Kelly v. Valeo North America, Inc.Kelly v. Valeo North America, Inc.
Plaintiff Thomas Kelly brings this suit against his former employer, Defendant Valeo North America, Inc. (“Valeo”), under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Kelly was employed at Siemens from 1985 to 1993, and then later with Valeo North America, Inc. (“Valeo”) from 1997 until he voluntarily terminated his employment on July 15, 2012, at which time he was 51 years old. ECF Nos. 31-2, 31-90.
Kelly was a participant in Valeo’s pension plan, currently known as the Valeo Lighting Salaried Pension Plan (“the Plan”). ECF No. 31-24. The retirement benefits available to Kelly under the Plan are articulated in the Plan and further described in the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”). Id.; ECF No. 31-52. The Plan provides the Valeo Administrative Committee with “full and exclusive authority under the Plan to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret the terms of the Plan.” ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1831. The Plan contains an
On June 30, 2011, Valeo amended the Plan to freeze accrual of Accredited Service for the purpose of determining a Member’s Accrued Benefit as of June 30, 2011, but continuing, for certain Members, the accrual of Accredited Service for purposes of vesting and eligibility through a Member’s termination of employment. ECF No. 31-23.
Since 2005 (seven years before Kelly terminated his employment from Valeo), Kelly has been provided with benefit calculations by Valeo at his request, providing estimates of what benefits he would be eligible to receive should he choose to retire at various ages. Kelly was informed that if he were to “Retire” under the Plan prior to age 55, he would be eligible for only a Deferred Vested Pension benefit under the Plan, subject to an actuarial reduction. ECF No. 31-14, PageID.1724 (“Deferred Vested Pensions can be started as early as age 55 but would be actuarily reduced if started earlier than age 65”); see also, e.g., ECF No. 31-65, PageID.2225–26; ECF No. 31-68, PageID.2247; ECF No. 31-89, PageID.2511; ECF No. 31-118. It is undisputed that Kelly voluntarily terminated his employment on July 15, 2012, when he was 51 years old. ECF Nos. 31-90, 31-112. Thus, under the terms of the Plan as explained to Kelly, because he left Valeo’s employment prior to turning 55, he was not eligible for an Early Retirement Service Pension under the terms of the Plan. ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1802.
On January 4, 2019, the Valeo Administrative Committee rendered a partially favorable decision on Kelly’s disputes, explaining its decision and providing specific references to Plan provisions. ECF No. 31-118. The Committee also attached a copy of the 2011 Plan that was in effect at the time of Kelly’s termination of employment, and the Actuarial Early Deferred Vested Reduction Factors table with its decision. Id. Valeo agreed with Kelly that his “benefit service” years under the Plan should be 14.1 years and his “accredited service” years should be 23.1. Id. However, Valeo affirmed the denial of Kelly’s request for an Early Retirement Service Pension. Valeo explained that, under the Plan that was in effect at the time of Kelly’s termination, even though his “accredited service” years meet the requirements for Early Retirement under the Plan, because Kelly terminated his employment with Valeo in 2012 at age 51, instead of at age 55 or older, he was not eligible for the Early Retirement Service Pension. Id. Kelly was instead qualified for a
After this decision on his appeal, Kelly stated that he agreed with Valeo’s determination regarding his years of service, but not with its determination that he was not entitled to an Early Retirement Service Pension, ECF Nos. 31-127, 31-128, and he continued to seek an Early Retirement Service Pension, in spite of being advised of his ineligibility. ECF Nos. 31-130, 31-158.
As part of a long email chain regarding his claim, Kelly also broadly requested from Valeo on May 16, 2019, “All Pension Plan documents fin [sic] your possession from 2011 through 2019 (current as of today)” and calculations regarding his average annual pay related to the estimates provided to him separately. ECF No. 130, PageID.2804.
