Dаvid Kelly, a black male and a Jehovah’s Witness, worked as a bailiff in the courtroom of Judge Wendell Mayer. Mayer discharged Kelly, ostensibly for poor job performance as well as for inappropriate conduct, including proselytizing and reading the Bible in public areas of the court house. In response, Kelly brought suit, claiming that he was harassed and ultimately fired due to his race, religious beliefs, and refusal to contribute to and work for the Republican Party. After dismissing some of Kelly’s claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and granting summary judgment against Kelly on most of the others, the district court conducted a jury trial on Kelly’s claim that he was fired due to his political beliefs. At the end of Kelly’s ease-in-chief, the district court granted Mayer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).
On appeal, Kelly challenges the dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds of various defendants; the grant of summary judgment on his claim that Mayer violated his rights to freedom of religion and equal protection of the law; and the grant of judgment as a matter of law on his claim that he was fired because of his political beliefs. He also raises several evidentiary issues. We affirm.
Defendant Wendell Mayer, a lifelong Republican, was appointed as a judge of the Marion County Municipal Court effective August 1,1989. Kelly applied for and was hired as Mayer’s bailiff and commenced work on August 22, 1989. Mayer interviewed Kelly, asked him about his previous work experience, and explained the requirements of the job. Mayer inquired of Kelly as to whether Kelly was a Republican, and Kelly replied that he was. He also told Mayer that he had once studied with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose religious doctrine prohibited members from voting or participating in the political system. However, Kelly stated that he wasn’t sure about the Jehovah’s Witnesses and intended on remaining a Republican at that time. Mayer told Kelly that he suggested to his employees that they contribute a part of their salary to the Republican Party. Further, Kelly testified that Mayer also told him that he “expected” his staff to work at the polls on election day and to participate in the electoral process. [Tr. II at 37]. Mayer denied these two statements, testifying that he never told Kelly that it was mandatory for Kelly to cоntribute to the party or to work at the polls.
At some point (the record is unclear), Kelly began studying to become a Jehovah’s Witness. [K. Aff. para. 13]. Kelly kept a Bible on his desk, which was located in an area of the office that was open to the public. Kelly read the Bible during “down time” in the public reception area; on several occasions, he also read the Bible to prisoners while they were waiting in the holding cells. [Mayer Dep. 170-90]. Mayer instructed Kelly to refrain from reading the Bible or proselytizing in public areas because he believed that such activities could suggest that the court was promoting religion and would thus be a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics, to which Mayer and his staff were bound. Mayer did not prohibit his other emрloyees from reading materials such as newspapers, paperback novels, and magazines. [Mayer Dep. 179-80].
In January 1990, Kelly informed Chief Bailiff David Anderson that he was no longer going to contribute 2 percent of his salary to the Republican Party because to do so would violate the religious dictates of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Anderson reported directly to Mayer. [K. Aff. para. 12], In February 1990, Kelly ceased contributing to the Republican Party. In late April or early May 1990, Kelly told Anderson that, in keeping with his religious beliefs, he did not intend to work at the polls for the Republican Party during the May primary. [Id. at para. 13].
Kelly’s decision not to contribute to the Republican Party and not to work at the polls was common knowledge among Mayer’s staff. [Tr. I at 68]. However, neither Kelly, Anderson, nor Jane Sears, Mayer’s court reporter, ever told Judge Mayer of Kelly’s decision. Anderson testified that if Jane Sears knew that Kelly was not contributing to the Republican Party or working at the polls, then Mayer knew it as well. [Tr. I at 70, 74],
On June 7, 1990, Kelly received a written reprimand from Mayer listing the following problems: (1) “Witnessing” (promoting his religious beliefs to the public), (2) “Reading Materials” (reading the Bible in public areas), (3) ‘Working Hours” (arriving late), (4) “Lunch Hour” (failing to coordinate times with other members of staff), (6) “Phones” (failing to answer the phone), and (6) “Absence during working hours” (failing to inform other members of staff). On September 7, 1990, Mayer terminated Kelly’s employment because he did not consider Kelly had improved sufficiently in these problem areas.
In July 1990, according to Kelly, prior to his discharge, certain members of Mayer’s staff harassed Kelly by teasing him about his sex life. They asked how he had time for sex when he went to church all the time. Typically, on Mondays when Kelly came to work, they would ask what he had done over the weekend and whether or not he had had any sexual encounters. Kelly reported this behavior to Mayer and asked Mayer to have them stop harassing him, but Mayer took no action. [K. Aff. para. 15].
