78 Fla. 636 | Fla. | 1919
— Upon an indictment for an assault with intent to commit murder in the first- degree, Kelley was convicted of an assault with intent to commit manslaughter. On writ of error it is in effect contended that the verdict is contrary to the law applicable to the evidence.
The statutes provide that:
“The unlawful killing of a human being, wiien perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when committed in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, shall be murder in the first degree, and shall be punishable with death. When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another, and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, it shall be murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life.
“When perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of any felony, other than arson, rape, robbery or burglary, it shall be murder in the third degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding twenty years.”
“The killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, in cases where such killing shall not be justifiable or excusable homicide nor murder, according to the provisions of this article, shall be deemed manslaughter, and shall be punished by im*638 prisonment in the State prison not exceeding twenty years, or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding-one year, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars.”
“Whoever, with malicious intent to maim or disfigure, cuts out or maims the tongue, puts out or destroys an eye, cuts or tears off an ear, cuts, slits or mutilates the nose or lip, or cuts off or disables a limb or member of any other person, and whoever is privy to such intent, or present, aiding or abetting in the commission of such of-fence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison not exceeding twenty years or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars.”
“In all criminal prosecutions hereafter begun in this State, if the defendant be found guilty of an offence lesser in degree, but included within the offence charged in the indictment or information, such verdict shall not be set aside by the court, upon the ground that such verdict is contrary to the evidence, if the evidence produced in such case would have supported a finding, or if such court would have sustained a verdict of guilty of the greater offense.” Secs. 3205, 3209, 3220 and 4007, Gen. Stats., 1906, Compiled Laws, 1914.
The prosecuting witness, Leroy Cowart, testified that he and another boy, Jim Bartman, were escaping from the Reform School at Marianna, and were at Quincy, and that “we went down in the woods about a half-mile awaj and lay down to go to sleep. Mr. Kelley, the defendant, came into the woods where we were with a shotgun, and said that he was going to carry us to jail; that he was the sheriff or was going to take us to the sheriff. I got up and started away; was walking fast away from him. Mr. Kelley told me to stop twice, and I did not stop, and
Jim Bartman testified: “I was with Leroy Cowart at the Reform School at Marianna and escaped with him. Had been in the woods around and not far from Quincy depot for part of two days and one night, before the shooting, but had bothered nothing or nobody. Went to a house and a woman gave us something to eat for cutting wood. Went back in the woods about a half a mile from where we got something to eat and lay down to sleep. Mr. Kelley, the defendant, came into the woods where we were with a shotgun. Leroy Cowart got up and started away pretty fast. Mr. Kelley told him to stop and when he did not, shot him with the shotgun. Leroy fell; he was shot with No. á shot and hit in the back all the way from his shoulder to his ankle, but the worst place was in the
The defendant testified: “Living on the railroad, where we do, we are continually bothered with tramps and hoboes. Some one broke into my commissary, and they had cut initials, etc., on plate of section house. That evening-some people had been around the house for awhile, and had gone to the' woods, so instead of sending for Mr. Bar-field, an officer, to get them, I went to the house when I knocked off from work, and got my shotgun and went into the woods for them. I came -upon them in the woods, lying down. One of them, Leroy Cowart, got up and started to run away. I called to him and asked him to stop twice, and he- would not. I fired the gun at him when he was .about 40 yards away, shooting him in the legs. He fell, and I went to where he was and told him to get up. He got up, and with assistance went to the railway track where the car was, and I brought him on to the depot at Quincy, and had the sheriff phoned, who came there and got him and Jim Bártman. I did not intend to kill or hurt the boy seriously. I thought the gun was loaded with No. 9 shot as it was when I left it. I-only had two kinds
J. D. Yaughn testified for the defendant: “I relieved Mr. Kelley, defendant, as section foreman at Quincy during the last days of December, 1918, and the first days of January, 1919, and lived in his house and had occasion to use his shotgun. I shot a hawk a short distance and apparently did not hurt him; he flew away. Did not shoot him over thirty yards. The gun must have been loaded with small shot as it did not seem to hurt the hawk. I possibly reloaded the gun, but am not certain. Do not remember positively whether I reloaded it or not.”
The testimony is legally sufficient as a predicate for a finding that the defendant unlawfully shot Leroy Cowart
Judgment affirmed.
I think the evidence establishes aggravated assault only. —Ellis.