Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc.

Plaintiff-Respondent, Ken Kempfer, Defendant-Appellant. Finishing, Inc., Automated Supreme Court 31, 1996. June argument Oral October No. 95-0649. Decided 20, 1997. 692.) (Alsoreported in 564 N.W.2d AbRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs.

Bradley, J., joins.

STEINMETZ, J., concurs. defendant-appellant by For the there were briefs Joseph Redding, Napierala Glojek E. Thomas R. argument by Limited, Allis and oral Thomas R. West Napierala. plaintiff-respondent

For the there was a brief Joseph Widmann, & J. Welcenbach Welcenbach argument by Joseph S.C., Milwaukee and oral J. Shneidman, and Patricia Meunier of Welcenbach Myers, Dowling, Ehlke, Domer, Hawks & Blumenfield, Milwaukee. by Timothy

Amicus curiae brief was filed G. Cos- Costello, S.C., tello and Krukowski & Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

¶ 1. P. WILCOX, JON J. This case is on certifi- appeals following jury cation from the court of trial. jury plaintiff, Kempfer concluded that Ken (Kempfer), damages past was $22,167 entitled to wages wages $145,000 and benefits and for future lost Finishing, Incorporated and benefits from Automated (AFI) wrongful discharge. for his The Circuit Court for County, Snyder, Judge, Waukesha Patrick L. denied appealed. AFI's motions after AFI verdict. (1)

¶ 2. On certification, whether, we consider: as Kempfer law, matter of identified a fundamental and (2) public policy, Kempfer, well-defined whether employee-at-will, demonstrated that he was termi- refusing contrary nated for to act to a fundamental and (3) public policy; well-defined whether the circuit erroneously by allowing court exercised its discretion jury awarding damages wage to consider of future Kempfer loss. We hold that identified a fundamental public policy and well-defined and that he was termi- refusing contrary public policy; nated for to act erroneously however, we also hold that the circuit court jury exercised its discretion when it allowed the to con- awarding damages Kempfer's wage sider future loss. The circuit court should have determined whether feasible, reinstatement was feasible. If it was not amount, circuit court should have determined what any, if necessary Kempfer of front was to make part part in and reverse Thus, we affirm whole. court. of the circuit decision dispute. not The relevant facts are Kempfer defendant, October AFI, on was hired initially assigned perform urethane to 8, 1981. He was years, Kempfer's approximately After five mold work. point began job began vary AFI to to and at some duties employees Kempfer to make as- and three other ask Har- a 22-foot International needed deliveries with purchased in truck. The truck had been vester flatbed registered Depart- weight with the 1984 and its was Transportation pounds. At the time 32,000 as ment of Kempfer

began driving AFI truck, indicated only requirement valid, that the drivers hold was regular driver license. returning Kempfer,

¶ while 1,1993, 4. On March delivery, stopped by patrol a state officer from a was that the truck had a cracked wind- who had noticed warning AFI tickets to shield. The officer issued Kempfer having for not cracked windshield and to (CDL). explained driver license The officer commercial weight Kempfer his truck was that due to the of required by further viola- law to hold a CDL and that personal jail fines and/or time. tions would result plant, Kempfer returned to the 5. When he f plant manager. Kempfer gave both citations to trips Department of four then made first (DMV) to learn more about the CDL Motor Vehicles up requirements. picked He informational book- some gave requirements the CDL which he later lets about employer. his Kempfer subsequently

¶ to drive 6. AFI asked separate Kempfer the truck on six occasions. refused required stating have the each time that he did not Kempfer CDL to drive the truck. stated that he was not get told AFI to a CDL and that he would have Accordingly, needed use AFI's truck to take the test. he never obtained a CDL. morning April plant 7. On the 16, 1994,

manager again Kempfer told to drive the truck. Kempfer stating refused that he did not have the proper licensing. plant manager found another reported Kempfer's truck, to drive the Kempfer suspended result, refusal. As a was for two days. Kempfer then went to the DMVfor a fourth time. explain An at the DMV called AFI to the CDL requirement operation company of the truck. Upon returning suspension April from his on Kempfer position 20, 1994, was informed that his had accordingly, eliminated, and, been he was fired. Kempfer's Bonney, foreman, Mark was also fired for refusing sign Kempfer's suspension notice. Kempfer alleging

¶ 9. filed suit that he was wrongfully discharged refusing public pol- for to violate icy. argued Kempfer AFI at trial that was released cost-cutting of because efforts to reduce the labor force. Following three-day jury a trial, found that Kempfer suspended was and fired for his refusal to operate company Kempfer truck without a CDL. was awarded back and in the benefits amount of jury Kempfer $22,167. The $145,000 also awarded wages future lost and benefits. The circuit court denied appealed. AFI's motions after verdict and AFI H-i ¶ 10. The first issue that we address is whether Kempfer as a matter law, of identified a fundamental public policy. question and well-defined This issue is a law, of Bradstreet, v. Dun & 113 Wis. 2d (1983), that this court 573-574, 335 N.W.2d Hospi Memorial v. Beloit novo. Winkelman reviews de (1992). 12, 24, 483 N.W.2d 2d tal, 168 Wis. proving plaintiff-employee of the burden bears public policy. of a clear mandate violates dismissal Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574. employee-at-will doctrine, an Under the good may discharge employee-at-will

employer "for an morally wrong, cause, or even for cause cause, for no legal wrong." being thereby guilty Id. at 567. without "narrowly recognized circum a this court has However, general exception" public policy Id. to this rule. scribed exception provides Specifically, an this at 574. refusing discharge employer not an a fundamental well-defined to violate command Brewing public policy. Co., 134 Wis. Bushko v. Miller (1986). 396 N.W.2d 167 136, 141, 2d public policy recognized court first 12. This employee-at-will exception doctrine explained Brockmeyer. case, In that this court what public a fundamental well-defined was meant policy: embodying the com- policy concept is broad

Public and common conscience. munity common sense of the Wisconsin Constitution provisions . . .The of this state. initially public policies declared the amended, that also is Each time the constitution addition, public public policy. In expression in the regularly adopted promulgated policy public pol- declarations of legislation. form of These every inherently incorporated into icy are relationship. employment at will vagueness concept Given the of the public policy, necessary it is that we more precise be about the public contours of the policy exception. A wrongful discharge is actionable when the termination clearly public contravenes the gravely welfare and paramount violates requirements public interest. public policy must be evidenced a constitu- An be statutory provision. tional or cannot refusing to violate the constitution or a stat- fired for ute. Employers will be held liable those terminations that effectuate an unlawful end.

