Lead Opinion
This case involves a dispute between appellants, who are the trustees of Williams Chapel African Methodist Episcopal Church, and appellees, who are the national African Methodist Episcopal Church and its officials. The dispute is over the ownership of church property in Screven County where Williams Chapel has held services for years as an AME church. In 2008, however, several members of Williams Chapel sought to terminate the local church’s relationship with the national AME church. As a result, the national church and its officials filed a petition to quiet title in the property and for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
After a final hearing, the trial court found that the AME church is a hierarchical church; that Williams Chapel at all times conducted its affairs as a member of the AME Church, Inc.; that, under the church discipline, all real and personal property of local churches is held for the benefit of the national AME church; that no deed exists as to the real property of Williams Chapel;
“For purposes of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, “ ‘equity cases” are those in which a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief sought in the superior court....’ [Cit.]” Lamar County v. E.T. Carlyle Co.,
In 1991, this Court issued Beauchamp v. Knight, [261 Ga. 608 (409 SE2d 208 ) (1991),] which held that whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal “depends upon the issue raised on appeal, not upon how the case is styled nor upon the kinds of relief which may be sought by the complaint,” [cit.] and that “(c)ases in which the grant or denial of such relief are merely ancillary to underlying issues of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying issues were resolved, are not equity cases.” [Cit.]
(Emphasis in original.) Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Assn.,
The trial court here granted equitable relief when it ordered that appellants’ “names shall be removed from all accounts, and such accounts (bank, mortgage, insurance, and any other like accounts) shall be delivered to” appellees by a certain date and that the “Plaintiff Church shall assume all indebtedness on any personal property and shall indemnify [appellants] from same.” In their enumerations, appellants have included an alternative contention that the trial court should have protected them more fully by requiring immediate payment of the indebtedness on the renovation as a condition of the AME church taking title to the property. See Division 4, infra. The determination of this issue of precisely how the trial court should have molded the equitable relief to protect appellants does not flow directly or automatically from the legal conclusion that the real property is held in trust for the AME church. Review of that equitable issue would require examination of the trial court’s exercise of discretion and depends upon equitable considerations. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry,
Justice Benham’s dissent fails to address this analysis, and its approach would destroy much of our equity jurisdiction. That approach would require the anomalous result of divesting this Court of its subject matter jurisdiction over all equity cases even when we are asked to review a decision by the trial court which, like the one at issue in this case, obviously requires a weighing of equitable considerations in order to determine the scope of equitable relief.
Because resolution of the equitable issue raised here would not be a matter of routine once the underlying legal issues are resolved, we conclude that a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief. Therefore, this appeal comes within this Court’s jurisdiction over equity cases, and we will proceed to determine the merits thereof.
2. Appellants contend the trial court erred in ruling that Williams Chapel and its trustees held the real property in trust for the national AME church and that the assets of Williams Chapel were the property of the national church. While the State has a legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes and provides a
In the absence of deeds of conveyance and of applicable statutes, we turn to the Book of Discipline, the governing ecclesiastical doctrine and constitution of the AME church.
The trial court’s finding of “permissive use” of the property, even when that use spans 70 years, “cannot be the foundation of a prescription until an adverse claim and actual notice to the other party.” OCGA § 44-5-161 (b). There was no evidence presented that an adverse claim was made and actual notice was given, so Williams Chapel does not hold prescriptive title in trust for the national AME church. However, it is undisputed that the church obtained the property by gift years ago and took possession and built the church building. While no deed of conveyance was found, “a donee of land under a parol gift . . . who . . . enters into possession and makes valuable improvements upon the faith of the gift, acquires a perfect equity as against the donor, his heirs, and those claiming under him with notice. ... [Cit.]” Smith v. Lanier,
Presiding Justice Carley’s dissent asserts that we must consider the version of the Book of Discipline in effect at the time Williams Chapel obtained title and suggests that the trust provision upon which we and the trial court rely was not in existence at that time. Legal commentators have noted that hierarchical churches, taking their cue from a concurrence in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
The statutes and the provisions of the Book of Discipline relied upon by Presiding Justice Carley’s dissent speak in terms of deeds and documents of conveyance when discussing express and implied trusts of real property used for church purposes. See OCGA §§ 14-5-46, 14-5-47. However, these
3. Appellants next contend that even if Williams Chapel held the property in trust for the national AME church, that trust was breached by the alleged failure of the national church to provide support and benefits to Williams Chapel. We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants’ position, and civil courts may not rely on doctrinal concerns or ecclesiastical principles when deciding disputes between churches. See First Evangelical Methodist Church of Lafayette v. Clinton,
4. Lastly, appellants contend the trial court erred when it failed to require the national AME church to pay immediately the outstanding mortgage on the property that was personally guaranteed by several members. The trial court’s order required the removal of the names of appellants from all accounts, including the mortgage, and delivery of the accounts to the national AME church within four days of the trial court’s order. Equitable relief is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Prime Bank v. Galler,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Four months after the litigation began, the trial court entered a temporary order which required the national church to assume the indebtedness secured by the real property, to pay all debts and bills associated with the local church, and to maintain and pay for insurance on the church van. Williams Chapel was required to remit $380 monthly to the national church in exchange for use of the local church building and van.
