*1 testi- allowing protested did not err or Amendment Fifth under privileged mony. court did trial The Constitution. Indiana's a verdict direct refusing to not err Affirmed. refusing to instruct inor favor Smith's produc- right to refuse he had jury that STATON, JJ., concur. CHEZEM sought. records tion also court trial contends Smith favor in his a verdict have directed any records evidence there was because contends further Smith existed. ever giving by error compounded this court
trial KELLY, Appellant, Timothy F. jury con- to the instruction erroneous an the offense. elements cerning the Parker, SMITH, Randall F. Robert J.B. and Daniel Nye, Fetsch Andrew J. J. that Smith trial testified at Albrecht Glavin, Appellees. W. private" papers were "his stated had private." "keep them right to he had 37A04-9105-CV-137. No. stat Smith's testified about also Paviakovie Indiana, Appeals of Court records, if submitted that ed concerns Fourth District. up in the State, eventually end might (R. March 1992. Service. Revenue the Internal hands of al to sufficient 589). testimony was This May Rehearing Denied records were find there jury to low allow the would which Smith existence Accordingly, examine.
Department it refused when did not err court
trial for Smith.5
direct a verdict trial court contends
Finally, Smith testify he allowing Pavlakovie Audit Divi- from the information
received tax to file concerning failure Smith's
sion testimony was this He contends returns. prejudicial. hearsay and
both may admit
Hearsay be evidence why a explaining purpose of
ted for particular took a official
government v. State action. Johnston
course of 1179, 1181. Pavlakovie's
Ind., the information regarding
testimony of file tax returns failure
Smith's subse for Pavlakovie's the basis
fered as admissible investigation. It was
quent Accordingly, the trial purpose. 706). (R. agents." See, its authorized Klingler, Revenue or exception. "required records" require failed the instruction Smith contends supra, at 310. actually existed. jury the records to find charge jury instructed trial court 5. The giving this instruction err in court did not sup- must Permit Examination Failure to defining language statute it tracks permit knowing failure "to by proof ported the offense. account, book, paper, the examination record, Department other data
1308 *2 Schmidt, Kathryn D. Cuppy, M. Fred Cuppy, Mer & Burke, Murphy, Costanza rillville, appellees.
CONOVER, Judge. Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellant partial grant of appeals Timothy Kelly Defen- of judgment favor summary dants/Counter-Claimants-Appellees J.B. An- Parker, Nye, Smith, Randall J. Robert (Firm). Fetsch, and Daniel Glavin drew J. affirm. We issues for restated presents three Kelly review: our erred as trial court 1. whether partial sum- entry in its of law matter Firm, the coun- for the mary judgment ter-claimants; judgment summary 2. whether Kelly, the counter- for be entered defendant; erroneously the trial court 3. whether Partnership. Articles of construed cross-ap- in its one issue presents Firm peal: in not trial court erred
1. whether issue judgment on the summary granting at the percentage Kelly's distribution his withdrawal. time of D. Kel- Elizabeth began when This action filed a verified Timothy Kelly F. ly and injunction with preliminary for complaint court asking the Superior Court the Lake "Kelly" using the Firm to restrain The Firm had firm title. law in their name name of practice under continued the termi- Beckman, after Kelly and Smith Kelly on with of their nation 31, 1989. March In count filed a counterclaim. The Firm Firm Kelly liable I, was it asserted matters by legal generated all fees for part of the business were withdrawal, less his date of Firm as Firm in- proportion applicable Both entitled. to which come summary partial filed motions sides The trial this count. judgment on judgment on summary its rendered Medrea, Hughes, Lu- Karen L. Daniel A. December Firm on in favor Merrillville, count I Medrea, cas, Holcomb & 7, 1990. appellant. errors, correct Kelly filed a motion to Affidavits are liberally to be con strued in appeal denied. This favor of the non-movant. which the trial court Wood Ins., (1982), Ind., ward Inc. v. White followed. More facts will be added nec- However, pursuant essary. to TR. 56(C), action, in effect at the time of the judgment sought shall be if Summary judgment only proper rendered genuine any where there is no issue as to pleadings, depositions, interrog answers to atories, admissions, and together affidavits City material fact. Evansville v. Moore any testimony genuine with show no (1990), Ind., issue 563 N.E.2d 114. In re exists as to material fact and the mov viewing entry summary a trial court's ing party judgment is entitled to as a mat judgment, reviewing court is bound *4 ter of law. court; the same standards as the trial we affidavits, pleadings,
must consider all the
Kelly's
While
denial in his affidavit
admissions,
depositions,
answers
to inter must be viewed as true since it is uncontra-
rogatories,
testimony
light
a
most
dicted, the trial court properly examined
nonmoving party.
favorable
Scott v.
pleadings, deposition,
interrogatory an
Bodor,
(1991), Ind.App.,
Inc.