We recognize intend to an existing public limited policy exception. employer may An require not an employee to violate a statutory constitutional or provision with impunity. If an employee refuses to manner, act in an unlawful the employer would be violating public policy by terminating for such behavior.

Brockmeyer, added). 113 Wis. 2d at 573 (emphasis However, this court warned:

Courts proceed cautiously should making when public policy determinations. No employer should subject be merely to suit discharged because a employee's conduct praiseworthy was or because public may have derived some benefit from it. Id. at 573-74. This court's rejection of an expansive exception to the employee-at-will doctrine is also illus- trated by the refusal to impose implied covenant and fair dealing on employers:

We refuse impose duty in good terminate faith into contracts. To do so would "subject discharge judicial each incursions into amorphous concept Moreover, of bad faith." we feel it unnecessary and unwarranted for the courts any termination

to become arbiters good Imposing attached. faith tinge have a bad restrict an unduly terminate would duty faith force. managing the work employer's discretion omitted). (citation Id. at 569 Wisconsin's considered again 13. This court employee-at-will exception policy narrow public case, this 2d 136. In that Bushko, 134 Wis. doctrine exception the public policy whether considered court discharged acting who were employees included public and well-defined with a fundamental consistent employer no order when there was policy This court stated: the public policy. violate Brockmeyer to required under is not plaintiff in the dis- had an evil intent employer prove or other Likewise, allegations gratuitous charge. of action will not save a cause of evil intent evidence if summary judgment motion for from defendant's by Brockmeyer pre- are not required the elements allege and requires employee Brockmeyer sent. refusing to violate discharged for that he was attest Although statutory provision. a constitutional or provide relief for Brockmeyer was intended intent, it did so a victim of evil employee who was circumstances. very limited under the standards cause of action and defined the the trial way that summary judgment in such a of the into the intent inquire need not judge employer. pub- to violate refuses a command

An who public policy. acting consistent with policy lic is acts However, of his own volition if the no more policy, he does consistently public with obey than action, law. Such consistent without an employer's otherwise, command to do merely "praiseworthy" conduct.

Id. at 141-42. Accordingly, public policy exception does not in apply cases where the employee-at-will is simply discharged acting with consistently the fun- damental and well-defined public policy; there must be an order by the employer to violate the public policy. 14. We are with provided further guidance on of this scope public policy exception by this court's decision in Winkelman, 168 Wis. 2d 12. In case, that this court considered whether a fundamental and well- defined public policy could be evidenced an by adminis- trative rule rather than a statutory or constitutional provision. Id. at 21. This court stated:

We hold that where a fundamental and well-defined public policy by is evidenced an rule, administrative a discharge for refusal to violate public policy that is actionable. The guiding principle Brockmeyer of is not a slavish adherence to the arbitrary require ment that the public policy by be evidenced statutory or rather, constitutional procedure; it is that an employer must not be allowed to discharge for the employee's refusal to violate a formally stated, fundamental pub well-defined and lic policy which has the effect of law. Heretofore we have required that the public policy by be evidenced statutory or provision constitutional as a means to protect public by from frivolous lawsuits allowing the circuit court to screen cases on motions to dismiss or summary motions judgment. [Brockmeyer, 113 574]. Wis. 2d at The facts of this case make clear that public policy that is fundamen tal important may be in enunciated' administrative rules and that to use such rules will administra- An type

not frustrate this screening. rule, statutory constitutional as as or tive well public a clear expression contain provision, policy. recog- Accordingly, Winkelman, this court at 22.

Id. exception public policy of the nized that the definition and well-defined includes fundamental statutory, policies by public are evidenced consti- provisions. However, this tutional, or administrative case and it does not does not include law definition every statutory, constitutional, or adminis- mean provision a fundamental well- trative evidences policy. public defined public policy not in a If a contained statu- provision,

tory, it constitutional, or administrative exception public policy fall under cannot employee-at-will just However, because a doctrine. statutory, public policy is a constitu- evidenced provision mean tional, or does not that administrative by recognized exception. This it falls under was this in court Winkelman: that

We however do not hold all administrative implicate public policy. rules fundamental Neither Rather, it is the of either a do all statutes. content a funda- rule or statute determines whether that public mental is stated. policy Accordingly, public policy must at 24. still be Id. and found to be fundamental well defined. This is by Brockmeyer. guidelines set in determined forth Brockmeyer, 2d at See 113 Wis. 573-74.1 likely satisfy note that less We an administrative rule is requirements a the fundamental than statu well-defined and likely tory provision statutory provision and is less that a rise public exception policy Thus, 16. employee-at-will the Wisconsin very only to the doctrine is narrow. It provides employee may discharged an not be refusing a command to a violate fundamental well- public policy by defined that is evidenced a constitu- statutory, provision. tional, or administrative With the exception public policy, employer may a of such an dis- charge any employee-at-will an reason or no reason. public policy recog- 17. AFI contends that the by employer nized the circuit court —that cannot require grounded someone to violate the law—was not specific statutory provision in a constitutional or which public pol- evidenced a fundamental and well-defined icy. Kempfer asserts that the circuit court identified (1) public policies: two fundamental and well-defined public policy against improperly licensed commer- 343.05(2)(a) § cial drivers evidenced Wis. Stat. (2) (1993-94);2 public policy against employers ordering employees to violate a statute carried penalties. criminal Kempfer

¶ 18. find that a We identified funda- policy public mental and well-defined sufficient level of fundamental and well defined than constitu- provision. tional stated, statutory Unless otherwise all future references 343.05(2)(a) are to provides the 1993-94 volume. Wis. Stat. part: relevant (2) (a) person may operate a Vehicles, No Commercial Motor upon highway vehicle commercial motor this state unless the

person following: is one of the years age, 1. A who is at of is not resident least who disqualified 343.315, s. under who has valid commercial driver revoked, and, canceled, suspended, expired not license which is or 343.04(2), any operation type for the of under s. has an vehicle authorizing operation type. endorsement vehicle public policy exception

invoke Wisconsin's employee-at-will 343.05(2)(a) § doctrine. Wis. Stat. sets requirements operating forth the for a commercial person operates vehicle in Wisconsin. If a a commercial complying requirements vehicle without with these employer may subject penal- driver and his or her be guidelines § ties under Wis. Stat. 343.245. The for operating commercial vehicle contained 343.05(2)(a) designed promote highway which are safety punished and violation of which be fine andlor incarceration constitute a fundamental public policy-to promote highway well-established safety through regulations penalties. the use of