The trustees of Williams Chapel executed a security deed in 2003 by which they conveyed the real property to a hank to secure a promissory note for the $40,443.94 the hank had loaned Williams Chapel. The bank apparently accepted the security deed based upon the title affidavits of two long-time members of Williams Chapel who stated there had never been a claim, question, or controversy concerning the local church’s right of ownership of the property.
The Book of Discipline is more formally known as “The Doctrine and Discipline of the African Methodist Episcopal Church.” The appellate record of this case contains only one page of the Book of Discipline.
In a concurrence, Justice Harlan stated that he did not read the Court’s opinion “to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids civilian courts from enforcing a deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions limiting a religious organization’s use of the property which is granted.”
[ujnder the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can . .. modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church... . And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As was stated earlier, Williams Chapel has had a relationship with the national AME church for over 70 years; has paid annual assessments to the national AME church, attended the annual conferences held by the national AME church, accepted pastoral candidates selected by the national AME church, used “AME Church” in its name for many years, and has the Book of Discipline provided by the national AME church.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully agree with Division 1 of the per curiam opinion that this appeal comes within our jurisdiction over equity cases and that we therefore must resolve the merits thereof. However, I strongly disagree with Division 2 because, in the absence of any showing or ruling of estoppel, the relatively recent provision of the “Discipline” of the AME Church on which the majority relies cannot provide the basis for the requisite application of the “neutral principles of law” method to a title obtained by the local church decades prior to adoption of that provision. Furthermore, this analysis would make the enumerations addressed in Divisions 3 and 4 moot.
Where, as here, no funds are donated by the general church to purchase and develop the local church property,
[n]o trust in favor of the general church may be implied under the general trust statutes ([cits.]).... However, [OCGA § 14-5-46] recognizes and validates deeds conveying land for church purposes according to the limitations set out in the deed and for use “according to the mode of church government or rules of discipline .. . .”
Carnes v. Smith,
However, the constitutionally authorized “neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in Georgia, requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general church.” Jones v. Wolf,
The majority relies on the following portion of the “Discipline” of the AME Church: “The title(s) to all real, personal and mixed property held ... by the local churches, shall be held IN TRUST for the [AME] Church, Inc. ...” However, the record contains no evidence whatsoever regarding when this provision was adopted. Thus, Appellees, as plaintiffs in this quiet title action, have wholly failed to show that such provision was already in effect when the local church obtained title by gift. See Simmons v. Community Renewal and Redemption,
As explained in a very recent law review article, favoritism of national churches in the manner set forth by the majority has First Amendment implications which are staggering. The majority’s determination that a hierarchical church can unilaterally impress a trust in its favor of local congregational property depends on dicta from Jones v. Wolf, supra at 606 (III), as quoted in footnote 4 of the per curiam opinion, but effectively ignores
the important qualification in the Jones v. Wolf dicta that the obligation of civil courts is to honor “the result indicated by the parties.” [Cit.] In simpler language, civil courts must give effect to bilateral agreements, and a unilateral declaration of trust by the putative beneficiary is not a bilateral agreement. . . . [The majority’s] decision to grant hierarchical churches aunique authority to impress a trust upon property they do not own merely by declaring that the church is the trust beneficiary of that property is [a] ... startling cession of governmental power to a religious organization. This is . . . the . . . extraordinary power to seize property by divesting others of their beneficial interests in the property. . . . Donors of property to local churches are not necessarily members of the hierarchical church. Such donors have no assurance that their intent to transfer property in trust for the exclusive benefit of the local church, and not the hierarchical church, will be honored. All the general church would need to do is alter its own internal governing instruments to nullify the explicit intentions of donors.
