3 Or. 189 | Clackamas Cty. Cir. Ct., O.R. | 1870
rendered the following decision:
The evidence shows that up to the present time the business of the defendant, the People’s Transportation Co., at the portage, has been transacted wholly on the east side of the river. There was some evidence tending to show that, in case of very high water, a canal or railroad on the west side of the river, over the premises in controversy, would, if constructed, enable that company to do business more conveniently and profitably than it could be done on the east side. And that at some future time the P. T. Co. will, or may, have occasion to use a part of the lands in controversy, in the course of their business. And on the other hand, there was some evidence tending to show that the principal object of the P. T. Co. in holding the land, was to prevent its use by competitors.
I shall treat the case as if it were established as a fact, that the actual use of the premises in controversy, as a way or route for transportation, has not yet become necessary, and as if the transit on the east side of the river afforded a sufficiently good route; and shall consider the two questions —whether under this state of facts the corporation can hold the property; and whether, if a disability exists, the defendants, Thompson and Lovejoy are in a position to avail themselves of it. The former of these questions is now for the first time presented for adjudication in this state. This circumstance, as well as a knowledge that very large pecuniary interests may, in various ways and at various places, depend upon the rule that may be established, impresses me with the importance of arriving at correct conclusions; and I very much regret not being able to find authorities bearing more directly on the points involved.
The powers and the restrictions which we are to consider are to be found in the language above quoted, the articles of incorporation, and the common law, or the law as it would stand independently of the provisions of our constitution and statutes.
It is undoubtedly the intention of our statute, as well as of the common law, that a corporation should have power to make all contracts that are lawful and can ordinarily be mad¿ by individuals in the kind of business the corporation is authorized to transact.
To determine with what degree of strictness or of liberality the language of the statute is to be understood, is a principal question, and particularly in arriving at right conclusions, as to the use of the words necessary and convenient in this statute, and ascertaining the legislative intent they are designed to express.
It is evident we are not to construe the word “necessary” in a sense in which it is sometimes used, as nearly equivalent to indispensable. It is not indispensable that there should be a railroad or canal at the portage in question. It is possible to do the business by means of road wagons; but it is not to be inferred that the law would limit the corporation to the use of that kind of property. The difficulty is in determining at what point, in the broad range that lies between what is absolutely indispensable and that which is merely convenient or desirable, this language is intended to fix a limit.
To take a less extravagant illustration: a corporation
This corporation, according to the evidence, now holds, and is using in its business, a large amount of property, both real and personal, that, if we use the words in the more restricted sense, was not necessary in the business, at the time the land in question was conveyed, but which tbe increasing commerce of the country has rendered desirable, and which has now become an acknowledged necessity. It bas been urged in argument in this connection, that an object of the law is to stimulate and encourage enterprise and to introduce the cheapest and most expeditious mode of transit, and that whatever is necessary to secure cheap and rapid transportation is necessary to carry out the object of the corporation, and this position appears to me sound.
What is necessary and convenient, must, of course, depend on tbe nature of tbe business, and the circumstances under which it is carried on. In all cases of uncertainty, it is evident the corporation, as purchaser, must judge in the first instance for itself whether the property is necessary and convenient; there is no tribunal to which it can resort to test the question in advance. After the property is pur
The power to purchase lands was incident to corporations at common law. (2 Kent, 281; 3 Pick. 239; 1 Ves. and Beam. 226.) And a corporation may do many things incidentally, although the power is not in the particular instance-expressly conferred. (Moss v. Oakly, 2 Hill, 265; Attorney-General v. Life and Fire Insurance Company, 9 Paige, 470; Jackson v. Brown, 5 Wend. 590; Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watt. 385.)
These cases show that what is within the spirit and reason of the statute conferring the power, and pertains to the object sought to be obtained, is within the authority conferred.
Imust say I am not fully satisfied that a corporation may not invest surplus funds in any property in which an investment will be advantageous, if it can be done without adding a new branch of business to that set forth in its articles of incorporation.
There is no statute expressly prohibiting a corporation from holding real estate; and evidently a corporation may increase its wealth. In most cases, the motive that induces individuals to create corporations is that of making profit; and the legislature knowing this, has not directed how or when surplus earnings shall be distributed. It will not be contended, I assume, but that corporations may, without any express grant to that effect, accumulate and hold money above what is actually necessary to transact the designated business. Tet, if we read the statute literally,, their right to hold such surplus money is as restricted as their right to hold other property. Money may be held, if we treat its
Acts of congress and of state legislatures, and the business habits of the community, although not amounting to judicial construction, are resorted to, as being in the nature of contemporaneous construction, in cases where the legislative intent is doubtful. So also, whatever was the usage elsewhere under similar statutes, at the time this act was passed, it is of peculiar weight. It has long been the practice of the general government to grant large bodies of land to corporations created under similar statutes, and our own legislature lias, by its acts, recognized the right of such corporations to take, hold and dispose of lands, the direct use or employment of which was not necessary to carry into effect the object of the incorporation. Such grants were made to corporations, similarly empowered, in other states, before the enactment of our general law, and a vast amount of real property now rests upon titles thus acquired, and much real property is now held by corporations in this state, the direct use of which is not necessary to carry into effect the object of the incorporation. I refer to these grave considerations not because I am prepared to conclude from them, or to decide that a corporation has the right to hold such property, but as in my mind very cogent reasons against a rule that would hold such grants absolutely void. It is, I doubt not, upon considerations of public policy, and in view of circumstances such as are above mentioned, that it has been held that even a corporation that is disqualified from legally holding, may pass a good title to its grantee.
It is said that this land was purchased to enable this corporation to prevent all competition, and that such practices would foster monopolies to the great detriment of the country. To meet such contingencies, and to protect the public,
It is also said that this is not a case of mistake of fact, or of error of judgment, but that the corporation made the purchase knowing that the property was not needed in its business. The theory under which it is attempted to avoid the deed, is, that purchasing or holding this land is exercising “a privilege not conferred by law,” and that the deed is for that reason absolutely void for want of capacity in the corporation to take. Under this theory, it is immaterial whether there was a mistake of judgment, or an intentional violation of the law; for, under this theory in either case the deed is void, and not voidable.
If the case of the defendants, Thompson and Lovejoy, was based on a claim that the deed is voidable, the question would be addressed to the equity side of the court, and of course they, as grantors, while still retaining the purchase money would have no standing in a court of equity upon which to ask to have the deed set aside. They, being-grantors for value, cannot maintain their claim'to the land, under any view that can be taken, except- as a strict legal right, founded on the assumption that the conveyance from them is void, and not merely voidable.
If the corporation has usurped privileges or franchises not belonging to it, to the detriment of the public, the remedy is by an action in the name of the state.
If the sale is illegal, and Thompson and Lovejoy sold the property with a knowledge of the illegal purpose, they are so far in the wrong as not to be in a condition to ask equitable relief. If they sold under a misapprehension of its powers, or o fthe objects sought to be carried into effect by the corporation, and now find that the sale should be declared void, their pleading should set out their excuse, and they shoiild offer to return the purchase money.
The cause was appealed to tho supreme court and submitted and taken under advisement at the September term, 1870, but before the next term a compromise was effected and the cause dismissed without a decision bein¿ made in the supreme court.