II. ¶ 19. The next issue that we address is whether Kempfer, employee-at-will, demonstrated that he refusing contrary was terminated for to act to a funda public policy. jury mental and well-defined This is a finding any that this court will not overturn if there is supports Coryell credible evidence that the verdict. Conn, 310, 315, (1979). 88 Wis. 2d 276 N.W.2d 723 In addition, light this court views the evidence in the most Keane, favorable to the verdict. Roach v. 73 Wis. 2d 524, 536, (1976). 243 N.W.2d 508 already Kempfer

¶ 20. As we have found that public pol- identified a fundamental and well-defined icy, only any we need determine whether credible supports jury's finding Kempfer evidence that was discharged refusing contrary public to act to that policy. sup- AFI contends that there is no evidence port Kempfer failing was terminated to act contrary public policy. support to a fundamental In contention, only Kempfer this AFT states could prevent have obtained a CDL and that AFI did not him doing only from so. AFI further states that it told Kempfer to "drive the truck."

¶ 21. We conclude that under the facts this commanding Kempfer case to drive the truck with full knowledge required that he did not have the license is commanding public pol- him tantamount to to violate icy. At the time that AFI ordered him to drive the truck Kempfer Kempfer it knew that did not have a CDL. suspended by refused to drive the truck and was AFI. Accordingly, support there is credible evidence to the jury's finding Kempfer discharged was for refus- ing contrary act to a fundamental and well-defined public policy.

I I I ¶ 22. The last issue that we consider is whether erroneously the circuit court its discretion exercised allowing jury awarding damages to consider wage Discretionary future loss. acts of the circuit court upheld are absent an erroneous exercise of discretion. Johnson, 137, 143-44, Johnson v. 78 Wis. 2d 254 (1977). apply proper N.W.2d 202 Failure to standard of law an erroneous exercise of discretion. Loy Bunderson, 400, 411-15, 320 2d N.W.2d Wis. (1982). During case, the trial in this course of jury decided the circuit court to allow the consider wage Kempfer whether would suffer a future loss. gave jury following circuit court instruction: you plaintiff If are satisfied that will suffer a and as the natural result of wage future benefit loss discharge, your then include answer wrongful his reasonably fairly 2 such sum as will question wages future loss of plaintiff for such compensate ... benefits exercise of the that this was an erroneous AFI contends employ in an at-will circuit court's discretion because relationship foreseeable future there are no ment damages upon of future lost to base an award which parties earnings cannot foresee the dura because the relationship. Kempfer employment asserts tion of the Weyenberg appeals in of the court of that the decisions Mfg. 373, 410 604 Seidl, Co. v. 140 Wis. 2d N.W.2d Shoe (Ct. 1987), Casualty Brogan App. Co., Ins. v. Industrial (Ct. 1986), App. 439 229, 2d 392 N.W.2d 132 Wis. Stoughton Hosp. Assoc., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d Hale (Ct. 1985), App. illustrate that future N.W.2d excep public policy wages in are an available tion cases. Weyenberg, jury that the In determined wrongfully partici- terminated for had been jury guard

pating in national exercises. The awarded past damages, employee $57,000 $35,000 damages, $15,000 for lost bene- future appeals agreed the trial court fits. The court of with support jury's that there was sufficient evidence finding plaintiff participat- was terminated for ing guard However, in the national exercises. the court appeals fall also held that the termination did not Brockmeyer public policy exception to the under the employee-at-will doctrine: going guard plaintiffs] [the

Because action is consistent with than public policy rather camp to violate public policy, termination for said refusal extremely conduct does not fall within the narrow exception ofthe at will doctrine under Brockmeyer smdBushko.

Weyenberg, (emphasis original). 140 Wis. 2d at 383 appeals upheld jury's The court of instead award of damages finding plaintiff based on a that the had been discharged in Veterans' violation of the Vietnam Era 2021(b)(3) Readjustment § Act, Assistance 38 U.S.C. (1982). Kempfer Weyenberg contends that the decision significant appeals upheld is propriety because the court of jury's damages

of the award of future to an employee. significant at-will We do not find this as case public policy exception it does not concern the to the employee-at-will doctrine. Whether an award of future 2021(b)(3) damages appropriate under 38 U.S.C. (1982) does not bear on whether such an award is con- Brockmeyer, and, thus, sistent with available under public policy exception employee-at-will doctrine. Kempfer

¶ 25. next on, The case that relies Bro- gan, public policy exception also did not involve the employee-at-will the doctrine. This was a breach of con- tract case that centered on whether the contract was (1983-84). rendered void Wis. Stat. 611.63 Bro- gan, appeals 132 Wis. 2d at 233. The court of held that upheld jury's the contract was not void and the award damages plaintiff. particular signifi- of future Of according Kempfer, appeals' cance, is the court of "[t]he damages statement that amount of awarded is resting largely jury's matter in the discretion." Id. at relying appeals' In 238. so on the court of decision in Brogan, Kempfer fails to consider distinction the employed pursuant between those to a contract and employed those who are at will. This case not does pertain employment relationship to the at-will and is not our relevant to decision. appeals' Kempfer relies on the court of also plaintiff brought case, the suit in Hale. In that