Judge Evan Goodman was the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Marion County during the time of Kelly’s employ
Kelly filed this lawsuit on October 24,1991. In his Second Amended Complaint, Kelly named as defendants the Municipal Courts of Marion County, Wendell Mayer, both individually and as administrator of support personnel of Municipal Court Room Six, and Evan Goodman, both individually and as chief administrator of the Municipal Courts of Marion County.
The district court dismissed Kelly’s claims under Counts I and II insofar as those claims related to Mayer and Goodman in their official capacities. The court determined that the Eleventh Amendment barred these claims. The court also dismissed the claims under Counts I and II as they related to Goodman in his individual capacity because of the absence of a causal link between Goodman and the alleged deprivations. Furthermore, the court dismissed Counts III and IV in their entirety. The claims in Count III were held to be barred by the statute of limitations, and the claims in Count IV were held outside of the scope of § 1981 pursuant to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
In an entry dated May 10, 1994, the court granted Mayer’s motion for summary judgment in part on the claims remaining against him in Counts I and II. The court granted summary judgment to Mayer on Kelly’s religious discrimination claim, concluding that preventing Kelly from reading the Bible or evangelizing during working hours while in the court’s public areas did not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Next, the court determined that Mayer was entitled to summary judgment on Kelly’s “liberty” claim. The court construed this as a claim that Kelly had a substantive due process interest in reading the Bible and evangelizing while in court. The court determined that Mayer’s restrictions during working hours were reasonable in light of the purpose that the court serves. Third, the court granted summary judgment to Mayer on Kelly’s claim that Mayer violated Kelly’s right to equal protection. According to the court, Kelly’s equal protection claim for racial discrimination failed for lack of evidence in support of the conclusion that he was terminated due to his race; his religious harassment claim failed because, in the court’s view, the “harassment” of which Kelly complained was not sufficiently severe to create a “hostile work environment.” Finally, the court denied summary judgment to Mayer on Kelly’s claim that he was terminated in violation of his right to freedom of political association.
The district court conducted a jury trial on Kelly’s claim against Mayer in his individual capacity that Mayer violated Kelly’s right to freedom of political association by terminat
The district court entered judgment dismissing all of Kelly’s claims on May 16, 1995. Kelly filed a timely notice of appeal on June 14,1995.
II. ISSUES
Kelly raises a number of issues in a variety of procedural postures. First, he claims that the district court erred when it dismissed the Municipal Court of Marion County and Mayer and Goodman in their official capacities. He maintains that, contrary to the holding of the district court, none of these defendants constituted an arm of the State of Indiana for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Second, Kelly maintains that the district court erred in dismissing defendant Judge Goodman, whom Kelly sued in his individual capacity, on the grоund that Goodman had no personal part in Kelly’s termination. According to Kelly, Goodman allowed Kelly to be fired without Goodman’s consent as required by the Personnel Manual of the Municipal Court of Marion County. Third, Kelly contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mayer in his individual capacity on Kelly’s claim that Mayer, by tolerating his staffs harassment of Kelly due to Kelly’s religious beliefs, violated his rights to religious freedom, due process, and equal protection. Further, Kelly alleges that his discharge violated these same rights. Fourth, Kelly maintains that the district court erred in granting Mayer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Kelly’s casein-chief. Finally, Kelly contends that the district court erred in excluding several exhibits and in refusing to pеrmit Kelly’s mother to testify.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment
Kelly claims that the district court erroneously dismissed the Municipal Court of Marion County and Mayer and Goodman in their official capacities. The district court dismissed these defendants on the ground that they were entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
On appeal, Kelly challenges the district court’s conclusion that the Municipal Court of Marion County is a state court. Kelly maintains that a municipal court is a city court. In support of this position, he traces the history of the municipal courts. He notes that under a 1905 Indiana law, certain cities were given the power to create their own courts. An Act Concerning Municipal Corporations, ch. 129,1905 IndActs 219. He contends that these courts were later succeeded by the municipal courts. Act of March 12, 1925, ch. 194, 1925 Ind.Acts 457. As a result, according to Kelly, a municipal court is a city court and not a state court.
