68 F. 652 | S.D. Ga. | 1895
(orally). T regret that anything has been said in the argument of this case which tends to take it out of the category of ordinary judicial investigation. Tt is in that view that the court considers if. It is true that, pending the trial, there has been some bitterness of publication, with regard to the action of the court in granting the writ, and some bitterness of denunciation of the officers, but. in the main the cause has been trea ted fairly by the press, and if it has been treated unfairly in any particular, it will be no more proper to hold fair journalism responsible than it would be to hold the good people of Telfair county responsible for the character a,nd conduct of such a man as Lhe evidence demonstrates Lucius Williams to have been. I am here to obey the law of my country. That commands the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, when applied for by any person who is in custody “for an act; done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or a judge thereof.” That is announced in section 753 of the Revised statutes, and is an epitome of the law upon the subject, from the 24th day of September, 1789, down to a very recent date. When the writ is issued, the duty of the judge is marked out with equal clearness. “The court, or justice, or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require.” Section 7(51, Rev. Hr.
Now, that is the law; and it is not only law, but it is the paramount law. Not only is it declared to be paramount law by the constitution of the United Htates, which of course every intelligent mind concedes is controlling upon the action of the court, but it is the law as stated in the initial paragraph of that admirable codification, the Code of Georgia. Section 1 declares: The laws of general operation of this state are “as the supreme law, the constitution of the United States, the la,ws of the United States in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States.” In subordination to this supreme law are the laws of the state of Georgia, first as expressed by its constitution, and then asJ expressed by its statutory enactments not in conflict with its constitution. It appears, then, unquestionably, that I am acting in obedience to law. Well, am I acting in accordance with the formal procedure of the law? There is no doubt about that. The decisions of the supreme court, from an early period in the history of our country, and a multitude of decisions of the circuit and district courts of the United States, have approved and sanctioned the precise proceeding we have before us. These questions have been already passed upon and decided here in a ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction and demurrer interposed in the progress of the case, and therefore it is not necessary to state them more elaborately at this time. I will, however, call the attention of counsel to the fact that,the authority of the United States is not re
“Here, again, we are met with the theory that the government of the United States does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of That government. We hold it to he an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United States, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, executes on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the.power to keep the peace to that extent. This power to enforce its laws, and to execute its functions in all places, does not derogate from the power of the state to execute its laws at the same time and in the same places. The one does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be executed at the same time. In that ease the words of the constitution itself show-which is to yield: ‘This constitution and all laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land.’ Without the concurrent sovereignty referred to, the national government would be nothing but an advisory government. Its executive power would be absolutely nullified. Why do we have marshals at all if they cannot ifiiysically lay their hands on persons and things in the performance of their proper duties? What functions can they perform if they cannot use force? In executing the processes of the courts, must they call on the nearest constable for protection? Must they rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and keep the peace, whilst they are soliciting and entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to'take its course? This is the necessary consequence of the positions that are assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on refining and refining, we shall drive the national government out of the United States, and relegate it to the District of Columbia, or, perhaps, to some foreign soil. We shall bring it back to a condition of greater helplessness than of the old confederation. It must execute its powers, or it is no government. It must execute them on the land as well as on the sea, on things as well as on persons. And, to do this, it must necessarily have power to command obedience, preserve order, and keep the peace, and no person or power in this lamí has the right to resist or question its authority so long as it keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction.”
That case is expressly approved by the court in the last case upon the subject (In re Neagle, reported in 135 TJ. S. 1,10 Sup. Ct. 658), and in summing up the argument in that case, Justice Miller, ior the court, said:
“It would seem as if the argument might close here. If the duty of the United States to protect its officers from violence, even to death, in discharge of the duties which its laws impose upon them, be established, and congress has made the habeas corpus one of the means by which this provision is made efficient, and if the facts of this case show that the prisoner was acting both under the law and the direction of his superior officers of the department of justice, we can see no reason why this writ should not be made to serve its purpose for the present case.”
Nor is there, as stated by counsel for the state, any dissent from this conclusion, even by those judges who are supposed by some to take a. more limited and literal view of the power vested in the United States by the constitution, and to attach more importance to the sovereignly of the states than do other judges who are more disposed to treat the implied powers of the constitution as operative
“Many of the propositions advanced on the behalf of the appellee, and urged with impressive force, we do not challenge. We do not question, for instance, the soundness of the elaborate discussion of the history of the offices and functions of the writ of habeas corpus, and its operation under section 753 of die Revised (Statutes (which I have just read), or the propriety of its use in the maimer and for the purposes for which it has been used in au> case where the prisoner is under airest for an act done in pursuance of the laws of the united Slates.”
Can it be denied that, prima, facie, these relators have acted in pursuance of a law of the United Shales? Here are accusations .for murder, presented before a commissioner, and for other crimes against national authority. Here is an indictment of the grand jury of this court charging the same offenses. The warrants were intrusted to these relators. They are officers of the executive department of the government. Not only do the constituted authorities of the land charge that the laws of the United states have been violated by the men whom these deputies were trying to arrest, but the laws of the United states directed the deputies to make the arrest, and therefore they acted in “pursuance of the laws of the United.States.”