decision wrongful employer against termination his former trial, At the with contract. and tortious interference questions. question jury given The first two verdict was wrong- defendant-employer had the involved whether question fully plaintiff-employee. This terminated accompanying from instruction was derived and the appeals in v. Dun & decision the court of (Ct. App. 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 1982). question the tortious The second concerned jury did not with contract claim. interference plain- question, found that the answer the second but discharged. Shortly wrongfully after the tiff had been rejected jury Hale, in this court returned its verdict appeals' holding Brockmeyer. in The circuit court of wrong applied the law and court concluded that it had plaintiff-employee whether the ordered a new trial on Kempfer wrongfully contends had terminated. been position supports his because the court that Hale wages appeals the award of future endorsed Kempfer wrongful fails to men- termination case. What plaintiff-employee in Hale was not an tion is that the appeals employee-at-will. The court of stated: wrongful question Nor does the termination duty adequately instruction describe hospital accepted bylaw. agree its We employ- than a mere "at will" bylaw creates more relationship. employer, Unlike an "at will" ment discharge [the not [defendant-employer] could any or even no cause. plaintiff-employee] for Weyen Hale, Thus, 2d at 275. neither Hale, Wis. berg, Brogan employee- nor is relevant to whether an discharged refusing at-will who is for a fun- violate public policy pay. damental is entitled to front ¶ 27. Our of this determination issue is con- by Brockmeyer. trolled this court's decision in In Brockmeyer, this court held that under Wisconsin's public policy exception employee-at-will doc- wrongfully discharged employee's right trine, the compensation reaching inis In contract. this conclu- wrongful sion, the court considered whether such a discharge appropriately brought suit would most be as a tort or contract This court action. determined that damages appropriate contract was more because the damages available in those suits stemming reflected best the wrongful discharge from suits: significant most distinction our view two between the causes of action in dis- wrongful charge damages is in suits be actions, In tort only recovered. limitations are "proximate public policy those of cause" or consider- are damages ations. Punitive also In allowed. by are limited con- actions, damages contract cepts foreseeability mitigation. The remedies majority wrongful established of Wisconsin discharge statutes are limited to reinstatement and backpay, believe We concepts. contractual backpay appro- are the reinstatement most priate public policy exception remedies wrongful discharges primary since concern the wronged employee these actions is to make "whole." Therefore, we conclude that a contract wrongful discharges. action is most appropriate added). Brockmeyer, (emphasis 113 Wis. 2d at 575 Accordingly, Brockmeyer proposition stands for the appropri- backpay are the most reinstatement and

that ate remedies. argues Brockmeyer Kempfer

¶ did not 28. wrongfully damages expressly for a dis- limit the charged employee-at-will and reinstatement remedy. appropriate backpay there is a more when According Kempfer, appropriate it in this is more wages future instead of reinstate- to award him case agree an there some cases where ment. We be necessary pay in lieu of is award of front reinstatement wronged employee However, as whole. to make the damages cases to limited in almost all only pay backpay, front can be reinstatement and is avenue to make available when there no other pay only employee an words, whole. In other is in those in which the available cases discharged refusing to violate fundamen- has been public policy is and reinstatement tal well-defined not feasible. not if 29. Reinstatement is feasible placed be in the same or a similar cannot company

position or if the refuses reinstate employee. is However, reinstatement not infeasible simply plaintiff does claims that he or she because get employer plaintiff along or not with because working is claims that he or she not comfortable previously him her. someone who terminated or In those situations where reinstatement not feasible an award of front is still limited concepts foreseeability mitigation. See Brockmeyer, Klug 575; 113 Wis. at see 2d also Corp., 2d 141, Flambeau Plastics 62 Wis. (1974) injured (requiring party in that the

N.W.2d situation "must make reasonable mitigate damages."). determining efforts to Thus, in whether front is available, when reinstatement already has been infeasible, deemed the court must (1) pay, any, consider the extent of front if foreseeable (2) under the circumstances of the case, and what effect employee's mitigation will have on the award of pay. front Accordingly,

¶ 31. the circuit court must first determine whether reinstatement is feasible. If the cir- cuit court concludes that reinstatement is not feasible jury then the court rather than the should determine pay, any, necessary amount of front if that is to wronged employee make the whole. See Stafford Systems Corp., Supp. Electronic Data 741 F. 664, 667 (E.D. 1990). present Mich. In the case, the circuit court did not consider whether reinstatement infeasible, was question pay jury. but submitted the of front erroneously Thus, we hold that the circuit court exer- jury cised its discretion when it allowed the to consider wage damages future loss in its determination. The cause is remanded for a determination ofwhether rein- statement is not feasible, and, so, if for a calculation of pay front the circuit court.

By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is part part. affirmed in and reversed in ¶ 32. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF (concurring). agree majority opin- JUSTICE I with the preliminary question ion's resolution ofthe case, in this plaintiff discharged that the was in violation of a fun- public policy. agree damental and well-defined I also the case should be remanded to determine pay and, so, if awarded how front should be whether much. (1) separately: the availa- I write because 33. discharge

bility pay for of an at-will of an award of front explain why I I is not and want to obvious (2) sug- to available; be that front should conclude might gest court considerations circuit several (3) awarding pay upon remand; and in front entertain explore respective court and to roles the circuit determining jury lieu of on remand reinstatement.

I—I goals The of a cause of dual wrongful discharge of an at-will are action wronged employees whole and deter make public policy.1 employers' court's violations of deci- discharge relating public policy wrongful give sions gener- guidance concerning practical remedies little ally. Brockmeyer set Nonetheless, the court forth general regarding propositions remedies in its certain recognized newly paint of the effort to the outlines (1) goal action: remedial is to make the cause of wronged and to advance whole well-estab- (2) public policies; remedies should be controlled lished principles; tort thus contract rather than foresee- 1 Bradstreet, subsequent Brockmeyer & Cases v. Dun 113 (1983), 561, fully 335 more addressed Wis. 2d N.W.2d 834 have Wandry Eye Bull's the contours of cause of action. v. Credit (1986); Union, 37, 325 v. 129 Wis. 2d 384 N.W.2d Bushko Miller (1986); Co., 136, 396 Brewing 134 N.W.2d 167 Wis. 2d Schultz 17, Stamping Corp., 148 Wis. 2d 434 N.W.2d 780 Production (1989); 2d Hosp., v. Beloit Mem'l 168 Wis. 483 Winkelman (1992). cases the ques N.W.2d None of these has addressed 211 tion of remedies.