On June 5, 2019, Valeo provided Kelly with a copy of the SPD for the 2011 Plan that governed his benefits, as well as the requested calculations. ECF Nos. 31-130 to 31-132 (email stating SPD and calculations are attached, and attachments). A copy of the 2011 Plan and applicable actuarial reduction factors table had previously been sent to Kelly six months prior with the January 4, 2019 appeal decision letter. ECF No. 31-118. Valeo asserts that these two productions provided Kelly
Kelly was also eligible to participate in the smaller Valeo Sylvania, LLC Pension Preservation Plan (“PPP”) during his employment. PPP Plan, ECF No. 31-149; ECF No. 31-160, PageID.2933. Under the PPP, Kelly was required to commence benefits at age 55 unless he elected an alternate commencement date prior to 2009. ECF No. 31-149, PageID.2876. Kelly never selected an alternate date prior to 2009, never provided the relevant information to Valeo to facilitate the payment of his PPP benefits starting at age 55, and never appealed any determination made by Valeo of his PPP benefits calculation.
The form of Kelly’s benefits under the PPP depends on his marital status as of the benefit commencement date (i.e., August 1, 2016, the first of the month following his turning 55 years old). ECF No. 31-149, PageID.2875–76. If Kelly was married as of August 1, 2016, his benefit is to be paid as a 50% Joint and Survivor annuity. Id. Valeo explained to Kelly on September 27, 2023 that it needed proof of his marital status as of August 1, 2016 to process his make-up payments and continuing benefits under the PPP. ECF No. 31-160, PageID.2933. Because benefits are to commence at age 55 but, to date, Kelly has never made any written
Rather than provide the relevant information and request his benefits under the PPP plan’s terms, Kelly’s counsel responded to Valeo on October 30, 2023, claiming that Valeo’s estimates were “not accurate as my client is single.” ECF No. 31-163, PageID.2941. Valeo asserts that it only recently learned of Kelly’s true marital status as of August 1, 2016, when Kelly’s divorce decree from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was produced to Valeo on July 16, 2025 after repeated requests during the pendency of this lawsuit. See ECF No. 31-88. The divorce decree did not finalize a divorce for Kelly until January 19, 2018, meaning that as of August 1, 2016, he was married. Id. PageID.2462. The divorce decree itself makes no mention of the PPP. See id.
B. Procedural History
Kelly filed the Complaint in this case on April 24, 2024, alleging three counts: Count I to recover for “Violation of ERISA”; Count II for Breach of Contract; and Count III for a Declaratory Judgment. Complaint, ECF No. 1. Following the Court’s ruling on Valeo’s motion to dismiss, only two claims remain: (1) Kelly’s claims for an alleged wrongful denial of benefits under
Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Orders, ECF Nos. 14, 19, 28, the Parties filed respective Statements Regarding the Standard of Review, ECF Nos. 16, 17, the Court has denied Plaintiff’s request for a Procedural Challenge, ECF No. 27, and the Parties have jointly filed the Appendix for the Administrative Record. ECF Nos. 30, 31.
The Parties have now filed cross Motions for Judgment on the Administrative Record. ECF Nos. 35, 36.1 Responses have been filed to each of the motions. ECF Nos. 40, 42.
A. Denial of Benefits Under § 1132(a)(1)(B)
The appropriate standard of judicial review of benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators depends on the language of the plan itself. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008).2 Where the plan grants discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits, “[t]rust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate.” Id. (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). Here, the Plan explicitly confers discretionary authority on the administrator to make benefit determinations and to construe the Plan terms:
… The Administrative Committee has full and exclusive discretionary authority under the Plan to determine
eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret the terms of the Plan. Any interpretation or determination made pursuant to such discretionary authority shall be given full force and effect unless it can be shown that the interpretation or determination was arbitrary and capricious.
ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1831. Accordingly, a deferential standard is proper.
A deferential standard requires upholding a denial of benefits unless the decision was arbitrary and capricious. McClain v. Eaton Corp. Disability Plan, 740 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (2014). The arbitrary and capricious standard is “extremely deferential and has been described as the least demanding form of judicial review.” Id. at 1064 (quoting Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1107–08 (7th Cir. 1998)). The arbitrary and capricious standard is met “if [the administrator’s decision] is the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process and ... is supported by substantial evidence.” Balmert v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 601 F.3d 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation modified); see also Autran v. Procter & Gamble Health & Long-Term Disability Benefit Plan, 27 F.4th 405, 411 (6th Cir. 2022) (explaining that the Court “must uphold an administrator’s benefits decision” where it is based on a “deliberate, principled reasoning process” and “supported by substantial evidence.”) (citation modified). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Davis v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 980 F.3d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting General Med., P.C. v. Azar, 963 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Courts reviewing denials of benefits consider only the evidence contained within the administrative record. See Okuno, 836 F.3d at 607; Schwalm, 626 F.3d at 308. The arbitrary and capricious standard is not “without some teeth,” nor is it a mere rubber stamp applied to approve plan administrator decisions. See McClain, 740 F.3d at 1064. Ultimately, though, the burden is on Plaintiff to prove that the Plan Administrator’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. See Farhner v. United Transp. Union Discipline Income Prot. Prog., 645 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 2011).