Calvin Massey, Church Schisms, Church Property, and Civil Authority, 84 St. John’s L. Rev. 23, 46-49 (III) (2010). Accordingly, I believe that we should follow the persuasive authority of Arkansas Presbytery of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church v. Hudson, supra at 309-310 (IV).
Moreover, even if the majority were justified in relying upon a trust provision added to the Discipline long after the local church obtained title by gift, that provision is not an existential proposition, and instead imposes a “requirement” on local churches “that property held by ‘the local churches’ shall be held ‘IN TRUST’ for the [AME] Church, Inc.” African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Stewart, 28 S3d 1044, 1046 (La. App. 2009). The immediately succeeding provision begins with the transition “However” and addresses the situation where, as here, the local church has not taken steps which meet that requirement. This second provision specifically deals with “the absence of an IN TRUST clause as indicated herein, in deeds, and documents of conveyance previously executed.” This language refers back to the trust requirement of the first provision, as it is the only other provision which even mentions holding property in trust, and treats that provision as contemplating the execution of some deed or document of conveyance containing an “in trust” clause. See Coles v. Wilburn, supra at 324. Under the terms of the second provision, the absence of such an express “in trust” clause in some appropriate document “shall not exclude a local church from or relieve it of its Connectional character and responsibilities” nor “excuse or absolve a local congregation” from its responsibilities and accountability to the AME Church, provided that certain conditions are met, including “conveyance of said property to the trustees of a local church or agency to the AME Church, Inc.” The language of this particular condition
is at best ambiguous. Even so, nothing in [any deed, or in the affidavits of title for that matter,] can be interpreted to convey the property “to the A.M.E. Church, Inc.” . . . Conveyance is to [or by] the local church, but not “to the A.M.E. Church, Inc.” .. . Applying the neutral principles of law that are evoked by our examination of the documents and evidence in purely secular terms . . ., [I] conclude that [Appellees have] failed to establish compliance with a necessary provision of the Discipline. [The] A.M.E.’s Discipline, therefore, does not contain regulations that effectively vest control of the property at issue in it under the facts of this case.
African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Stewart, supra at 1047-1048. There simply are “no ‘neutral principles of law’ entitling the [A.JM.E. Church to the local church . . . property.” Coles v. Wilburn, supra at 324 (where the Discipline contemplated the creation of express trusts by deed to the general church, and no deed to the general church existed).
Because of the majority’s reliance on an inapplicable provision of the Discipline and its strained interpretation thereof, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part to the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein joins in this opinion.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. Because I do not believe this appeal falls within this Court’s subject-matter appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll equity cases” (1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (2)), I believe the appeal should be transferred
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction,
“[e]quity cases” are those in which a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief sought in the superior court — whether that relief was granted or denied. Cases in which the grant or denial of such [equitable] relief was merely ancillary to the underlying issues of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying issues of law were resolved are not “equity cases.”
Beauchamp v. Knight,
The equitable relief awarded in this case — removal of the names of the local church and its trustees from bank accounts, mortgages, insurance policies, and the like — flows directly from the legal determination that the national church, pursuant to church discipline, owns the real and personal property at issue and the local church holds said property in trust for the national church. Since the equitable relief routinely follows upon the determination of the legal issue, “there is no question of ‘the legality or propriety of equitable relief’ and the case is not one in equity.” Lamar County v. E.T. Carlyle Co., supra,
2. Because I agree with the per curiam opinion’s determination that the trial court correctly ruled that the real property at issue
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins me in concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Justice Hines joins me in dissenting to Division 1 of the per curiam opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
For the reasons stated in Division 1 of Justice Benham’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, I do not believe that this Court has jurisdiction of this appeal, and accordingly I join in Division 1 of his opinion. As I would not reach the merits of the appeal, I must dissent to Divisions 2, 3, and 4 of the per curiam opinion.