We must consult Indiana law to determine whether a municipal court is part of the judicial branch of the State of Indiana. Scott
B. Goodman in His Individual Capacity
Kelly argues that the district court erred in dismissing Counts I and II as they pertained to Judge Goodman in his individual capacity. Counts I and II alleged violations of Kelly’s rights to due process, equal рrotection, and freedom of religion. The district judge determined that these two counts, each of which asserts a separate cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had to be dismissed because liability under § 1983 requires a causal connection between the misconduct complained of and the official sued, and, according to the trial judge, any such link as to Goodman was entirely absent.
On appeal, Kelly disregarded and failed to address the district court’s reasons for dismissing Counts I and II as they related to Goodman in his individual capacity. Rather, he simply states that Goodman denied him his right to continued employment “by allow
Individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can only be based on a finding that the defendant caused the deprivation at issue. Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
In reviewing the trial court’s dismissal of Counts I and II for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we must accept as true the allegations of Kelly’s complaint insofar as they relate to Goodman’s involvement in his firing. McTigue v. City of Chicago,
C. Religious Discrimination and Equal Protection
Kelly next contends that the district court committed error in granting summary judgment to Mayer on Kelly’s claims that Mayer, by tolerating his staffs harassment of Kelly due to Kelly’s religious beliefs and also the firing of Kelly, violated Kelly’s rights to religious freedom and equal protection of the law.
Kelly claims that Mayer violated his right to religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by preventing him from reading the Bible during working hours in a public area of the court, while other members of Mayer’s staff were permitted to read literature of their choice.
Before delving into a detailed analysis of Kelly’s religious discrimination claim, we pause to consider whether we need address the merits of this issue at all. At oral argument, we tried to ascertain what relief Kelly sought on the religious discrimination claim. We pointed at that, according to Kelly’s submissions to us, he was discharged on
Kelly also asserts that he endured religious harassment by his eoworkers, specifically, that his coworkers harassed him about his religious practice of abstaining from sexual activities outside of marriage. He further maintains that Mayer failed to do anything to stop the harassment when Kelly informed him of it. However, Kelly fails to set forth clearly the legal framework upon which he bases his claim. Although we assume this claim is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kelly failed to mention § 1983 and its ramifications in relation to this claim. For example, under § 1983, an employer cannot be held responsible on the basis of respondeat superior, yet Kelly faded to delineate under what theory of law he believes Mayer can be held responsible for his staffs alleged harassment. We might speculate as to a possible explanation, but under our adversary system, it is Kelly’s responsibility to make his position clear. Moreover, as for the substantive constitutional right at issue here, the district court believed that the religious harassment claim was based on an equal protection theory and analyzed the claim at length on that basis. On appeal, Kelly asserts in cursory fashion that the alleged harassment constituted a violation of his equal protection rights; likewise, he makes a general reference to the First Amendment without any attempt to provide the court with citation to relevant authority. Due to Kelly’s failure to advance a coherent legal framework for analyzing his religious harassment claim, he has waived the issue on appeal. United States v. South,
D. Political Beliefs
Kelly argues that the district court erred in granting Mayer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Kelly’s case-in-chief. A trial was held on Kelly’s claim that he was fired, in violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of political association, more specifically for not contributing to the Republican Party and not working at the polls on еlection day. The court granted Mayer’s motion for judgment as a matter of
We review the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. Jackson v. Bunge Corp.,
In a § 1983 claim based on the First Amendment, the plaintiff must establish (1) that his conduct was constitutionally protected and (2) that his conduct was a “substаntial factor” or “motivating factor” in the challenged action by the defendant. Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire,
Mayer argues that there was no evidence that he knew of Kelly’s decision to withdraw from political activity. Mayer notes that Kelly himself testified that he did not inform Mayer of his decision. Mayer also points to the testimony of his other staff members; none testified that he or she told Mayer about Kelly’s decision. According to Mayer, absent evidence that he knew оf Kelly’s decision to withdraw from polities, no jury could reasonably conclude that Mayer’s decision to fire Kelly was motivated by Kelly’s decision to refuse to participate in political activity.
Kelly argues that, drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, a reasonable person certainly could conclude that Mayer knew of his decision to withdraw from politics. Kelly points to the fact that he informed Anderson in late April or early May of 1990 of his decision to no longer work at the polls. He also maintains that Anderson informed Mayer about where Mayer’s staff members would be working at the polls during the May 1990 primary election. Kelly infers from this that “Anderson told Mayer that Kelly would not be working at the polls” during that election. (Appellant’s Br. 28).