B. Failure to Respond to Written Request
ERISA requires an administrator to provide an employee with specified information upon written request.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Benefit Claim
Valeo asks the Court to conclude that its decision was not arbitrary and capricious in determining that, according to the plain language of the Plan’s terms, Kelly was not eligible for an Early Retirement Service Pension under the Plan but instead was eligible for the Plan’s Deferred Vested Pension. ECF No. 35, PageID.3325–29. Kelly had appealed the Plan’s calculation of his “benefit service” years and “accredited service” years and asserted that he should be eligible for an Early Retirement Service Pension at age 58, without any reductions. The Valeo Administrative Committee issued a partially favorable decision on January 4, 2019. ECF Nos. 31-118, 31-119. Valeo agreed with Kelly’s “benefit service” and “accredited service” calculations, but, citing to specific Plan terms, explained that because Kelly terminated employment with Valeo on July 15, 2012, at age 51, instead of age 55 or older, he was not eligible for an Early Retirement Service Pension. Id.
The Court will start with the Plan’s terms and definitions:
- A “Member” “means an Employee who has met the requirements for membership as set forth in Article III.” ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1794 (Art. II, Sec. 27).
- Article III on “Membership” provides that “[a]ny Employee who is in the service of an Employing Company3 shall become a Member in the Plan as of the first day of the Eligibility Computation Period in which he first qualifies as an Employee under Section 17 of Article II.” Id. PageID.1796 (Art. III, Sec. 1).
- “Employee” in turn is defined as “any person who is employed by one or more Employing Companies in a salary-rated position, who receives a regular and stated compensation other than a pension, other than a retainer, from an Employing Company and who completes at least 1,000 Hours of Service during any Eligibility Computation Period….” Id. PageID.1792 (Art. II, Sec. 17 (emphases added)).
- “Retire,” “Retired” or “Retirement” “means either (a) the separation of a Member from employment with an Employing Company under such circumstances that he is entitled to receive a Pension, except that a Member who becomes entitled to a Deferred Vested Pension shall be deemed to Retire on the last day of the month immediately preceding his Pension Commencement Date ….” Id. PageID.1795 (Art. II, Sec. 39 (emphasis added)).
A “Deferred Vested Pension” “means the payments under the Plan to a Member who is eligible by reason of age and Vesting Service, pursuant to Section 5 of Article V and Section 3 of Article VI.” Id. PageID.1791 (Art. II, Sec. 11).
Under the terms of the Plan, “[a]ny Member who has attained age 55 and has completed 15 years of Accredited Service may Retire, and shall be entitled to a Service Pension.” Id. PageID.1802. Valeo determined, based on the Plan’s terms, that to be eligible for this Service Pension, the “Member” must be an “Employee” of Valeo who has “attained age 55” at the time they “Retire” and separate from the Company. In this case, Valeo determined that Kelly “separate[ed]” from employment with Valeo on July 15, 2012 at the age of 51, not 55, and thus he was not eligible for an Early Retirement Service Pension under the Plan’s terms.
The Plan provides that “[a]ny Member whose employment with the Company terminates other than by death after 5 or more years of Vesting Service or due to the closing of the facility where such Member is employed, but who cannot qualify for a Service Pension or Disability Pension, shall be entitled to a Deferred Vested Pension,” with the “normal Pension Commencement Date” as the former Member’s “Normal Retirement Date” (i.e., age 65). ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1803 (Art. III, Sec. 5); see also id. PageID.1794 (Art. II, Sec. 28). A “Member” may elect to commence his Deferred Vested Pension prior to his “Normal Retirement Date” (age 65), “on the first day of any month following the
Pursuant to these Plan terms, when Kelly, a former Valeo employee, requested to commence his pension benefits at age 58, Valeo determined that he was eligible for a Deferred Vested Pension, subject to a reduction factor of 56.7%, according to the Plan’s applicable reduction factors table that “takes into account [the person’s] age and life expectancy at the time payments are scheduled to start.” 2013 SPD, ECF No. 31-52, PageID.2123 (actuarial reduction factors table); see also ECF No. 31-118, PageID.2694.
