43 Conn. 129 | Conn. | 1875
The defendant contends that an attachment of real estate creates no incumbrance upon'the land, within the meaning of the covenant against incumbrances, until judgment has been rendered in favor of the attaching creditor, and the land has been set off on execution to satisfy the judgment. This claim is based upon the uncertainty which exists in such cases, whether the attachment will ever be followed by the levy of an execution upon the land. But there is no more uncertainty in such cases in this respect than in many cases of mortgages, whether the property will be eventually
It is clear that if the judgment in this case did not constitute the attachment an incumbrance upon the property, then an incumbrance, by our law, never can be created by an attachment. For nothing remained to be done but the levy of an execution, and the levy of an execution, by our law in a case like this, transfers to the execution creditor the immediate and absolute title of the execution debtor in the land set off upon the execution.
In some states the levy of an execution operates like a decree of foreclosure in the case of a mortgage. The execution debtor has the right during a certain period of time to redeem the land, and during such time the levy of course continues an incumbrance upon the land. But it is not so in
We are satisfied that the attachment in this case created an incumbrance upon the land, and the authorities are in accordance with this view. In Harlow v. Thomas, 15 Pick., 69, the court recognize an attachment as an incumbrance upon land. In Norton v. Babcock, 2 Met., 510, the court hold that a second attachment of all a debtor’s right, title and interest in land, is an incumbrance on the land from the time it is made. It will be found upon examination that this case is exactly in point, as is also that of Johnson v. Collins, 116 Mass., 392. These cases were actions for breach of covenants against incumbrances, and the breach consisted in the fact that attachments were resting upon the lands at the time they were conveyed. We might cite other authorities upon this subject, but these are sufficient.
It appears in the.case that the plaintiff conducted with reasonable prudence and care in regard to the interests of the defendant in the matter; that he had abundant cause for believing, and did believe, that the land would be taken to satisfy the judgment that had been rendered in favor of the attaching creditor, unless he paid and satisfied the same; and consequently, after he had made fruitless efforts to obtain instructions from the defendant in regard to the course which he desired him to pursue in the matter, he, in good faith, paid and satisfied the judgment, in order to free the land from the lien created by the attachment. In such circumstances we think the amount paid should he the measure of damages, no claim being made that it was greater than the value of the land attached. It was so held in the case of Norton v. Babcock, supra, in a similar case, and we think correctly.
We advise judgment for the plaintiff.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.