We have been unable to find any evidence in the record, nor has Kelly pointed to any page citation in the record, that anyone told Mayer of Kelly’s decision to withdraw from any and all political activity. The testimony does reflect that it may have been common knowledge among Mayer’s staff that Kelly had decided to cease contributing and to not work at the polls on election day. However, the record is barren of any evidence that any staff member actually told Mayer of Kelly’s decision. Anderson did indeed testify that, in his opinion, if Jane Sears, Mayer’s court reporter, knew of Kelly’s decision, then Mayer must have known as well. Yet the evidence before us falls far short of establishing that Sears actually told Mayer. The portions of her testimony included in Kelly’s appendix on appeal fail to contain any statement by Sears that she informed Mayer of Kelly’s decision. Thus, Kelly’s assertion, based on Anderson’s testimony, that Mayer must have known because Sears knew is a self serving declaration based on nothing more than speculation.
Kelly argues that, although perhaps no one told Mayer directly of Kelly’s decision to withdraw from politics, Mayer was informed indirectly. Kelly contends that Anderson conveyed to Mayer by implication the fact that Kelly decided not to work at the polls. Kelly relies on Anderson’s testimony on direct examination:
Q. And do you recall whether or not Mayer asked his employees where they would be worldng on election day?
A. I remember telling him; I don’t remember him asking. He probably did. I don’t recall that part about it, but I remember telling him. I can’t remember if it was his question or just me blurting it out. I don’t know.
*912 Q. But in any event, the information was conveyed by one means or another; is that correct?
A. Yes. He knew I was working at the polls.
Kelly interprets Anderson as saying that he told Mayer where all of Mayer’s employees would be working on election day. (Appellant’s Br. 28). Under this interpretation, Anderson would necessarily have omitted any mention of Kelly working at the polls, so Mayer would have been informed indirectly that Kelly would not be working at the polls. In our view, speculation of this nature is at best an unreasonable interpretation because, in response to the follow-up question, Anderson clarified that he had told Mayer only where he, Anderson, would bе working on election day, not where each and every member of Mayer’s staff would be working. Kelly has thus failed to identify or cite any evidence in the record that Mayer was informed indirectly or by implication that Kelly had decided not to work at the polls on election day and not to contribute to the Republican Party. Without evidence, either direct or indirect, that Mayer was aware of Kelly’s decision to withdraw from politics, Kelly has failed to demonstrate that his political views were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in Mayer’s decision to fire Kelly. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law to Mayer. Johnson,
Mayer also argues that, aside from whether or not Mayer knew of Kelly’s withdrawal from politics, there was insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that active involvement in politics was a condition of employment for Mayer’s employees. Mayer concedes that he viewed political participation as very important and highly desirable; however, he denies that he ever conditioned an employee’s job on being involved in politics. Kelly responds by noting that he testified that Mayer told him that he “expected his staff to work at the polls. And that they participate in the electoral process.” Kelly argues that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, his testimony should be interpreted to mean that Mayer required his employees to work at the polls and to participate in the electoral process.
We disagree and do not believe that Kelly’s interpretation is a reasonable one. First, after testifying that Mayer told him he “expected” his employees to work at the polls and to participate in the electoral process, Kelly was asked what he understood Mayer to mean by that statement. Kelly responded: “I understood that that’s just what he meant: He expected us to do that.” Tr. II at 39. When given an opportunity to equate “expected” with “required,” Kelly declined and instead affirmed that Mayer simply meant “expected.” Thus, Kelly’s own testimony does not support Kelly’s current interpretation of Mayer’s statement. Second, the sequence of events leading to Kelly’s termination supports the conclusion that Kelly’s withdrawal frоm politics was not a substantial or motivating factor in his termination. Kelly informed Anderson in early May 1990 that he would not be working at the polls. Kelly was not terminated until September 1990. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mayer was aware of Kelly’s decision, the four-month delay between Kelly’s decision not to work at the polls and his termination seems to undercut any inference that Kelly’s withdrawal from politics was a substantial or motivating factor in Mayer’s decision to fire Kelly. This situation is analogous to that in Benson v. Cady,
E. Evidentiary Rulings
Kelly argues that the district court erred in several of its evidentiary rul
Kelly has failed to demonstrate the relevance of the Manual. The only claim at issue in the trial was whether Mayer violated Kelly’s right to freedom of political association by firing him for not participating in the political process. Whether the presiding judge needed to consent to Kelly’s firing has no bearing on that issuе. In addition, Kelly failed to address the district court’s revised ruling that Kelly failed to lay a proper foundation for the admissibility of the Manual. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the Personnel Manual.