The Court finds that this determination is based on a “deliberate, principled reasoning process” and “supported by substantial evidence” and thus must be upheld. See Autran, 27 F.4th at 411. This determination by Valeo was based on the Plan’s plain language and offered a “reasoned explanation” for its determination that Kelly was not entitled to an Early Retirement Service Pension because he left his employment with Valeo before age 55. See Kolpacke v. CSX Pension Plan, 554 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (Roberts, J.), aff’d, 527 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding Administrative Committee’s determination that terminated vested employee was not entitled to an early retirement
Similarly, the Plan’s determination that Kelly’s Deferred Vested Pension was subject to an actuarial reduction because he retired before age 65 was a reasoned application of the Plan’s terms and was not arbitrary and capricious. See Radell v. Michelin Retirement Plan, 578 F. App’x 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding decision to apply an actuarial reduction to disability benefits to an employee who chose to retire early, even where the plan’s terms were deemed ambiguous, because company’s interpretation of the plan’s language was reasonable).
Kelly fails to show that Valeo’s pension determination was arbitrary and capricious. His Motion and Response to Valeo’s Motion are somewhat difficult to follow but he appears to argue that Valeo improperly determined that Kelly was entitled to 14.1 years of benefit service for purposes of calculating the amount of his benefit instead of 23.1 years. ECF No. 36, PageID.3469. However, the Plan provides that a Member may have a different value of “Accredited Service” used for determining vesting and eligibility than for determining the calculation of their pension benefit. See 2011 Pension Plan, ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1788 (defining “Accredited Service” differently for employment
Accredited Service is used to calculate the amount of your benefit and to determine your eligibility for an early or disability retirement benefit. Your accredited service generally equals your service while you are a member of this Plan. It begins with your date of employment and continues until your employment ends because you chose to leave the Company, you retire, or you are discharged.
For purposes of determining the amount of your benefit, you do not earn accredited service after June 30, 2011. However, you continue to earn accredited service for purposes of determining eligibility for early retirement benefits.
ECF No. 31-52, PageID.2118 (emphasis added).
Consistent with this Plan language, Valeo informed Kelly since at least 1998 that the date commencing his Accredited Service for purposes of determining pension eligibility and vesting service would be June 15, 1989, and that his Accredited Service for the purpose of his pension benefit calculation would be based on service since his date of hire, June 2, 1997. ECF No. 31-5, PageID.1616. Valeo and Kelly both agreed in 2019 that Kelly’s Accredited Service for the purpose of determining pension eligibility and vesting would be from June 15, 1989 to July 15, 2012,
To the extent Kelly argues that Valeo acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his appeal by relying on the Actuarial Early Deferred Vested Reduction Table to determine his benefit amount, or contends that no such table exists, ECF No. 36, PageID.3467–68, those arguments fail. The Plan plainly provides that “the amount of such Deferred Vested Pension shall be reduced by multiplying his Deferred Vested Pension at his Normal Retirement Date by the appropriate factor as indicated in Table I – Early Commencement Factors,” ECF No. 31-24, PageID.1805–06, referring to the Actuarial Early Deferred Vested Reduction Factors table that was provided to Kelly with his appeals decision letter on January 4, 2019. ECF No. 31-118, PageID.2694. Kelly was expressly informed about and provided this table as early as 2005 and thereafter, including in the SPD and with the appeals decision letter. See, e.g., ECF No. 31-16, PageID.1741 (stating “Deferred Vested Pensions can be started as early as age 55 but would be actuarially reduced if started earlier than age 65. The actuarial reduction factors are also attached so you can estimate your monthly vested pension at various
Kelly also argues that he was “misled” into not accepting a 2016 lump sum offer because he anticipated being eligible for a full Early Retirement Service Pension at age 58, based on his accredited service years. ECF No. 36, PageID.3459–60. However, in emails between Valeo and Kelly in November 2016 regarding his inquiry about the lump sum offer, Valeo plainly informed Kelly that he was not eligible for an Early Retirement Service Pension, stating “since you were not age 55 when you terminated employment the early reduction table you need to use is for Deferred Vested participants. I believe I sent that to you in a prior e-mail.” ECF No. 31-70, PageID.2328. This is consistent with the information communicated to Kelly in the years prior to his lump sum inquiry. See, e.g., ECF No. 31-65, PageID.2232 (stating on October 10, 2012 “you were not retirement eligible at termination (age 55 w/ 15 years of svc)”); ECF No. 31-68, PageID.2247 (stating on August 4, 2014 “Your employment … ended on July 15, 2012 [and] … we are informing you of your eligibility to receive a deferred vested retirement benefit.”).