122 ability mitigation range and limit the of available (3) appropriate remedies; and the most remedies are pay. Brockmeyer reinstatement and back v. Dun & Bradstreet, 561, 574-76, 2d 335 Wis. N.W.2d 834 (1983).2 pay While and are, reinstatement back as

Brockmeyer appropriate stated, remedies, the most appropriate in reinstatement is not certain cases. In pay I cases, these conclude that an award of front gap. pay should be available to fill the remedial Front necessary principles is achieve set forth (1) Brockmeyer: pay comports front with the Brockmeyer principle that reinstatement and back (2) appropriate remedies; are the most while reinstate- important making wronged ment is an employees whole, there are often serious obstacles (3) rarely ordered; reinstatement and it is front designed precisely to achieve what reinstatement place achieve, would were reinstatement feasible: to wronged employee position he or she would (4) wrongful discharge; in had there be ing been no award- pay comports Brockmeyer front contract with (5) theory damages wrongful discharge; allowing pay comports with the wrongful court's reliance on Wisconsin and federal dis- Brockmeyer's approach, For discussions of contract see Practice, Perritt, Jr., Henry Employee H. Dismissal Law and (3d 1992); Dobbs, Law Remedies: p. 1.2 at ed. Dan B. § 6.10(2) Damages Equity—Restitution, p. at 195-96 — (2d 1993). nn.13, 14 McCarthy, Recovery ed. also John C. See of (1990) Damages Wrongful Discharge, pp. 1.31 at 118-19 for (doctrine unavailability foreseeability punitive and the damages contract characterize "elusive" differences between damages public policy wrongful discharge). and tort charge crafting the common law cause of statutes for wrongful discharge. action for pay comports First, 36. front with the Brockmeyer principle pay that reinstatement and back appropriate employers are the most remedies. If know only pay legally reinstatement and back are avail- pay able, and that front is not available in lieu of reinstatement, reinstatement will cease to be available Barring in fact. front as a substitute for reinstate- perverse employers ment create a incentive for will wrongfully discharge employees who in violation of public policy make not In to reinstatement feasible. essence, not were available when reinstate- ment is not feasible the deterrent effect of the cause of employer action would be undermined or the could dis- charge public policy by an violation of paying damages.3 a minimum amount of impor- Second, while reinstatement is an making wronged employees whole, tant there are often serious obstacles to reinstatement and does, employers Unless court holds as it would have admitting liability instantly the further incentive of after wrongfully discharging employees would be encouraged delay asserting way a cause of action. In that employers they pay wrongfully would seek to reduce amounts discharged employees employees would seek to increase the they public policy amounts receive. The deterrent effect of the wrongful discharge seriously cause of action would be threatened.

it ordered.4 has rarely high Reinstatement costs for as well as for the courts.6 employers employees,5 4Professor Dobbs has noted as follows: "Common law reme employer's dies for an breach of an contract have traditionally specific performance. Although not included rein quite casually statement has mentioned been some common wrongful discharge [quoting Brockmeyer], law cases it seems Dobbs, actually sought granted." not to have been or Law of 6.10(2) (citations omitted). Remedies, p. at 198 and n.28 See § Larson, Dismissal, Unjust p. 9A.02[2] also Lex K. at 9A— 9 § (3/97) ("reinstatement awarded, normally is not due to the often employment relationship"). deteriorated Nonetheless, many pre courts consider reinstatement "the See, remedy." e.g., Inc., Express, ferred Sasser v. Averitt 839 (Tenn. 422, 1992); App. S.W.2d 439 Ct. v. Electronic Stafford (E.D. Sys. Corp., Supp. 781, 1990)(apply Data 749 F. 785 Mich. law); Lab., Inc., ing Michigan McNeil Economics 800 F.2d (7th 1986), denied, (1987), 118 Cir. cert. 481 U.S. 1041 (1988). grounds, overruled on other 860 F.2d 834 majority opinion does not discuss whether offered, sought, employer in this case or whether the reinstatement. Reinstatement was not ordered. 5 evaluating feasibility of reinstatement have Courts employers identified various obstacles to the for both available; employees. position may be other No suitable or, employees may displaced disrupted; quite or otherwise be commonly, hostility productive there is such that a and amica working relationship impossible, would be such that ble discharge. amount to a constructive See conditions would 785-86; Sasser, 433; Supp. F. at Stafford, 839 S.W.2d at (Second) McNeil, 19; of Contracts 800 F.2d at Restatement 118 — (1981) 367(1) (noting "undesirability compelling the contin arisen"). personal disputes after have uance of association factors in deter These same considerations are often used as mining feasibility of reinstatement. imposes on courts which front Reinstatement costs requires A either careful contin- not. reinstatement order 38. Because of costs of reinstatement and courts it has been

employers, employees suggested that front more the future efficiently compensates economic loss from a flowing wrongful discharge. Chief Posner has offered the economic Judge following analy- sis front supporting pay:

[T]he [reinstatement] social costs of be avoided by corrective transactions. Suppose that reinstate- $100,000 ment would be worth employee but employer $150,000 would cost the neg- because of a ative effect of on employer's reinstatement the productivity; contrast, $100,000 in an award of $100,000 employer only would cost the while bene- fiting $100,000. to the tune of pay substitution of front for reinstatement would produce a savings $50,000 yet social costs of if— unavailable, front pay employer might buy were reinstatement, out the employee's right of since at any price $100,000 $150,000 par- between both ties buy-out. would be made better off such a pay may Front socially preferable still be the form of relief, because it tricky avoids the need for a transaction. monitoring spurring litigation

ued or risks additional surrounding compliance issues of and retaliation. The Seventh Appeals Circuit Court of described costs ofreinstatement for courts as follows: equity traditionally specific per- Courts of have refused to order employment contracts, formance of it because is difficult and time- consuming supervise parties' ongo- for a court to conduct in an

ing possibly long-term relationship employment. of . . .Courts equivalent do not want to involve themselves in the industrial of squabbling. matrimonial (7th McKnight Corp., General Motors 908 F.2d Cir. 1990). Metropolitan Chicago,

Avitia v. Club Inc., 49 F.3d (7th 1995) (citation omitted). 1219, 1232 Cir. pay designed pre- Third, to achieve cisely what reinstatement achieve, would were place wronged employee reinstatement feasible: to position in the same he or she would be in had there wrongful discharge. pay up been no Front makes earnings difference between the would receive were the old to continue and the earnings expected present employment. and future Thus, front substitutes for reinstatement in that it flowing remedies future economic losses from the wrongful discharge. conjunction recovery In with past wage through pay, loss a back award, front wrongful discharge like reinstatement, remedies the wronged employee itself and assures that the is made whole.

