57 Wis. 425 | Wis. | 1883
The authority to the plaintiff to sell the defendant’s wood is found in the letter of the defendant of February 13th, the price being modified by the letter of March 2d. The testimony tends to show that plaintiff made contracts for the sale of 500 cords before any further modification of plaintiff’s authority was attempted. It is contended on behalf of the defendant that the letter of March 26th required
If the plaintiff produced customers ready and willing to purchase the wood at the specified prices, before revocation of his authority, he is entitled to his commissions on the amount those customers would have taken, although the defendant refused to deliver the wood. To entitle him to his commissions we do not think it essential that the plaintiff should have entered into written contracts for the defendant with such customers in order to bind them under the statute of frauds. It is sufficient if the customers were ready and willing to perform their verbal contracts with the plaintiff to purchase the wood. It was substantially so held in the late case of Connor v. Semple, ante, p. 243.
Thus far our views seem to accord with those of the learned circuit judge, expressed in his instructions to the jury. But he gave one instruction which we think erroneous. It is in these words: “ If the defendant revoked the agency of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, notwithstanding such revocation, went on and completed the sale of the wood, and immediately thereafter notified the defendant thereof,
But when it comes to a transaction between the principal and the former agent, the reason of the rule utterly fails, and the rule has no application. Should a stranger, without authority, assume to act as the agent of another, it would be intolerable if such other would be bound to compensate the interloper for his services unless he gave the latter “ notice of his dissent within a reasonable time thereafter.” The law imposes no such obligation upon business men in respect to those who, without authority, interfere in their affairs. If the defendant revoked the authority of the plaintiff to sell wood for him, such revocation was a perpetual notice to the plaintiff that he dissented from each and every act of assumed agency, and as to him no other notice of dissent is required. The jury may have found the revo
Other errors are assigned and have been, argued by the respective counsel. It is not deemed necessary to consider them.
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.