[¶ 1] Kenmare Education Association (“KEA”) appeals from a judgment denying a petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition sought the removal of contract language in the negotiated agreement inserted by the Kenmare Public School District No. 28 (“School District”) after negotiations failed to resolve a conflict. We hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the writ of mandamus, was, not clearly erroneous in its finding of good faith negotiations, and did not err in concluding the. Sсhool District had the authority to issue a last-offer contract. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] When a speech language pathologist left Kenmare in June 2004, the School District attempted to hire a replacement.
[¶ 3] On April 13, 2005, the School District and KEA began contract negotiations for the following school term. KEA represents the certified teaching personnel within the Kenmare school system as the representative organization. The parties reached agreement on most negotiable issues, but could not resolve one issue proposed by the School District. The School District requested additional contract language that would allow the School District the discretion to pay more than the minimum hiring salary. KEA objected to the proposed language. KEA claimed giving the School District the discretion to increase an individual’s salary would usurp the organization’s power and allow for individual contract negotiations. Following additional negotiations, the School District countered with proposed language that would allow an individuаl in a difficult-to-hire position — as defined by the Educational Standard and Practices Board — to be paid a salary not to exceed $15,000 more than the minimum hiring salary. KEA again objected. The parties agreed they had reached an impasse in negotiations. They requested the North Dakota Education Fact Finding Commission (“Commission”) review the dispute.
[¶ 4] The Commission recommended the School District be allowed to provide for special accommodations оf higher pay only for a speech language pathologist, but not provide additional compensation for any other difficult-to-hire position. Following the Commission’s recommendation, the parties again attempted to negotiate an agreement. When no agreement could be reached, the Commission’s findings were published in the local newspaper.
[¶ 5] Following the publication, the parties engaged in a final round of negotiations, this time including the Schоol District’s final offer. The School District’s final offer — based on what the Commission had recommended — allowed the School District to pay a speech language pathologist an amount up to $15,000 more than the base pay for teachers. The additional pay was limited to this single teaching area and was limited to years in which a speech language pathologist was considered a hard-to-fill-position as defined by the Educational Standard and Practices Board. KEA again objected to this additional language arguing the proposed language would allow the School District to engage in separate contract negotiations, rather than allowing KEA the exclusive right to negotiate for teachers employed by the School District. The School District then unilaterally included this proposed language in the agreement.
[¶ 6] KEA filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in district court requesting the School District be forcеd to remove the additional contractual language in the negotiated agreement.
1
An “Alternative
[¶ 7] KEA appeals claiming the School District did not negotiate in good faith, and the court erred in denying the writ of mandamus because the ’current arrangement allows the School District to unilaterally issue contracts and negotiate with individual teachers. The School District argues the .court did not аbuse its discretion in denying the writ of mandamus, was not clearly erroneous in its finding of good faith negotiations, and properly concluded the School District had authority to include language providing a higher salary for a speech language pathologist.
II
[¶ 8] KEA argues the School District did not negotiate in good faith because it issued contracts based upon a final offer of the School District. KEA petitioned for a writ of mandamus requiring the School District to remove the аdditional contract language regarding the speech language pathologist.
[¶ 9] Issuance of a writ of mandamus .is left to the sound discretion of the district court.
Wutzke v. Hoberg,
[¶ 10] Section 32-34-01, N.D.C.C., governs the issuance of writs of mandamus:
The writ of mandamus may be issued by the supreme and district courts to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station....
[¶ 11] A petitioner for a writ of mandamus must first demonstrate a clear legal right to performance of the particular act sought to be compelled by the writ.
Ward County Farm Bureau v. Poolman,
[¶ 12] KEA argues
Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n,
Hilton therefore was a teacher for purposes of the teachers’ representation and negotiation law, and we conclude the trial court correctly decided Hilton was a member of the C.E.A. appropriate negotiating unit. Because Hilton was a member of the C.E.A. appropriate negotiating unit, he was bound under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1 by the negotiated agreement between the C.E.A. appropriate negotiating unit and the School District.
Id. at ¶ 19. Hilton is distinguishable from this case. In Hilton, the core issue this Court was deciding was whether a counsel- or, who was certificated under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-36 and who did not devote more than half time to administrative duties, was a teacher as defined by statute. This Court detеrmined the counselor was a teacher and therefore Hilton was “bound under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1 by the negotiated agreement” between the “negotiating unit and the School District.” Id.