¶ 40. When reinstatement feasible, is not back pay wronged employee is insufficient to make a whole. pay compensates wages Back judg- for the loss of until remedy wrongful discharge it ment; does not the itself. wrongful discharge Reinstatement remedies the and precludes economic loss that would otherwise flow from wrongful discharge. the If reinstatement is not feasible discharged employee's employment oppor- and the new tunities are inferior, the should receive front pay. logic purpose. "The of such an if award, the . .is plaintiff indeed to make the whole, is undeniable." McKnight Corp., v. General Motors F.2d (7th 1990).7 116-17 Cir.

7The Seventh Circuit Appeals Court of pay discussed front follows, under Title VII as deciding without the issue: Supreme [T]he Court has said that the remedial scheme in Title designed plaintiff whole, VII is to make the and this dictum has thought by imply plaintiffs been employ- some courts to if the expectation pay

¶ the 41. Front fulfills interest remedial otherwise there would be a void. where employees may "Wrongfully discharged have valid wages. Such award of 'front claims for lost future 'rightful theory; pay' predicated place' i.e., on the is wrongfully discharged employees are entitled to jobs they of the would have obtained but for the benefit discharge." Litigating Wrongful Tobias, H. the Paul (6/91). Discharge atpp. § 8-37-38 Claims, 8.12 awarding comports Fourth, 42. with theory damages wrong- the contract discharge. remedy in For to be a contract ful available the fact of must be foreseeable. Restatement action (Second) loss (1981). enough

of Contracts 351 It is that the distinguished probable, was as a as loss foreseeable necessary, cmt. of the breach. Id. at a. from a result might employer argue An that because an expectation employ- of future at-will has no employer term, for a definite ment with this loss wages pay inappro- is and front is future unforeseeable foreseeability priate. argument This confuses the of the foreseeability wages, harm, future with the of the lost Only amount of the the former need be foresee- loss. infeasible, opportunities ment are inferior and reinstatement is he lump in should receive addition to back sum —called "front distinguish pay specified pay" from the of back it present representing discounted value of the differ- statute — ence between earnings he would received in his have old earnings expected and he can be to receive his future, inferior, present by hypothesis employment. award, logic purpose of such an if the of Title VII's remedial scheme whole, plaintiff to make is indeed undeniable. (citations omitted). McKnight, 908 F.2d at 116-17 128 only reasonably able; the latter need be calculable.8 (Second) (1981). Restatement of Contracts 352 wage wrong- 44. The harm of future loss to a fully discharged employee indefinite term Although employee may foreseeable. an at-will be dis- charged any many at time reasons, reason, or no employee may discharged at-will not be for a reason public policy. that violates It is foreseeable if wrongfully discharged, the at-will will suffer many including having economic harm due to factors begin new at or near the bottom of a seniority experience-based pay or scale. That harm necessarily employer's wrongful flows from the conduct.9 argument against availability 45. The of pay, [s]uch employment relationships that" do not period

exist for a foreseeable, definite of time," is not an argument wages that the loss of future is unforesee- argument able. Rather it is an that the amount of the certainty. loss is difficult to ascertain with This is put doubtless true.10 As one court has it: damages "The existence proved; must be the amount of damages must be decided with certainty all the per the case mits." Pipe Smith, Panhandle Eastern Line Co. v. 637 P.2d 1981) 1020, 1027 (Wyo. (approving award of front to indefi breach). nite term employer's Repinski 9 See Loan Ass'n, Clintonville &Sav. Wis. 2d (1970) ("An 53, 58, 181 N.W.2d 351 damages award of for breach of contract compensate should injured party for losses nec essarily flowing breach"); from the Wis JI — Civil 3710. 10As Professor Corbin has instructed: governing recovery damages

The rules of law for breach of very application contract are flexible. Their in the infinite number beyond question of situations that arise is variable and uncertain. law, they Even more than in the case of other rules of must be regarded merely guides court, leaving as much to the individ- damages biggest problem awarding in future The is wrongful discharge of an at-will for the established, how- avoiding speculation... .It is well if it is ever, recovery will denied "while be damage has and uncertain whether speculative sustained, merely recovery will not denied be been damages is difficult the amount of because ascertain." Smithway Xpress, Inc., 464 Motor N.W.2d

Smith v. (Iowa 1990)(citation omitted)(reversing trial 682, 688 jury question to in refusal to front court submit action). discharge wrongful The a fact that uncertainty calculating degree require in of preclude it of the not a reason to as a amount loss is damages of must be decided matter of law. amount certainty permits. the case with all ¶ rule in contract 46. Indeed the black letter involving employment seems to be recov actions damages pay. ery Bar includes front State of of Damages § Wisconsin, in 23.2 at Wisconsin, The Law of (2d 12/95) (Russell ed.); p.23-3 Ware, ed. M. State Bar at p. Employment § Wisconsin, Law, 13.40 of Wisconsin (4/95). Stoughton Hospital e.g., See, Hale v. 13-14 (Ct. Ass'n, 267, 279-81, 126 N.W.2d 89 Inc., Wis. 2d 376 1985) (indefinite employment App. of term, loss future ordinary wages pension arising course benefits as matter ofbreach of contract foreseeable law). front-pay Although measure rem- 47. necessary edy appropriate uncertain, is it is where wronged one court make the whole. As has injus- justice than exact said: "Substantial better special feeling of the circumstances of the ual court created particular case. (1964). Contracts, 5 on 1002 at 33 Corbin (Pa. 1931) Gibson, A. Weinglass tice." contract even damages need to award (discussing amount). where uncertain with the Fifth, allowing comports

Brockmeyer court's reliance on Wisconsin and federal statutes the common wrongful discharge crafting of action for The wrongful discharge. law cause Brockmeyer court, 568, 575, 113 Wis. 2d at determined statutes, that state reinstatement public policy as with and are the most remedies.11 Yet pay appropriate back (WFEA), Act provides the Wisconsin Fair Employment for a of in lieu of reinstatement remedy "compensation 111.389(4)(c) by any if Wis. Stat. requested party." § 11 Brockmeyer recognized public policy The court wrongful discharge goals spe action as cause of has same wrongful statutory of action for cific Wisconsin causes Act, discharge, Employment such as the Wisconsin Fair Wis. II, Act, 111, Employment Peace Stat. ch. subch. the Wisconsin 111.06(1)(c)1, VII, as well as Title 42 U.S.C. 2000e § Wis. Stat. § wrongful seq., prohibiting et and other federal statutes dis public remedying and charges policy. in violation of Because public policy the heart of these deterring violations of are at action, brought statutory decisions in cases under causes of analyses determining provide helpful these statutes public policy appropriate regime remedial in a common law Brockmeyer, wrongful discharge action. 113 Wis. 2d at 567-68. citation, stated, "[t]he court without wrongful majority of Wisconsin remedies established backpay, limited to reinstatement and discharge statutes are at remedy concepts." Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d contractual statement, from the of Regardless of whether this drawn briefs 35) (at 30, p. and amicus Wisconsin Association employer (at 1983, 17), in p. accurate Manufacturers and Commerce was today. it is not

