring the accuracy of those payments with audits, and (3) remitting the royalty payments to the Tribe.
Relator Wright owned royalty interests in a tract of land near the Indian Tribe’s Reservation and had been receiving royalty payments for gas wells located on the property for over twenty-five years. When the operator on Mr. Wright’s property sold its lease interests to Comstock, Mr. Wright’s royalty payments dropped dramatically. Based on this dramatic *1041 drop, Mr. Wright speculated that Com-stock was underpaying him and others in the area, including the Tribe. •
Mr. Wright contacted Relator Kennard with his information. Relator Kennard researched and investigated public records and discovered that the Indian leases might have expired. Based, on the investigation and Relators’ extensive oil and gas experience, they concluded that Comstock was underpaying royalties to the Tribe and also that Comstock knew that .it was underpaying the Tribe. After consultation with attorneys, Relators concluded that Comstock had committed fraud and violated the FCA. The attorneys, including Mr. Sydow, began drafting a complaint. Rela-tors invited the Tribе to join the suit as co-Relators and the Tribe declined.
On October 21, 1998, Relators sent the required “Disclosure Statement” to the Government to which a yet-unfiled complaint was attached. On October 26, 1998, Mr. Sydow filed suit acting as the Tribe’s attorney instead of as Relators’ attorney. The following day, Relators filed this suit alleging essentially the same things as the Sydow Complaint. Relators allege that Mr. Sydow essentially stole their information in preparing the Tribe’s complaint.
The FCA imposes liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). Violators are “liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730, a private individual, known as a relator, “may bring a civil action for a violation of [31 U.S.C. § 3729] for the person and for the United States Government ... in the name of the Gоvernment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The relator then receives a share of any Government recovery. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). The relator’s qui tam complaint is filed under seal and served on the Government with “a written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information” in the relator’s possession. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). The Government may then . either choose to intervene and take over litigation or decline to intervene, “in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to . conduct the action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (4).
In the instant case, the district court dismissed Relators’ FCA qui tam complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) which provides:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
On appeal, we are asked to decide whether the district court erred in dismissing Rela-tors’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that (1) the current action was barred because of a prior public disclosure and (2) Relators did not qualify as an original source. We review
de novo
the district court’s dismissal of Relators’ FCA
qui tam
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp.,
Application of the 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) jurisdictional bar requires a four-step inquiry:
(1) whether the alleged “public disclosure” contains allegations or transactions from one of the listed sources; (2) whether the аlleged disclosure has been made “public” within the meaning of the False Claims Act; (3) whether the relator’s complaint is “based upon” this public disclosure; and, if so, (4) whether the relator qualifies as an “original source.”
United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care,
Relators argue strenuously that because Mr. Sydow allegedly unethically used their information in drafting his complaint for the Tribe that this court should not validate that fraud. However, we are constrained by the law as it is written. The jurisdictional bar in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) does not contemplate an exception to public disclosure unless the person is an original source. The remedy for the alleged conversion of information in this case lies elsewhere. Section 3730(e)(4) operates to satisfy the dual goals of “avoidance оf parasitism and encouragement of legitimate citizen enforcement actions.”
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn,
In the instant case, the alleged public disclosure is the Sydow Complaint. Civil hearings are specifically referenced in 31 U.S.C. § 3780(e)(4)(A). Section 3730(e)(4) lists “[ (1) ] a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, [ (2) ] a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, [or (3) ] the news media” as sources available for public disclosure. We have repeatedly held that prior civil actions are public disclosures under the FCA.
Precision,
We must next address whether the alleged disclosure has been made public within the meaning of the FCA. Relators
*1043
argue that because the disсlosure in this case was only made to a single Government filing clerk who stamped the Sydow Complaint, no public disclosure occurred. This argument is unpersuasive. Section 3730(e)(4) operates as a “quick trigger.”
Precision,
Relators’ argument that providing a complaint to the Government in advance of filing immunizes a relator from the operation of the FCA’s public disclosure bar is similarly misdirected. Seсtion 3730(e)(4) does not contain an exception for complying with the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of § 3730(b)(2).