[¶ 13] The process of getting to the negotiated agreement was not at issue in Hilton, as it is here. Although the resolution of the negotiations in this case included the imposition of a provision that will allow a single position to be treated differently from other teachers, that resolution does not conflict with Hilton beсause it is part of the negotiated agreement resulting from the negotiations between the parties. Further, that provision is subject to the limitations discussed below.
Ill
[¶ 14] If a statutory representative organization is formed, a school district must negotiate with the representative organization under N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-08, and must negotiate in good faith. N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-13.
[¶ 15] Unlike a private sector employee, a teacher does not have the option of engaging in a strike.
See
N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-16. As such, teachers are оften without the ultimate bargaining weapon that could pressure their employers into agreement. In order to compensate for the lack of a right to strike, the legislature has enacted an impasse provision that allows for mediation and a fact-finding process through the Commission.
See
N.D.C.C. §§ 15.1-16-02, 15.1-16-15. The Commission does not have binding authority on the parties, but does have the authority to make its findings public.
Dickinson Educ. Ass’n v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist.,
[¶ 16] In
Dickinson Educ. Ass’n v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
We find that the statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., recognizes that there comes a point — after the conclusion of a good faith negotiation process — when a school board must be allowed to make contractual offers to the teachers of a school system, which contracts the teachers must choose either to accept or to reject. It should be noted that the provisions of such contracts so offered, relative to the status of negotiations, would be important factors in the determination of a school board’s motive.
Id.
at 209-10 (emphasis removed);
see also Edgeley Educ. Ass’n v. Edgeley Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 3,
[¶ 17] The power of school districts to issue last-offer contracts was limited by Dickinson II. In Dickinson II, we stated:
We recognize that NDCC Ch. 15-38.1 does not place school boards and public school teachers on equal footing in contract negotiations. In all contract nеgotiations conducted under NDCC Ch. 15-38.1, a school board always holds a trump card — the power to unilaterally issue last-offer contracts, which teachers must either accept or reject — ranking higher than any held by the teachers. Because of that tremendous disparity in bargaining power, we decline to extend Edgeley II to allow a school board to unilaterally issue last-offer contracts containing provisions that, while not applicable to the school year that is the subject of negotiation, are applicable to a future year not yet under negotiation.
Dickinson II,
[¶ 18] This case falls under the Dickinson I analysis because the School District did not attempt to impose its last offer on future negotiatiоn periods, as was attempted under Dickinson II. The School District’s last offer was limited to the contractual provisions for the current period of negotiations. KEA argues the School District does not have the power to issue this last-offer contract. This argument would essentially require us to overrule our previous decisions in Dickinson I and Edgeley II.
[¶ 19] In previous decisions, we requested a legislative solution that would correct our interpretation had we wrongly interpreted the statute.
See, e.g., Dickinson I,
[¶ 20] We are mindful that a school district’s authority to end contract negotiations creates unequal bargaining power. But pragmatically speaking, were negotiations to proceed unrestricted for an unlimited amount of bargaining, the School District and KEA might never form a
[¶ 21] KEA has not demonstrated a clear legal right to the removal of the additional contract language regarding a speech language pathologist, nor has it demonstrated the denial of the writ was an abuse of discretion. The district court correctly determined KEA was not entitled to the writ.
IV
[¶ 22] KEA argues the School District did not negotiate in good faith becausе it issued a contract in violation of KEA’s right to negotiate on behalf of the teachers. KEA bears the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the School District did not negotiate in good faith.
Edgeley II,
[¶ 23] Under N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-13, a duty of good faith negotiations is required of a school district and the representative organization. The overall conduct of the partiеs is evaluated to determine whether good faith negotiations have occurred. The statutory definition of good faith found in N.D.C.C. § 1-01-21 applies in teacher-contract negotiations:
Good faith shall consist in an honest intention to abstain from taking any un-conseientious advantage of another even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious.
Belfield Educ. Ass’n,
[¶ 24] KEA has not demonstrated the court’s finding that the School District acted in good faith was clearly erroneous. Initially, the School District requested the following additional language: “At the discretion of the board, in hard to fill positions, the individual being hired may be paid over the minimum hiring salary.” There were several more negotiating sessions between the parties. During those meetings, all outstanding issues were settled between parties except for the additional language to increase wages above the salary schedule. The School District modified its proposal to be: “At the discretion of the board in hard to fill positions (defined by Educational Standard and Practices Board), the individual hired may be paid over the minimum hiring salary not to exceed $15,000.” The dispute was thеn brought before the Commission. After the Commission released its report, the parties again tried to negotiate an agreement, but were unsuccessful. Finally, the School District issued its final proposal that was included in the contract. The final language stated: “In years when speech language path[ologist] (SLP) has been classified by the ESPB as a hard to fill position, the board in [its] full discretion may offer an SLP candidate an annual salary which may exceed, by $15000 or less, that salаry which is otherwise authorized by this negotiated agreement.”