131 (1995-96).12 discharge Similarly, wrongful in federal recognized remedy pay in statutes, front has been as lieu of reinstatement.13 388, 397-99, Byers LIRC, 2d See 208 Wis. 561 N.W.2d (1997) (discussing public policy purposes of the WFEA LIRC, 753, 764, available); 2d

remedies Watkins v. 117 Wis. (1984) authority (finding provides N.W.2d 482 that the WFEA remedy). appropriate to fashion statutes, Age Title VII and the Discrimi Federal such as (ADEA), Employment seq., nation in Act 29 U.S.C. 621 et are similarly premised remedying deterring on violations public policy. interpreted allowing Each has been as courts reinstatement, provide as a substitute for addition pay, to back where reinstatement is not feasible. Front regardless available under these statutes of whether employment was for an indefinite term. Supreme pur-

The United that the States Court has stated poses of Title VII are to and deter discrimination injuries persons to "make due to whole" Paper unlawful discrimination. Albemarle Co. v. (1975). Moody, 405, 422 U.S. 417-18 following among The are the courts that have held that pay front is available in lieu of reinstatement under Title VII: (11th Gallardo, Inc., 1515, v. Weaver Casa 922 F.2d 1528 Cir. 1991); 1442, 1449 Corp., Edwards v. Occidental 892 Chem. F.2d (9th 1990); Express Corp., Cir. v. Shore Federal 777 F.2d (6th 1985); Sys. Co., 1159-60 Cir. Goss v. Exxon 747 F.2d Office (3d 885, 1984); McKnight Corp., 889-91 Cir. v. General Motors (E.D. (7th 675, 1991), Supp. aff'd, 768 F. 680 Wis. 973 1366 F.2d (1993). 1992), denied, Cir. cert. 507 U.S. 915 The seventh "all circuit has stated that of the circuits that have decided pay the issue.. .have held that front is an available remedy appropriate brought McNeil, in cases under the ADEA." 800 F.2d at 118. pay

The circuit seventh has held that front is available in retaliatory discharge brought lieu of reinstatement in actions Act, seq. under the Fair Labor Standards 29 201 et U.S.C. § 132 the state and federal stat- 49. Consistent with public policy by seek to deter violations of utes which plaintiff employees employers whole, a in and to make wrongful discharge public policy action a common law remedy pay of front when should have available the is not feasible. reinstatement jurisdic- of the 50. For these reasons all but one considered the issue of the

tions14 have wrongful availability pay public policy in dis- of front pay charge front is actions have concluded I, too, reinstatement is not feasible.15 available where pay should be an available conclude that is not fea- in lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement principles Front consistent with the set out sible. statutes which and state and federal Inc., 1219, 1231 Metropolitan Chicago, v. Club 49 F.3d Avitia (7th 1995). Cir. 14 Supreme of Arkansas has held that front The Court wrongful discharge actions. public policy is not available in (Ark. 1988). Oxford, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. 743 S.W.2d 380 litigation wrongful discharge is rela "Since much of tively the existence and breadth ofthe recent and has focused on action, received exten the remedies available have not cause Pepe & reported Stephen decisions." P. Scott sive attention Discharge Dunham, Avoiding Defending Wrongful H. (5/93). Claims, p. 1.10 at 1-36 resolved the following among are the courts that have fayor v. availability pay: of front Hummer

question in of the (Idaho 1996); Sasser, Evans, 981, 839 S.W.2d 923 P.2d 987-88 Inc., 422, 433-34; Smithway 464 N.W.2d Xpress, Motor Smith (Iowa Trulock, 830, 1991); P.2d Hayes v. 687-88 (Wash. Co., 1988); v. Ford Motor 347 N.W.2d App. Ct. Goins 1983). (Mich. Dougherty, 184, 191 App. also Francis M. Ct. See Discharge Wrongful At-Will Damages Recoverable of (collecting supp. and anno. Employee, 5[c] 44 A.L.R. 4th 1131 cases). discharges violating public wrongful to deter

seek policy.

II. is remanded for determi- 51. Because this case pay, I to set forth several factors nation of front wish might appropriately consider in that the circuit court awarding pay. stated, as one court is, Front necessarily every remedy, "special not warranted in Express, Inc., case." v. Averitt 839 S.W.2d Sasser (Tenn. 1992). App. 433, 439 Ct. following among factors, others, should 52.

f determining propriety considered in the and amount be (1) of front employee's is not feasible: when reinstatement seniority wrongful at the time of the dis- (2) charge; employment the likelihood that the would long, wrongful continued, have and for how but for the (3) discharge; (4) expectancy; employee's and life work mitigating employee's at or her dam- efforts his any; ages, including (5) employment, if nature of new availability comparable employment opportu- (6) length required nities; and of time to find job. at Sasser, another See 839 S.W.2d ¶ 53. In this case the was an long standing. Although employee will, at there going discharged. was no indication that he was to be According employee's salary to the record the level had seniority, part through been achieved in and his skills history unlikely it made that he could comparable salary pay may Front obtain elsewhere. proper be in this case if reinstatement is found not feasible.