1
Additionally, disclosure to the Government through § 3730(b)(2) is not a public disclosure contemplated by § 3730(e)(4). As discussed above, § 3730(e)(4) specifically lists the following sources as avenues for public disclosure: [ (1) ] “a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, [ (2) ] a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or - [ (3) ■] the news media.” “[I]n order to be publicly disclosed, the allegations or transactions upon which a
qui tarn
suit is based must have been made known
to the public
through some affirmative act of disclosure.”
Ramseyer,
The first two inquiries being answered in the affirmative, we then ask whether Relators’ complaint is based upon the public disclosure. “The test is whether ‘substantial identity’ exists between the publicly disclosed allegations and the
qui tarn
complaint.”
MK-Ferguson,
Since we hold that the Sydow Complaint was a public disclosure, we must now address the fourth step — whether Relators were an original source. Section 3730(e)(4)(B) defines original source as “an individual that has direct and independent knowledge оf the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.”
See also United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
Comstock argues that Relators were not an original source because: (1) Relators did not possess substantive information about the particular fraud, (2) they were not insiders of Comstock or the Tribe, and (3) they relied on public records. Thus, Comstock asserts that Relators merely conducted background research and relied on their own expertise to speculate that Comstock had defrauded the Government. We will address each contention in turn.
Comstock’s first assertion, that Relators did not possess information about the particular fraud, has no basis in Tenth Circuit precedent. Knowledge of the actual fraudulent conduct is not necessary.
See Stone,
Comstock’s second contention, that Re-lators were not insiders of either Comstock or the Tribe, is also without merit. Our review of the relevant case law revealed no requirement that a relator be a corporate *1045 insider. Additionally, we can think of no valid reason for creating such a restriction.
The third contention, that Relators relied on public records, deserves more attention. We have not and will not adopt any bright-line rule disqualifying a relator as an original source when the relator examines public records. However, the degree and character of such reliance is necessarily deserving of our attention. A mere compilation of documents or reports already in the public domain will not allow a relator to qualify as an original source. However, a complete and thorough investigation of a fraud on the Government will likely necessarily involve some review of contracts, documents, or other information in the public domain. It is the character of the relator’s discovery and investigation that controls this inquiry.
On one end of the spectrum, there are several cases that define an action based solely on the labor of others. In
United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club,
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “[a] relator’s ability to recognize the legal consequences of a publicly disclosed fraudulent transaction does not alter the fact that the material elements of the violation have already been publicly disclosed.”
Similarly, in
United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp.,
the Second Circuit held that' an attorney who participated in the initial litigation on which his
qui tam
action was based was not an original source.
Nor does the fact that [the relator’s] background knowledge enabled it to understand the significance of the information acquired ... make its knowledge independent of the publicly disclosed information. If that were enough to qualify the relator as an original source then a cryptographer who translated a ciphered document in a public court record would be an original source, an unlikely interpretation of the phrase.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Our case is easily distinguished from both Findley and Kreindler. Unlike the relator in Findley, Relators in our case did not merely attach a legal label to a fraud already noticed in the public domain. While “relаtor Findley’s complaint merely echoe[d] publicly disclosed, allegedly *1046 fraudulent transactions,” id., Relators in our case conducted their own investigation and crafted their own claim of the fraud on the Government. Additionally, unlike the relator in Kreindler, Relators in our case cannot be compared to mere cryptographers who translated a document. Nor can they be compared to an attorney who took someone else’s labor and investigation and gave it legal meaning. While some of the information discovered by Relators was in the publiс domain, Relators did not merely label or translate an already publicly disclosed fraud.
On the other end of the spectrum, our case parallels the court’s statement in
Springfield
where “[the relator] started with innocuous public information [and] completed the equation with information independent of any preexisting public disclosure.”
The district court concluded that “Rela-tors have merely compiled public information and because of their education and background were able to speculate that [Comstock] underpaid [] royalties.” Aplt. App. at 498. We disagree. In its determination, the district court relied heavily on the fact that Relators were not members of the Tribe or insiders of Comstock, a concern we deem irrelevant to the current inquiry. The district court further relied on the fact that Relators used documents already in the public domain during their investigation. However, in the instant case, Relators’ claim did not derive from a third party’s research and investigation. Relators discovered the alleged fraud and Relators conducted the investigation. Our concern discussed in
Hafter
of the necessity to “weed out parasitic plaintiffs who offer only secondhand information, speculation, background information or collatеral research” is not implicated in this case.