571 N.E.2d
swers, and admissions as well. Frink v.
313, 318;
(1991), Ind.App.,
Reed v. Dillon
(1991), Ind.,
535, 536;
State
568 N.E.2d
585,
any
566 N.E.2d
588. If
doubt as to
56(C) (1990).
agree
T.R.
The
present,
the existence of a factual issue is
ment was an
exhibit
Firm's counter
against
the same should be resolved
Moreso,
claim.
the resolution of how the
56(C),
moving party.
City
Ind.Trial Rule
partnership agreement
interpreted
is to be
implicit
in count I of the counterclaim.
Evansville,
Lawlis v. Ind. & Furthermore, Kelly has cited no au 435, 439, App., denied, 562 N.E.2d rek. thority proposition pre for the Firm is trans. denied. recovering vented from on I count counterclaim because it contained an alle However, unnecessary irrelevant or gation fiduciary duty of breach or for disputes factual will not be considered. Id. proposition proof that of such a claim is A "genuine" only factual issue is it when an essential element of an action for an cannot be foreclosed reference to undis accounting principles partnership. under puted requires facts and a trier of fact to fact, In jurisdictions addressing other opposing parties' differing resolve the ver precise question fiduciary have held sions. Id. duty upon part exists the termination of a nership absent an to the con Kelly contends the trial court should trary. only denying have considered his affidavit fiduciary duty breach and not have Kaplan App. Resnick v. 49 Md.
interpreted
partnership agreement
in 582, 587,
Maryland
484 A.2d
considering the
Firm's
explicitly rejected
proposition
a firm
fiduciary
points
motion. He
out J.B. Smith's affida-
prove
duty
needs to
a breach of
vit, attached to the Firm's motion for sum-
it can recover fees. The court held
before
mary judgment, does not address the issue
part
there
whether
was
violation
fiduciary duty
instead recites the
but
nership agreement
"was
relevant
Firm's calculation of the amount to which
rights
material to the
of both sides to an
Kelly
is entitled under the
accounting."
Mary
ments discussed If there is er. IND.CODE 28-4-1-18. *5 tention. contract, IC 28-4-1-1 the UPA controls. undisputed It is the through 23-4-8-8. power in has the inherent This court agree- partnership into a parties entered summary judgment to re the review of govern provides the UPA will ment which summary judgment grant of verse the not cover. the does in areas summary judgment party and enter for one v. party. Davidson appropriate for the correctly found the The trial court (1991), Ind.App., 572 Ins. Co. Cincinnati specific pro agreement has 502, reasons set out be 508. For N.E.2d remaining par vision which describes low, trial court error. There find no we from the interest in cases removed ties' fore, grant we will not According partner firm after withdrawal. Kelly.1 provides ly, the UPA Kelly the trial court contends account Every partner must construing and hold as partnership for benefit partner duty withdrawing include him points any profits He derived wind-up unfinished business. for it trustee agreement which provisions to two of the other the consent without with the the Firm's and the any transaction connected suggests control all from he in this re- withdrawing partner's duties conduct, formation, liquidation of or gard. partnership. agree- Paragraph 6 of IC 28-4-1-21. ment, Buy-out, in titled Termination partnership is the Dissolution of a part, states: pertinent change in the relation of partnership may agreement and this This ceasing to as- by any partner be caused beginning by any partner terminated be on as distin- carrying sociated (120) Twenty days after One Hundred winding up of the busi- from the guished writing to do is or intention so notice ness. partners. In the event given to the other withdrawing part 23-4-1-29. IC death, retirement, or withdrawal partner as a trustee when ner remains partner paid in partner, such shall be of a herewith, Bousheh computed ship dissolved and terminated. and as is accordance (1990), account, Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d v. Ishak hereunder, ry his capital his net findings regard. fact Kelly urges After the trial court's find no error in this ever, we court, affidavits, Kelly's reviewing material before based on admissions were not testimony. designated How- properly sworn
1311 pre-dissolution in fees work share (modified rehearing on other 784, 788 116)2 paid after dissolution to the dis progress grounds, 560 withdrawing part partnership or to solved joined the Boushehry, Indiana right if has exercised a ners even the client which hold long jurisdictions line of discharge attorney sharing who is in partners remain fiduciary duties of the Bromberg fees. and Ribstein on up process with during winding tact (1991 Ed.) 7.08(e). Only in Partnership § pending at partnership business respect to partner dies is the a situation where Rosenfeld, Meyer time of dissolution. surviving partner of a law firm entitled to (1983), Cal.Rptr. 194 v. Cohen & Susman compensation completing litigation pend 200; Kap 180, App.3d Resnick v. 146 Cal. However, 23-4-1-18(f). ing in an inter IC 582; (1981), 434 A.2d Md.App. 49 lan case, partner general rule is the vivos (1977), Tex.App., 558 Bryant v. Woodruff project completed who is not entitled (1974),Sup., 535; Lavin v. Ehrlick S.W.2d fee should compensation extra and the 50; 363 N.Y.S.2d Frates 80 Misc.2d pre-dissolution divided on a basis. Id. 77; (1964),Fl.App., 167 Fou Nichols 80.2d 190 Or. chek v. Janicek argues Kelly the trial court's decision Partnership 783; P.2d 59A Am.Jur.2d illogical because it allows the UPA con- (1987). § disposition removed trol the assets the Firm after withdrawal allows but contrary agreement, If there is no 6 of the progress fiduciary duty extends to work disposition of those assets to control the This is true the time of dissolution. at remaining with the Firm. He claims the completed after the even if the work is of Firm result is an uneven distribution In Hammes v. Frank dissolution. *6 Further, Kelly argues if his with 1348, assets. a law firm dis Ind.App., 579 N.E.2d We partnership agreement. partnership, no the clearly terminates solved with drawal in partners participate the all the partnership agree held that in absence of a pro- up partnership of all business ment, gov wind Partnership Indiana Act the Paragraph in 15. vided produced income erned. Under UPA the by winding up unfinished busi equal provides for an distribu- UPA part to former ness was to be distributed withdrawal of a tion of firm assets on respective to their proportion ners in re- only reason to contract partner. The A class action was shares. Id. at 1356. depart distribution is to garding dissolution the time of the dissolution of pending at Here, from this scheme. to firm. The new firm continued the law majority of agreement covers the issues had on the case to the conclusion but work Paragraph 6 of partnership. involved in a representative. We substituted a class agreement specifies how the assets liti post-dissolution work on that found valued progress work in are from the former gation was unfinished work of the partner only. -It is writ- departing for the work, we or partnership. As unfinished language refers singular in and the ten firm the income the new received dered departing partner, not the interest of the the old firm. Id. this case divided with limitation remaining partners. This fa- Firm continuity of the and discour- applies general vors the This decision partner with its attendant ages withdrawal holding all are entitled rule liability upon statutory attaches claim of law or interrogatories, to the Firm's brief, and answers findings though partnership, even trial court's were correct. we find the the dissolution of contract, if in a breach of dissolution results (7th Cir.1989), Ferguson v. 2. cites Bane judg- by good faith is motivated the dissolution 11, upon proposition termi- F.2d for the 890 partnership rather of the ment for the benefit nation, longer withdrawing partner has a managing partner. gain personal of the than up fiduciary duty to wind to the old partnership was not at issue. Dissolution point. The facts affairs. This case is not the duties of did not address Also the court partner's against suit involved a retired case partnership. winding up in for the loss of his retirement the new firm court held no common benefits. The circuit 1312 Kelly strongly con Additionally, consequences. and disruption economic part reading of the court's tends the trial the Firm to permits agreement two Indiana nership agreement violates sudden effects and the harsh mitigate First, he conduct. professional rules of discourages part and of clients solicitation Ind. Professional Con it violates maintains prior orchestrating matters from ners split 1.5(e), prohibits fee which position duct Rule in a they would be so withdrawal in same firm lawyers not ting between them cases with lucrative the most to take pro in fees was not the division of where does The court the event of withdrawal. performed.3 to the work portion agreement parties' go not behind consideration adequacy of
assess Kelly cites arguments, support In of his However, equal benefits. to assure many jurisdictions. contract cases cases from Service, factual situa very different See, Herrera v. Collection they all have e.g., 981, 983- Superior (1982), App., 441 N.E.2d Champion Court Ind. tions. Inc. 777, Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d denied, to en the court refused reh. the court Kelly's argument entitled the law an force accounting Firm ordering an by not legal recovered all the fees firm to almost Paragraph 15 misses required assets as attorney regardless an withdrew after 15 of the point. performed by preparation was how much accounting full shall provides a specifically concluded the firm. The court to settle order upon termination be taken winding up of was not a termination effects, moneys. Logically, debts, up the fees were un partnership and noted creditors, departing part it is to benefit Silverberg In In re conscionable. specifically limits ners, Paragraph 6 since 427 N.Y.S.2d 75 A.D.2d withdrawing partner is enti amount a agree award. The an arbitration affirmed account, his capital to his net tled to receive partner each dispute provided ment under receivables, and his vest interest vested pay the dissolving partnership was to in a fee cases. contingent interest ed of fees earned specified percentage other eighteen months their clients remaining partners permits Indiana This following dissolution. partnership may entity of the agree the aas restriction found to be unenforceable *7 notwithstanding the withdrawal continue impermissible practice of law and an on the Lawlis, at 562 N.E.2d partner. of one See fee division. agreement Here, partnership 441-444. agree enforced jurisdictions have Other the continuation possibility of foresees the partner violating split the fee challenged if one as ments provides remain (1990), La. 17 withdraw. v. ting Roy rule. Gravel 1175, a the court enforced pos App., to retain 570 So.2d entitled ing partners shall be allocating fees received contract equipment. dissolution premises session of grounds it did not on the the Firm are after dissolution remaining partners of The splitting. It conclud prohibited fee involve although it is not continuing in business fictional existence the firm continued ed a agreement. type clear under what accounting. up so there was need for an being there is no it wound as was meaning of Prof. fee division within forcing Further, an account a court order lawyer 1.5(e). The client knew his Kelly's duty to Cond.R. relevant to ing not be would agreed to implicitly in a firm so he more was him to receive or entitle the Firm agree Paragraph 6 of the fees however by split firm to those provided than allow the Likewise, fit. in the firm saw ment. client, lawyer as- agreement each 1.5(e) part with the provides fol- as 3. Prof.Cond.R. representa- joint responsibility for the sumes lows: lawyers are not tion; who of fee between A division object (2) does not advised of and the client is only may made if: in the same firm lawyers in- participation of all to (1) proportion servic- to the the division is in volved; (3) or, reasonable. total fee is by lawyer performed by written each es
1313
(lawful
practice
restriction on
A.2d 1287
(1989),
Murray v. Lambert
in Hendler &
444,
monetary penalty
part
560,
impose
a later
to
147 A.D.2d
law
N.Y.S.2d
537
or client since
taking
the firm's staff
ners
arbi
case,
enforced an
the court
York
New
termination moneys
awarded
award which
money);
tration
not
earned
were
ongoing
busi
the new
payments paid
out of
Fisch, Power,
Aspelmeier,
Anderson
It
partner.
a retired
proceeds
ness
(1990),
Iowa,
Engbeg
461
&
Warner
apply
rule did not
splitting
the fee
opined
(firm's
pay departing
refusal to
N.W.2d 598
partner.
of his earned interest not
to a former
partner full value
payments
rules)
disciplinary
under
Co
sanctioned
held
reasoning Roy,
we
Adopting
Lord, Day & Lord
551
hen v.
prohibition contained
splitting
fee
410,
contingent by covered the Order 7. The issues its later determina- trial court reserved for the other sufficiently distinct from being defer to the trial court. tion. We complaint and by the issues raised the Firm's we decline both Counter-Claim, pur- now finds the Court urgings judgment enter on this Kelly's 54(C) 54(B) that and TR. to TR. suant issue. delay and just reason for there is no Affirmed. entry of a final and hereby directs the judgment favor appealable *9 MILLER, J., concurs. against the and Counter-Claimants I GARRARD, J., separate on Count of dissents with Counter-Defendant opinion. Counter-Claim.
