21 Conn. App. 424 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1990
In this summary process action, the defendant tenant appeals from the judgment awarding possession to the plaintiff landlord. The defendant claims that the court erred in failing to require the plaintiff to demonstrate a good faith desire for a higher rent sufficient to constitute good cause for purposes of terminating the defendant’s federally subsidized § 8 tenancy.
In 1980, the plaintiff rented a four bedroom apartment in Ansonia to the defendant for a monthly rent
Under the § 8 program, the total rent for a particular unit is based on a schedule of fair market rents for the locality; 24 C.F.R. § 882.106; and a landlord’s termination rights are subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
The plaintiff brought this action to terminate the defendant’s tenancy on the ground that he desired to rent the apartment at a higher rent. The trial court found that, although the apartment was classified as a four bedroom unit under the § 8 program, the defend
The defendant’s claim that the court erred by rendering judgment for the plaintiff is in two parts: (1) the court ignored the federal good cause requirement for termination; and (2) the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his stated desire for a higher rent was held in “good faith.” We disagree.
We reject the defendant’s argument that the court ignored the good cause requirement for termination. The principal issue at trial was whether the plaintiff met the good cause requirement as provided in the lease and the federal regulation. That issue was vigorously argued throughout the trial and in the oral arguments following the evidence. The court rendered judgment orally from the bench after the oral arguments, and filed an articulation of its ruling thereafter. Although the court did not explicitly use the term “good cause,” it is clear, from the context of the court’s ruling and from its specific finding that the plaintiff proved a desire for a higher rent, that its decision was based on the good cause requirement.
The defendant’s argument in this respect is based on several remarks made by the court in the course of certain colloquies with the defendant’s counsel during the proceedings. Those comments arguably indicated that the court erroneously perceived the legal status between the parties to be that of a conventional
With respect to the defendant’s second argument, namely, that the plaintiff failed to prove a “good faith” desire for a higher rent, we agree that 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (c) (1) (iii) requires the landlord’s desire for a higher rent to be held in good faith. In this case, however, the record supports the court’s implied finding that the plaintiff established good faith.
In Park Terrace Associates Limited Partnership v. Taylor, 9 Conn. App. 477, 519 A.2d 1225 (1987), we assumed good faith to be a component of a § 8 landlord’s desire for a higher rent pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (c) (2) (iii). In upholding the trial court’s conclusion that federal law had been satisfied, we stated that “there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the termination of the tenancy was motivated by a good faith desire to rent the unit at a higher rent.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 480. This assumption stems from common sense. The “good cause” requirement for termination derives from the federal statute; see footnote 1, supra; and under the federal regulation implementing that statutory standard, the landlord’s desire for a higher rent is one of the examples constituting good cause. See footnote 2, supra. It would be an aberrant reading, indeed, of the statutory and regulatory term, “good cause,” if it were held to indicate a desire for a higher rent entertained without good faith or in bad faith.
This conclusion is buttressed by the regulatory commentary to 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (c), and by a decision of at least one other appellate court that has specifically addressed this issue. The regulatory history of the
In common usage, the term “good faith” has “ ‘a well defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation.’ 35 C. J.S. 488 and cases cited. It has been well defined as meaning ‘An honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or tech
Applying these standards, we conclude that the court impliedly found that the plaintiff had a good faith desire for a higher rent. Although the court did not explicitly state that the plaintiff’s desire for a higher rate was held in good faith, it did describe the evidence of that desire as “overwhelming.” Furthermore, as disclosed by our reading of the trial record, the plaintiff did not dispute the defendant’s claim that a showing of a good faith desire for a higher rent was required; the plaintiff argued that the evidence established such a desire. In the light of this posture of the case as tried, we read the court’s articulation as containing an implicit finding that there was a good faith desire by the plaintiff for a rent higher than was afforded under the § 8 program.
That finding was not clearly erroneous. As the defendant argues, there was evidence that would have justified a finding that the plaintiff’s stated desire for a higher rent was pretextual, was not held in good faith, and was motivated solely by a desire to withdraw the defendant’s apartment from the § 8 program without regard to the amount of rent. There was also evidence, however, from which the court could, and did, find that
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended in 1974; 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; established the housing assistance payments program known as the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, which provides for various types of assisted housing. The purpose of the Section 8 program is to “[aid] lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and . . . [to promote] economically mixed housing . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (a).
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (d) (1) (B) (ii) provides that “[c]ontracts to make assistance payments entered into by a public housing agency with an owner of existing housing units shall provide (with respect to any unit) that—the owner shall not terminate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State or local law, or for other good cause.”
24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (c) (2) provides in pertinent part that “[t]he following are some examples of ‘other good cause’ for termination of tenancy by the Owner: ... a business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy (such as sale of the property, renovation of the unit, desire to rent the unit at a higher rental).”