Finally, Kelly’s argument that his receipt of deferred compensation through a separate Section 409a plan, which was paid to him as a non-
B. PPP Claim
Valeo argues that to the extent Kelly asserts a claim under ERISA for benefits pursuant to the Pension Preservation Plan (“PPP“), it should be dismissed for several reasons, including failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Kelly‘s failure to instruct Valeo regarding how he would like to proceed with his PPP benefit, or his failure to dispute that he was married as of his benefit commencement date. ECF No. 35, PageID.3329–32. Kelly disagrees with Valeo‘s arguments and contends that he is entitled to 100% of his PPP benefit using 23.1 years of Accredited Service. ECF No. 42, PageID.3667–73.
While the ERISA statute does not contain an administrative exhaustion requirement, the Sixth Circuit has “read an exhaustion requirement into the statute.” Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 403(b) DC Plan, 851 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir. 1998)). This exhaustion requirement “enables plan fiduciaries to efficiently manage their funds; correct their errors; interpret plan provisions; and assemble a factual record which will assist a court in reviewing the fiduciaries’ actions.” Ravencraft v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 212 F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Makar v. Health Care Corp., 872 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1989)). Ensuring a complete factual record is of “particular importance because the court in an ERISA action is limited to a consideration of the evidence which was included in the record before the plan administrator[.]” Barix Clinics of Ohio, Inc. v. Longaberger Fam. of Cos. Grp. Med. Plan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 617, 622 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate to the extent that a plaintiff has not established exhaustion. See Falandays v. Penn Treaty Am. Corp., 114 F. App‘x 738 (6th Cir. 2004); Borman v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 64 F. App‘x 524, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2003); Weiner v. Klais and Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88, 91 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
Valeo asserts that Kelly never made any appeal, or exhausted any administrative remedies, regarding the PPP benefit. Valeo agrees that Kelly is entitled to a PPP payment, and accepted Kelly‘s years of “accredited service” calculation. But Valeo informed Kelly on September 27, 2023 that it needed information regarding his marital status as of his 55th birthday (by August 1, 2016), per the terms of the PPP. ECF No. 31-160, PageID.2933. Kelly responded on October 30, 2023, that he “is single,” but failed to provide any documentation as to what his marital status was “on August 1, 2016.” ECF No. 31-163, PageID.2941. Per the terms of the PPP, Kelly‘s present marital status is not relevant; whether he was married or single on August 1, 2016, the first month after his 55th birthday, is the relevant consideration. Valeo asserts that Kelly did not
Kelly nevertheless has failed to respond to Valeo with instructions as to how he wants to proceed with his PPP benefit, other than to demand a 100% payout. And, Kelly never appealed the determination of his PPP benefits as expressly required by the PPP, which states: “Claims for benefits shall be filed with the Administrative Committee (or its delegate) and resolved in accordance with the claims procedure in Exhibit A.” ECF No. 31-149, PageID.2878, citing Ex. A at PageID.2881–83 (addressing procedures for “Filing a Claim for Benefits” and “Appealing a Claim Denial“). Valeo argues that Kelly‘s claim for PPP benefits should be dismissed for failure to exhaust.
