137 Misc. 653 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1930
The District Council of New York City of the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, which is represented in this suit by the plaintiff Kelso, its secretary and treasurer, is a voluntary unincorporated association consisting of more than seven members, having its offices in Indianapolis, Ind. Local 585 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, represented in this suit by its president, James T. Cavanagh, is also a voluntary unincorporated association consisting of more than seven members, with offices in New York city, and until February 25, 1930, was a subordinate body of the district council from which it held a charter. It is alleged that
The three plaintiffs have united in one complaint three distinct causes of action. The plaintiff Kelso, suing on behalf cf the district council, demands judgment for $1,250.50, alleged to be due from local 585 to the district council as the capita tax from September, 1929, to February 21, 1930. The plaintiff Jose demands judgment for $4,200, alleged to be due as salary for services rendered by him as business agent of local 585 from May 14, 1929, to February 25, 1930. He alleges Ms election to that office in December, 1928, for a period of three years from January 1, 1929. The plaintiff Fessler demands judgment for $680 as salary for services rendered by Mm as financial secretary of local 585 from January 1, 1930, to February 25, 1930. He alleges Ms election to that office in June, 1929, for a period of one year from July 1,1929.
The question presented is whether these three plaintiffs may umte these causes of action in one complaint under section 209 of the Civil Practice Act, wMch so far as material here provides: “ All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would arise.” In order to justify the union in one suit of separate causes of action by different plaintiffs under tMs section of the Civil Practice Act two conditions must concur: (1) The causes of action must arise out of the same transaction, or series of transactions, and (2) they must present some common question of law or fact.
The causes of action here do not meet the first of these requirements nor the second. The cause of action asserted by Kelso is for capita taxes arising out of the previous affiliation of local 585 with the district council. The cause of action asserted by Jose is for salary as business agent of local 585 arising out of Ms election to that office in December, 1928. The cause of action asserted
It is sought to justify the union of these three causes of action by these plaintiffs by reason of the joinder of the banks as defendants. The banks are joined upon allegations that, after the suspension of local 585, they refused to recognize its checks and that “ by reason of said suspension of Local 585 and the revocation of its Charter the moneys in the defendant Banks to the credit of said Local Union is held by said defendant Banks in trust for the creditors of said Local Union as well as the persons who composed the. membership thereof.” It is, therefore, suggested that by operation of law a trust liability was imposed upon each of the defendant banks in favor of each of the plaintiffs wMch arose out of the same
Local 585 is a voluntary unincorporated association of more than seven members. Assuming, as alleged, that • on February 25, 1930, its rights as a constituent member of the district council were terminated by the revocation of its charter, this did not affect the structure of the local; it only severed its affiliation with the parent body. Neither the United Brotherhood nor the district council had power to dissolve local 585 (Wells v. Monihan, 129 N. Y. 161; Grand Court, etc., v. Court Cavour, etc., 82 N. J. Eq. 89), nor is it alleged that this was attempted to be done. They had no power over the property rights of the local as between the local and its debtors or creditors. (Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N. Y. 232; Wells v. Monihan, supra; Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112; Grand Court, etc., v. Court Cavour, etc., supra.) It follows that local 585 has every power necessary to collect its debts, pay its creditors and distribute its surplus. It may sue and be sued as provided by sections 12 and 13 of the General Associations Law (added by Laws of 1920, chap. 915) and a judgment against it may be enforced against its property. (Gen. Assn. Law, § 15, added by Laws of 1920, chap. 915.) The allegation of the complaint, therefore, made upon information and belief, that “ by reason of said suspension of Local 585 ” the funds in the defendant banks are held “ in trust for the creditors of said Local Union ” constitutes a conclusion of law which the facts alleged do not sustain. It is sufficient to say that upon this question of law the plaintiffs’ “ information ” is not correct and its “ belief ” is without foundation. The obligations here were those of the association; they were not the obligations of the banks; nor are they converted into such by the circumstances that the banks have declined to recognize the checks and orders of the local. That may present a controversy between the local and the banks. It presents none between the banks and the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ claims, if reduced to judgment, may then, it is true, be enforced according to law against the property of the local, including any outstanding credits; until then they may not be enforced against their debtor’s debtor on the fiction of a trust relationship.