I—I HHHH Finally, relating ¶ 54. the court s decisions public policy wrongful discharge give gui- actions no concerning respective dance the of the roles circuit jury determining propriety and court the the and majority opinion, amount of remedies. without dis- pay by cussion, front mandates that is to be determined by jury. the court a rather than growing 55. A number of courts common law statutory wrongful discharge

and actions have con question pay, cluded the of the of amount front simply propriety, by not its should be decided the by jury. generally court, trial not See Richard J. Ser yak, Front-Pay Employment Litigation: Awards in An Jury? Judge Employee the Issue or Relations L.J. (1991). assigning The most common rationale for duty pay essentially this is that court front is equitable remedy in this context. See v. Elec Stafford (E.D. Sys. Corp., Supp. 664, tronic Data 741 F. 665-67 1990) law);16 (applying Michigan Mich. common pay Sasser, 839 S.W.2d at 434-36. is Front awarded in equitable of the lieu of reinstatement and is predicated equitable principle making on the of wronged employee whole where there would otherwise by only awarding gap pay. remedial be a left back practical ¶ 56. Courts have noted it is charged deciding propriety the have court with of pay Entrusting front also decide amount. the front- pay award to the court also assure that front 16 Stafford, In Supp. 749 F. at the court ultimately 791 — paid it set and ordered on an "installment" basis whereby the inquiry court made biannual into the continued propriety pay, including of front employee's mitigation situation efforts. overly speculative under the circum- or

not excessive particular case. stances jury were circuit court and 57. The roles argued parties I, and therefore not briefed or majority opinion, this would not decide unlike the the court for I remand cause to circuit issue. would this considering argument whether, of after determination by parties, front-pay by made a a award should be the jury. I alternative, In the would circuit court or briefing in this court. order additional majority ¶ the court is 58. circuit directs appro- front-pay if award, of to decide the amount priate. the presented the issue In case the circuit court this jury. the court determine that to a plaintiff Should circuit may pay, to front the circuit court

is entitled pay jury as award front in this case consider the of 805.02(1) (1995-96). advisory. § Stat. Wis. foregoing ¶ reasons, I 59. concur. For Justice Ann 60. I am authorized to state that Bradley joins opinion. this Walsh {concurring). STEINMETZ, W. J. DONALD agree majority case. I with the mandate of the this impor- majority's However, treatment of the due to the pay possibility cases, I tant issue front as a future of separately solely further the issue of write to discuss pay. keeping spirit employ- In of the front with availability doctrine, I of ment-at-will note that cases front must be limited to in which employee discharged in a funda- has been violation of Additionally, public policy. I mental and well-defined explain to of the in which write further some situations will and will not be available as Finally, of I instead reinstatement. write to stress employee duty mitigate damages, has a to the including all pay, explain

those awarded as front to duty employee's mitigate. employment-at-will recog 62. The doctrine f employment [is] nizes an "that where for an indefinite employer discharge good term, an an 'for morally wrong, cause, cause, no or even cause being thereby guilty legal wrong.'" without Bradstreet, v. Dun & 561, 113 Wis. 2d (1983). years, 335 N.W.2d 834 However, over the exceptions through have been out rule carved of this legislative judicial both action. See id. It is now discharge employee, employee- unlawful to even an religion, at-will, race, color, sex, because or national origin. e.g., seq.; See, § 2000e, U.S.C. et Wis. Stat. Brockmeyer, In 111.31 — 111.395. this court also held that it is unlawful terminate an at-will if discharge contrary "the a fundamental and well- public policy by existing defined as evidenced law." 113 2dWis. at 573. discriminatory discharges

¶ with 63. As where pay may only front be in limited available circum- stances,1 court in this held appropriate backpay "reinstatement and are the most wrongful public policy exception remedies dis- charges." Brockmeyer, then, Id. at 575. on I Based

1 (7th Quasar Co., 389, v. See Fortino 950 F.2d Cir. ("the 1991) very pay possibility of front under Title VII is uncer it). though imposed tain" some courts have See also Griffith (10th 1994) Colorado, Servs., Youth Div. 17 F.3d 1323 Cir. (front pay may appropriate simply be where reinstatement is (6th reasonable); Fenik, 860 not Gutzwiller v. F.2d. 1988) (back and favored pay Cir. reinstatement are the reme VII, though pay dies for discrimination claims Title front under discretion). appropriate be at the trial court's majority opinion must limited to be stress that extremely employee-at-will has cases when an rare discharged well- in of a fundamental and violation been Generally, public policy. however, reinstate- defined preferred pay and are remedies ment and back only pay when reinstatement should be available front Majority op. 121. at is "not feasible." majority provides opinion exam- some 64. The ples and not be of when reinstatement would would important I it is However, feel that feasible. Id. they examples expand are to stress that on these and only examples. situa- There will be numerous other required in reinstatement is as a tions which option. not front not an Reinstatement is and is discharged impossible in where the a situation employee's position a sub- available, former is not but job stantially position in terms of duties similar impossible salary is available. Reinstatement not simply employer do not because the get along, employee claims that he or she is not or the working previously who ter- comfortable someone already place minated him her. There are laws or retaliating employer employees prevent an or its from e.g., against employee. See, 42 U.S.C. such an Following as it 2000e-3. the law is stated Brockmeyer, only properly I feel that will be (or posi- employer positions no no awarded if the has substantially employee's pre- tions discharge similar employer simply

position) available, or if the discharged employee. refuses rehire Finally, plaintiff I write to stress who mitigate pay necessarily duty has to is awarded damages. long-standing principle is a Wiscon This Klug Corp., 62 Wis. law. v. Flambeau Plastics sin See (1974) (requiring that the 141, 155, 2d 214 N.W.2d 281 138 injured party employment in an situation "must make mitigate damages"); reasonable to efforts v. Gauf Club, 333, MilwaukeeAthletic 151 Wis. 335, 139 N.W. 207 (1912) (damages wrongful discharge in a case are "sub ject mitigation by the amount the earnfs], might by diligence or the exercise of reasonable [earn]"). Transport also Marten See v. DILHR, 171 Wis. (Ct. App. 1992); 147, 155, 2d 491 N.W.2d 96 Hale v. Stoughton Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 126 267, Wis. 2d (Ct. 1985); App. Koenings Joseph 376 N.W.2d 89 Brewing Co., Schlitz 490, 503, Wis. 2d 368 N.W.2d (Ct. 1985). App. Mitigation always has been required employment Consequently, cases. I stress discharged employee duty mitigate that a has a dam ages actively and to seek other if possible. reinstatement is not To hold otherwise would discourage seeking be from other employment entirely employer. to the detriment of the majority opinion

¶ 66. The touches on all of the aspects opinion. sepa- of front raised in this I write rately simply important to further discuss these issues provide guidance and to in future cases. foregoing sepa-

¶ 67. For the reasons, I write rately.

Case Details

Case Name: Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc.

Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 20, 1997

Citation: 564 N.W.2d 692

Docket Number: 95-0649

Court Abbreviation: Wis.