Kelly does not dispute that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to a claim for PPP benefits. He instead alleges that Valeo is at fault for failing to inform him of his duty to exhaust. ECF No. 42, PageID.3667. That argument is readily rejected as the PPP is an ERISA plan and the Sixth Circuit has “read an exhaustion requirement into the statute.” Hitchcock, 851 F.3d at 560. ERISA employee-benefit plans are required to “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the
Kelly argues that there are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement based on “futility of the administrative process and inadequacy of the administrative remedy.” ECF No. 42, PageID.3668. Exhaustion may be excused if a plaintiff demonstrates futility—that “resorting to the plan‘s administrative procedure would simply be futile or the remedy inadequate.” Coomer v. Bethesda Hosp., Inc., 370 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fallick, 162 F.3d at 419). Futility must be shown by a “clear and positive indication...that [a plaintiff‘s] claim will be denied on appeal” and “not merely...doubt[ ] that an appeal will result
(1) when the “Plaintiffs’ suit [is] directed to the legality of [the plan], not to a mere interpretation of it,” Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphases omitted); see also Fallick, 162 F.3d at 420, and (2) when the defendant “lacks the authority to institute the [decision] sought by Plaintiffs,” Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 719 (6th Cir. 2005).
Dozier v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 466 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2006).
On this record, Kelly has not demonstrated clear and positive evidence of the futility of exhausting administrative remedies regarding his claim for PPP benefits. Kelly does not challenge the legality of the PPP, only Valeo‘s interpretation of its terms and calculation of benefits under the PPP. Kelly‘s arguments are like those made in Borman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, where the Sixth Circuit refused to excuse exhaustion based on futility:
Borman vaguely alleged in his complaint that he had engaged in a “lengthy period” of fruitless discussions concerning his benefit claims in controversy, and had filed some sort of unspecified claim, with unnamed officers of A&P. He has further asserted that the defendants had not timely informed him of the available internal claim and review procedures, nor had they referred him to the Pension Committee. However, in the trial court, Borman filed no affidavit nor produced any other evidence in opposition to the Eckert affidavit and the documents offered by the defendants in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint. Most importantly, Borman
failed to evince, or even allege, that he had made any effort to adhere to A&P‘s formal written internal benefit claim and review procedures, or had even inquired of any A&P agent about those procedures.
64 F. App‘x at 528. See also Riverview Health Inst., LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, No. 3:07-cv-354, 2008 WL 4449482, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008), aff‘d, 601 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2010) (“While Plaintiffs describe some efforts to obtain payments from Medical Mutual of Ohio, there are no allegations detailing any efforts to pursue administrative remedies under any of ERISA plans.… [A] claimant bears the burden of proving futility beyond mere conclusory allegations.“).
Like the plaintiffs in Borman and Riverview Health, Kelly fails to demonstrate a “clear and positive indication” of futility sufficient to convince the Court to excuse the exhaustion requirement. Coomer, 370 F.3d at 505 (quoting Fallick, 162 F.3d at 419). Kelly‘s claim for PPP benefits therefore will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
C. Failure to Provide Documents Claim under § 1132(c)
Finally, Kelly asserts a claim for violation of
Any administrator ... who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary … may in the court‘s discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary[.]
Valeo argues that it is entitled to judgment on Kelly‘s failure to provide documents claims on four grounds: (1) the claim is time-barred; (2) Kelly‘s request provided no “clear notice” in that triggered Valeo‘s obligations to provide documents; (3) even if clear notice was given, Valeo provided Kelly with all of the documents it was obligated to provide; and (4) Kelly was not prejudiced as a result of not receiving certain documents. ECF No. 35, PageID.3335–41.
1. Kelly‘s § 1132(c) claim is time barred
Valeo argues that a two-year statute of limitations applies to Kelly‘s failure to produce documents claim under
“When a plan does not itself provide a limitations period, the Sixth Circuit applies the most analogous state statute of limitations of the forum state.” Patterson v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 845 F.3d 756, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2017). Because
Kelly does not dispute that the two-year limitations period applies to his
Kelly argues that the statute of limitations on his
Applying this analysis, Kelly knew of the pension documents that Valeo had provided him in response to his inquiries as of June 5, 2019, when Valeo produced the SPD to him in response to his May 16, 2019 request for “all Pension Documents []in your possession from 2011 through 2019 (current as of today).” That is when his claim accrued, and he was not entitled to “wait and see” if any additional documents would be produced. Further, to the extent Kelly contends that Valeo has “repeatedly failed to provide all Plan documents,” the Sixth Circuit and district courts within this circuit have refused to apply the continuing violations doctrine to ERISA claims. See, e.g., Medical Mut. of Ohio v. k. Amalia Enters. Inc., 548 F.3d 383, 394 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to apply continuing violations doctrine to claim brought by insurer against insured under
Accordingly, taking “a common-sense approach,” the June 5, 2019 production of the SPD “should have alerted” Kelly to protect his rights and assert a claim under
2. To the extent Kelly provided “clear notice” of a request for documents, Valeo produced responsive documents
Under ERISA, a plan administrator “shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary, plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or operated.”