Comstock also argues that Relators are factually incorrect in their claim of fraud
*1047
on the Government. However, whether the “claim is ultimately flawed on the merits is an analytically distinct question from the one mandated by the FCA for establishing jurisdiction.”
Stone,
We will briefly address Comstock’s alternative argument that the FCA’s
qui tarn
provision does not authorize a relator to sue based upon losses allegedly suffered by an Indian Tribe. This argument is unsupported by the text of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). “As in all cases involving statutory construction, оur starting point must be the language employed by Congress, ... and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”
Holmes,
Comstock’s argument that the FCA does not authorize Relators to sue on behalf of the Tribe misstates the issue because a qui tarn suit is on behalf of the Government, not the Tribe. 5 A qui tarn suit is to recov *1048 er penalties for false statements to the Government. Section 3730(b)(1) provides that a private person may bring an action “for the person and for the United States Government ... in the name of the Government.” The fraud is that which occurs when the person or entity makes a false statement to the Government. The fraud at issue is not that which occurs when the Indian Tribe receives less royalties than those which are due pursuant to the lеase. While this suit relates to leases between Comstock and the Tribe, it is an action on behalf of Relators and the Government to redress an alleged fraud on the Government.
The mineral royalties at issue are paid to the Mineral Management Service of the United States Department of the Interior. Royalty payments due on Indian leases must be paid “in the time and manner as may be specified by the Secretary [of the Department of the Interior].” 30 U.S.C. § 1712(a). Royalties owed on Indian Tribe leases must be transmitted to “the MMS or such other pаrty as may be designated.” 25 C.F.R. § 211.40. Indian lessees like Comstock must report to the MMS the amount of royalties due when they submit their royalty payments. See 30 C.F.R. § 210.52; 30 U.S.C. § 1713(a). The royalties paid to the MMS on Indian leases are transferred from an MMS Treasury account to separate accounts in the Treasury and the royalties are then disbursed to the appropriate Indian Tribe or allottee. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 218.51, 219.103. The MMS is required to collect payments and to have “a comprehensive ... accounting and auditing system ... to accurately determine oil and gas royalties.” 30 U.S.C. § 1711(a).
As discussed above, Section 3729(a)(7) imposes liability for making “a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or
transmit
money ... to the Government.” (emphasis added). Pursuant to § 3729(a)(7), Relators are required to allege that Comstock had “an existing, legal ‘obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government’ ” and that Comstock submitted false statements or records to conceal, avoid, or decrease that obligation.
See United States v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,
REVERSED and REMANDED. 6
Notes
. Section 3730(b)(2) provides:
A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint shall be filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant until the court so orders. The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the material evidence and information-.
Id.
. Relators certainly have no quarrel with the findings of the court below that [t]he factual situation giving rise to the allegations is identical in each complaint[, and] the language detailing the alleged fraud in each complaint only varies slightly.
Aplt. Br. at 17 (quoting Aplt.App., Vol. II, at 493) (internal quotations omitted).
. There is no merit in Comstock’s argument that disclosure of information to the Tribe was a former public disclosure. Disclosures of actions that, at the time, were not contained in any of the sources enumerated in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) are not public disclosures.
. Amicus Curiae Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co.’s cites to cases involving § 3729(a)(1) are inapposite because the plain language of the statutes is distinctly different. Sectiоn 3729(a)(1) provides:
Any person who ... knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval ... is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person....
Section 3729(a)(1) requires the existence of a "claim.” Relying mostly on the word claim, some courts interpreting § 3729(a)(1) have held that this provision requires a showing of actual or potential loss to the Government. See,
e.g., Hutchins v. Wilentz Goldman & Spitzer,
Any person who ... knowingly makes, uses, or cause's to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or proрerty to the Government, is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person....
(emphasis added).
. Additionally, Comstock's argument that 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3) deprived the district court of jurisdiction over this suit on behalf of the Government is incorrect. Comstock can point to no earlier suit by the Government that' would trigger the statutory bar. The Tribe is not the equivalent of the Government.
. Comstocks’ motion for leave to file a supplemental brief in response to the brief for the United States which was received by the court on May 7, 2003, is GRANTED.