Next, Kelly maintains that the district court erred in sustaining an objection to the introduction of a memorandum memorializing a conversation that Kelly had with Judge Goodman after the termination of Kelly’s employment. Kelly claims that the memorandum contained a statement by Goodman as to why Kelly had been discharged. This statement, however, was hearsay. Kelly argues that the memorandum should have been admitted under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R.Evid. 803(24). However, at trial Kelly maintained that the memorandum was admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid. 803(1). The district court rejected this contention. We cannot say that, under either theory, the district court’s exclusion of the memorandum amounted to an abuse of discretion.
Kelly also argues that the district court erred in sustaining Mayer’s objections to questions regarding the amount of money that Mayer contributed to the Republican Party. However, Kelly fails to explain how the exclusion of this testimony prejudiced him. By the time Kelly’s attorney asked Mayer how much money he contributed to the Republican Party, Mayer had previously testified that he was a long-time, ardent Republican and had contributed money to the party. The precise amount of money that Mayer contributеd would have added little if anything to the jury’s understanding of Mayer’s political views. Kelly suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of this testimony.
Next, Kelly contends that the trial judge erred in excluding Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4, and testimony from Kelly’s mother. Because Kelly fails to state why in his opinion the district court excluded these exhibits and testimony, we are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
Finally, Kelly maintains that the district court erred in excluding Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8, which was a written determination by the Indiana Division of Employment 'and Training Services that Kelly was not terminated for just cause. The district court concluded that the determination was not relevant and failed to satisfy the requirements of collateral estoppel. We agree. The issue in the proceеding before the Indiana Department of Employment and Training Services was whether, under Indiana law, Kelly had been fired for “just cause.” This question differed from the federal constitutional issues presented in this case. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 8.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AfFIRMED.
Notes
. Kelly also named "Municipal Court Room Six” as a separate defendant. Because Municipal Court Room Six is a subunit of the Municipal Court of Marion County, which Kelly named as a defendant, we will not refer to “Municipal Court Room Six” as a separate defendant.
. Kelly refers only to Mayer and Goodman in the separate counts. We construe these counts as referring to Mayer and Goodman in their individual and official capacities.
. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The judicial power of thе United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits against a state by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana,134 U.S. 1 ,10 S.Ct. 504 ,33 L.Ed. 842 (1890).
. The Municipal Court of Marion County, established under Ind.Code § 33-6-1, was abolished effective December 31, 1995, and all cases pending before it were transferred to the Marion superior court. P.L. 16-1995, Secs. 15 & 22.
. Kelly notes that, in his First Amended Complaint, he sought equitable and injunctive relief, and points out that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit such relief. However, Kelly fails to actually argue that the district court erred by dismissing his claims for equitable and injunc-tive relief. In addition, we note that, based on the Eleventh Amendment, the district court dismissed portions of Kelly’s Second Amended Complaint, not his First Amended Complaint. Because of the cursoiy treatment accorded this issue in Kelly's brief, see Appellant’s Br. 9, we conclude that Kelly has waived any argument concerning the dismissal of his claims for equitable and injunctive relief. See United States v. South,
. The district court noted that Kelly’s complaint offered little guidance as to the precise legal theory on which he based his religious discrimination claim. The court analyzed Kеlly's claim under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Entry of May 10, 1994 ("Entry”) at 5. On appeal, Kelly again offers no clear guidance as to the basis of his religious discrimination claim. Because he does not discuss the law supporting a claim based on the Establishment Clause, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman,
. This reasoning also applies to Kelly’s claim that he was denied equal protection of the law because Mayer banned him from reading the Bible in public areas of the court while his white, non-lehovah’s Witness coworkers were not similarly enjoined.
. In its entry explaining its grant of summary judgment, the trial judge construed Kelly's complaint as alleging a due process interest in being able to read his Bible and evangelize while working in court. The district court thoroughly analyzed the issue as if it had been properly raised. Entry at 12-16. On appeal, Kelly asserts that the district court erred, insisting that Mayer violated his right to read what he liked. He terms this a violation of his "liberty interest” and, as such, a violation of his due process rights. (Appellant's Br. 14). We agree with the district court that Kelly's claim is unclear in this regard. Unlike the district court, we will not spare him from the requirement of offering a coherent argument on the issue. Because Kelly fails to explain how his “liberty interest/due process" claim differs from his religious discrimination claim, we deem the former waived, at least to the extent it differs from the latter. Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc.,