Valeo argues that Kelly‘s broad request for “[a]ll Pension Documents []in your possession from 2011 through 2019 (current as of today)” is not specific enough to trigger the obligation under
Given the vast scope of the request, “all pension documents” for an 8-year period, with no specification as which plan documents are being sought, the Court cannot say with certainty that the plan administrator knew or should have known which documents were being requested. Consequently, the request did not provide “clear notice” of the records being sought.
Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for Valeo to read such a broad request as extending to those “key documents” governing Kelly‘s benefit determination at issue and used by Valeo to determine his issues on appeal. ECF No. 35, PageID.3337–38. Valeo asserts that it did provide those documents—the SPD for the operative 2011 Plan and his requested calculations, provided on June 5, 2019, along with the operative 2011 Plan and actuarial reduction table provided to Kelly a few months earlier, on January 4, 2019 with the appeal decision. Id. Valeo asserts that the Plan contains all of the operative terms governing Kelly‘s eligibility for pension benefits, the table details the actuarial reduction factors that are to apply to his Deferred Vested Benefit Pension, and the SPD explains in lay terms how the terms of the Plan are applied, including how to
Kelly does not dispute that he possessed these documents as of June 5, 2019. A plan administrator‘s provision of the applicable policy and the summary plan description generally satisfies the administrator‘s obligation to provide “plan documents” pursuant to
The Court finds that Kelly was provided with all documents Valeo had a duty to provide. Kelly‘s request for “all Pension Documents” does not pass the “clear-notice test” for documents beyond those provided by Valeo. See Cultrona, 748 F.3d at 707 (finding that plaintiff‘s “broadly phrased” request for “all documents comprising the administrative record
Kelly‘s complaint that he did not receive PPP documents or the 2015 Valeo Lighting Salaried Pension Plan documents in response to his May 19, 2019 request fails to change this finding. The PPP is a separate non-qualified plan from the retirement plan at issue, and the 2015 Valeo Lighting Salaried Pension Plan did not govern Kelly‘s benefits, as his employment terminated in 2012. See 2015 Plan, ECF No. 31-69, PageID.2252 (“Employees who terminated their employment before the effective date of this amendment and restatement shall … be subject to the terms of the Plan as in effect on the date of their termination of employment.“). Moreover, Valeo discussed “the non-qualified plan, the Valeo Lighting Pension Preservation Plan” in its response to Kelly‘s document request, in connection with Kelly‘s request for calculations of Kelly‘s earnings, but Kelly did not follow up with a request for that separate plan document. See Goldstein v. Grp. Ins. Plan for Admin. & Mgmt. Emps. of Fairchild Rep. Co., 940 F. Supp. 474, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff‘d, 99 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) (administrator‘s decision to send plaintiff 1983 SPD rather than the 1987 version because plaintiff‘s employment ceased before the 1987 version was issued was reasonable).
Kelly fails to explain how the allegedly missing documents impacted Valeo‘s determination regarding his retirement benefits, or how he has been prejudiced by not receiving the documents. See Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1068–69; Briggs v. Nat‘l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 1:16-CV-1197, 2018 WL 3326857, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 6, 2018), aff‘d, 774 F. App‘x 942 (6th Cir. 2019) (denying penalties or attorney‘s fees and costs where plaintiff “has not shown that she was prejudiced, and there is no indication that the other Defendants would have taken any different position with regard to [plaintiff‘s] claim for benefits if she had received the full AD&D policy sooner.“).
Kelly‘s
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant‘s Motion for Judgment, ECF No. 35, will be GRANTED, and Plaintiff‘s Motion for Judgment, ECF No. 36, will be DENIED.
This is a final order and closes the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 31, 2026
/s/Terrence G. Berg
HON. TERRENCE G. BERG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE