75 So. 291 | Ala. | 1917
Though it be conceded, in deference to the arguments for appellee, that his complaint is in tort, his action, according to the uncontradicted evidence, was barred by the statute of limitations, and appellants should have had the general affirmative charge which the .record shows they requested in writing. _
We think the rule as to the statute of limitations applicable to this case is soundly stated in 25 Cyc. 1136, in the following language: “If the act of which the injury is the natural sequence is of itself a legal injury to plaintiff, a completed wrong,
This is the rule of our cases.—Mardis v. Shackleford, 4 Ala. 493; Governor v. Gordon, 15 Ala. 72; Snedicor v. Davis, 17 Ala. 472; McCalla v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 163 Ala. 107, 50 South. 971.
There is a class of cases in which a different statement of the rule is necessary, though the basic principle is the same. They are cases in which the act complained of does not itself constitute a legal injury; that is, an injury giving rise to a cause of action because it is an invasion of some legal right. In such cases plaintiff’s injury, the invasion of his rights, depends upon a further and subsequent development of what defendant has done, and the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to'run when, and only when, the damages are sustained. This rule is illustrated in the case of West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 South. 849, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 805, 135 Am. St. Rep. 127, 18 Ann. Cas. 750, and in the cases to which reference is there made. In the case here it hardly admits of doubt that a cause of action accrued to plaintiff when defendants had completed their work and received payment for it. Then his right was invaded. Then the statute began to run. As the Supreme Court of New York said in an old case involving this same question: “The plaintiff’s case may be a very hard one; but that affords no reason for construing away a statute of great public benefit, and which, in many cases, is a shield against antiquated and stale demands.”—Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 33.
It follows that appellants should have had the general affirmative charge which they requested.
Reversed and remanded.