[¶ 25] KEA has not pointed to any specific instances of conduct that would demonstrate bad faith by the School District.
V
[¶ 26] KEA argues that as a matter of law it has the exclusive right to negotiate on behalf of the teachers in the district and the School District does not have the right to impose a contract provision which permits negotiations with individual teachers.
[¶ 27] By statute, teachers are not required to join a representative organization such as KEA. Section 15.1 — 16— 07(1), N.D.C.C., states: “An individual employed as a teacher may form, join, and participate in the activities of a representative organization of the individual’s choosing for the purpose of representation on matters of employer-employee relations.” N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-07(1) (emphasis added). Teachers may also “refuse to join or participate in the activities of a representative organization.” N.D.C.C. § 15.1 — 16— 07(3). Nowhere in N.D.C.C. ch. 15.1-16 is the word “exclusive” used. KEA attempts to read an exclusivity requirement from N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-08: “A representative organization has the right to represent a negotiating unit in matters of employee relations with the board of a school district. Any teacher or administrator has the right to present the individual’s views directly to the board.”
[¶ 28] Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to full review upon appeal.
Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n,
Our primary objective in the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. We look first to the language of the statute. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. If a statute’s language is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, we may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history, along with the language of the statute, to ascertain legislative intent.
Harter v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp.,
[¶ 29] We have previously determined portions of the former version of the code ambiguous and have resorted to extrinsic aids, including legislative histоry, to interpret the statute.
See, e.g., Hilton,
[¶ 30] The 2001 Legislative Assembly created an omnibus bill that revised several provisions of the education code previously found in Title 15.
See
2001 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 181. The bill'was designed
15-38.1-08. Right to negotiate. Representative organizations have thе right to represent the appropriate negotiating unit in matters of employee relations with the school board. Any teacher, or administrator, has the right to present his views directly to the school board.
with the final version of N.D.C.C. § 15.1— 16-08:
15-38.1-08. 15.1-16-08. Representative organization — Negotiating unit— Right to negotiate. Representative-organizations have A representative organization has the right to represent the-appropriate a negotiating unit in matters of employee relations with the school board of a school district. Any teacher, or administrator, has the right to present his the individual’s views directly to the school board.
[¶ 31] The “embellished” version of N.D.C.C. § 15.1-16-08 (created in House Bill No. 1045) proposed by NDEA and rejected by the Legislative Assembly рrovided:
A representative organization has the exclusive right to represent a negotiating unit in matters of employee relations with a school board. An individual employed as a teacher or as an administrator may independently present the individual’s views to a school board, but may not enter into independent negotiations with the board.
(Emphasis added).
[¶ 32] KEA is asserting a position that was rejected by the Legislative Assembly. It is not the province of this Court to enact judicially what the legislature rejected. Rather, we look to the statute to determine whether the negotiated agreement can provide for discriminate treatment of a single teacher. Section 15.1-16-13(1), N.D.C.C., provides:
The board of a school district or its representatives and the representative organization or its representatives shall, if requested by either entity, meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good faith regarding:
a. The terms and conditions of employment.
b. Employer-employee relations.
c. Formation of a contract, which may contain a provision for binding arbitration.
d. The interpretation of an existing contract.
We dеtermine a and b of this subsection are broad enough to encompass a provision in the negotiated agreement that permits the School District to contract with an individual teacher on a distinct basis subject to the limitations outlined above. There is no suggestion in this record that the School District intended to or did negotiate separately with any teacher except for the speech language pathologist which negotiations would be constrained by the limits of the negotiated agreement. Under these facts, we conclude the limited ability to contract separately for an identified teacher need is not contrary to N.D.C.C. ch. 15.1-16.
VI
[¶ 33] We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Notes
. Although the parties failed to resolve this area of dispute we will, as the parties did,
. While both Dickinson I and Dickinson II addressed the statutory scheme found under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1, the same statutory scheme is in place at N.D.C.C. ch. 15.1-16. Thus, the same analysis is applicable.