55 Ark. 318 | Ark. | 1892
The court, found, in accordance with the evidence, that the equitable title to the land was in Kendall, and that Davis’s grantor held the legal title as security for a. usurious loan. But it found that Davis was induced by Kendall to make the purchase, and we find no evidence to-support this finding. The contrary is distinctly stated by Davis, who in his deposition says that he never spoke to Kendall on that subject until after he made the purchase. He nowhere indicates that.he made the purchase in reliance upon anything done or said by Kendall, and the evidence is conclusive that he did not. As he purchased from one who-did not own the land but held the legal title only as security for a debt, he acquired no more than his grantor had, unless there is something in the conduct of the appellant to enlarge his acquisition. To this end two matters are relied upon.
The appellant does not show the dates or amounts of payments made by him, and we cannot find that they exceeded the principal and lawful interest; he therefore fails to bring himself within the rule stated, if it prevails in this State—a question which we need not determine.
The statutes of the State contain no express provision with reference to the recovery of money paid on usurious contracts; and we see nothing in them to enlarge the common law rule, as above stated, if it is preserved. They prohibit the taking of excessive interest; and while they provide that all contracts for excessive interest shall be entirely void and not enforcible in the courts, they nowhere prohibit the collection of the, principal and lawful interest; and neither the party paying, nor the party receiving, the same violates the letter or spirit of any law. Such payment is not only not prohibited by the statutes of the State, but has been, since their enactment, recognized as a moral duty, for the courts of equity, prior to the act of 1887, following the rule in England, declined to grant affirmative relief against them, except upon the payment of the principal and lawful interest. As there is nothing in the statutes to prohibit such payments, we think they should be treated as voluntary, and held not to be recoverable.
There was no error in the court’s judgment in this regard, but the court did err in finding that the appellant was es-topped to assert his equitable right to the land or to demand that the legal title be vested in him.
The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in accordance with this .opinion.