gt writing interlocutory in ex- summary judgment, unless the involves a 5. Sincethis case 56(C) just pressly which states is not rea- is TR. determines that there the trial rule involved part: pertinent writing expressly delay in directs and in son for upon entry judgment less than all the is- less than all the of as to A respect sues, parties. with in a claim or issues involved claims or parties shall be all the claims or less than partners according tributed to the former GARRARD, Judge, dissenting. respective partnership to their shares. See agree majori- I I While with dissent. disagree IC 23-4-1-80. I do not with the ap- question ty only that the available analysis except to the Hommes extent summary judg- pellate review is the reasoning appears the court's to focus on remaining partners' ment entered on inquiry as to what constitutes "unfin- counterclaim, disagree I with first count of ished business" rather than what consti- of that issue. its resolution "winding up." tutes al- remaining partners In that count 23-4-1-80, when a Under IC dissolution partnership left the leged that when partner, by is caused the withdrawal of a potential him clients and he took with partnership the existence of the continues partnership; per- that he clients of the winding up partnership of "until the affairs them, legal accept- and formed services completed." "winding up" is The term has therefor; partner- and that payment ed special legal significance in the context ship entitled to all the fees earned process partnership law. It refers to the employments both before and after those settling partnership affairs after dissolu (subject, partnership dissolution tion, liquidation, often called and involves course, percentage.) Kelly's partnership reducing pay the assets to cash to creditors granted partial agreed The trial court and partners the value of their distribute ordering. my In summary judgment so respective interests. v. Dreifuerst view this was error. Dreifuerst (1979) 90 Wis.2d 280 N.W.2d precepts legal system of our One of the 335, 338; (1989) Ely see also Weisbrod v. litigants legal is that should be entitled to 171, 174; Wyo., 767 P.2d Smith v. Kennebeck their representation by lawyer(s) (1 Mo., 973) 502 S.W.2d willing choosing, assuming litigant is of some absence pay lawyer the bill and the is and able to among partners as to in- how work- question. the court admitted before valued, progress winding are to assets be reflected in Rule 5.6 of the That view is up activity necessary to determine their is Rules of Professional Conduct. mean that worth. But this does not work course, the former is enti- Of ordi- performed after a dissolution treat as an asset work which was in tled to business, opposed to nary course of as on the date of dissolution. The progress activity, belong winding-up should or does agreement details the manner partnership. may, This ad- previous to the valuing hourly that business for mat- 28-4-1-18(f) ditionally, be inferred IC ters, contingent flat fee matters and fee partner is not provides that while applied cases. be acting in the entitled to remuneration for dissolu- progress all work in date of business, partner surviving remaining by retained tion whether remuneration for his entitled to reasonable by Kelly. partners or winding up part- performed services (1991) Recently, in Hammes v. Frank words, In the line of nership affairs. other Ind.App., 579 N.E.2d the court was at time of demarcation is to be drawn the dissolution of a law confronted with recognition that some dissolution with split up partnership caused activity may necessary. winding up partner no firm. There had been written us the the case before (unlike ship agreement, accordingly work-in- covers both how here) present provision circumstances how progress are to be valued and assets work-in-progress how was to be covered payment for their are to receive Looking upon a dissolution. handled winding up Potentially, minimum shares. Act, Partnership et Uniform IC 28-4-1-1 be, was, necessary. activity will seq. controlling under those cireum- hand, the other the former On stances, the court determined that income *10 matter of are not entitled as a through winding up of unfin produced dis- partnership business should be new, continuing, ished law to the fruits of clients former for Kelly performs services the firm. they holding that
The court
were. reversed. COLE, Appellant-
Jerry Leneille
Defendant, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
STATE 49A02-9101-CR-6.
No. Indiana, Appeals
Court of District.
Second 30,1992.
March Soards, & Fruechten- L. Soards
William icht, Indianapolis, appellant-defendant. Pearson, Gen., Atty. Richard C. Linley E. Gen., Webster, Indianapolis, Deputy Atty. appellee-plaintiff. SHIELDS, Judge. convic appeals his
Jerry Leneille Cole felony,1 B crimi robbery, a class tions for confinement, felony,2 and a class B nal license, a handgun carrying a without A class misdemeanor3 robbery and confinement affirm the We handgun convictions; con- we reverse viction.
ISSUE sup- sufficient the evidence is Whether port convictions. Cole's
FACTS February a.m. on Around 2:80 manager of Walker, the associate James (1988). 35-47-2-1, 35-47-2-23 (1988). IC3. 1. IC 35-42-5-1 (1991 Supp.). IC 35-42-3-3