“Nor do we contend,” continues Justice Lamar, “tliat any objection arises to such use of the writ, and based merely on that fact, in cases where no provision is made by the federal law for the nial and conviction of the accused.”
And that is the refutation of the proposition, pressed by counsel for the srate here, that there is now.no opportunity for trial by jury of the accused, that this proceeding is subversive of the rights of the state. The law is tliat the right of trial by jury is not the right of the government, but is the right of the accused. The constitution of the United fc*rates declares that “the a.ccused shall enjoy the right: to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury." Amendment G. It, then, is not the right of tin* government, either of the state or of the United States, to insist that in all criminal cases there shall be a trial by jury. It is the right of the accused, and they have not demanded it:. This precise question, also, was passed on by the supreme court of the United States in the case I hold in my hand (In re Neagle), approving the language of Judge Kane (in Ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr. 543, Fed. Cas. No. 7,259):
“It has been urged,” said Tliat judge, “tliat my order, if it shall withdraw the relators from the prosecution pending against them in the state court, will prevent their trial by jury at all. It will not be an anomaly, however, if the action of this court shall interfere with the trial of these prisoners by a jury. Our constitution secures that mode of trial as a right to the accused, but they nowhere recognize it as a right of the government, either state or federal.”
The relators, then, were acting in pursuance of a law of the United States when they went to execule the warrants of arrest on Lucius Williams and his sons. They were, moreover, acting in obedience to the order of this court, issued appropriately, and expressed by its warrants. They claim that, in obedience to law and
This case is the culmination of a tremendous litigation, imposing for more than ten years tremendous responsibility and tremendous anxiety upon this court, resulting from the fact that years ago the late William E. Dodge bought large bodies of land in this state, about which his children have been compelled to appeal to the courts for protection. These lands were conveyed by him to his son, George E. Dodge, and by George E. Dodge to Norman W. Dodge. All of this appears from the record before the court. These wére residents of the state of New York. number of persons, residents of the state of Georgia, were charged with numerous acts of fraud and forgery and violence, with the purpose to deprive these nonresidents of the benefits of their investments in this state. The case had been brought before I had the honor of presiding in this court, and was pending when I entered upon the performance of my judicial duties. It was tried. The trial lasted through many days. It was thoroughly and ably argued and fully considered. A final decree was rendered sustaining the title of Mr. Dodge to every foot of this land. Dodge v. Briggs, 27 Fed. 160. No appeal was taken from the decision of the court. It was, therefore, final. The decree itself, in the further progress of litigation with other parties, was carried before the supreme court of the state of Georgia, and that court added its high sanction to the decision of this court, and held that the decree perfected the title of Norman W. Dodge in the land described in the decree and order of the court and in his evidence of title. The decree itself enjoined the defendants to that bill from interfering with the lands of Mr. Dodge. For a time the decree was obeyed. But finally a gigantic system of forgery of deeds, and a fraudulent seizure of the land with the attempt to establish prescriptive titles, was begun. This was done at the instigation of and by Luther A. Hall, a party to the original case before this court, and who had been expressly enjoined. The matter was brought to the attention of the court, and, in a trial lasting many days, the character of this man’s conduct was investigated. The court found him guilty and sentenced him, for contempt of the decree, to five months’ imprisonment in Chatham county jail. While in that jail, as it appeared from the evidence in the trial which ensued, he concocted a conspiracy for the murder of a most amiable, excellent, and valuable citizen, John 0. Forsyth, the agent of Norman W. Dodge, who had been conducting the litigation. The conspiracy, as the' bill of indictment charged and the jury found, was to prevent and hinder Mr. Dodge from exercising the right to pursue his remedies in the United States courts. The case is fully reported in U. S. v. Lancaster
Several years elapsed. The title of Mr. Dodge in the same lands was, it is alleged, assailed by other parties. He filed a bill of peace against some three or four hundred defendants, alleging circumstances of trespass and wrong which he now insists claim the attention of the court for his relief. In that case not one single contested question has yet been decided. It is pending before the court Lucius Williams was a party defendant to that bill, and, when the officers went to serve him with the original writ of subpoena, he refused to accept service and informed the officer, in violent and truculent language, that he had no respect for the court and did not intend to accept service or obey its orders. Rule day came, — the day on which he should have filed his answer. He made no appearance. In the orderly progress of the case, judgment pro confesso, that is to say, judgment by default, was taken against him. Ho injunction had been granted when the bill was originally filed. After service of subpoena upon him, he then,, proceeded, as the court was advised by the sworn petition of the plaintiff, ran off his hands, cut trees across his tramway, and otherwise threatened violence to his agents and employés. But, even then, so careful was the court to give him every right to which he was entitled that only a rule nisi was issued against him to appear and show cause why he should not be enjoined from committing acts of violence or trespass pending the final determination of the suit. When the young deputy went to serve the rule he was met with, a string of profanity which the court will not repeat in this presence. The deputy was told, if he ever attempted to serve any papers from this court upon him, his life would be taken, and that if any officer of the court .came there to arrest him or his sons it woul d be a question of who could shoot
The court need say no more with regard to the criminal and lawless character of Lucius Williams, except that it appeared from the records in his own county that, in 1889, he was indicted by a grand jury thereof for the offense of forgery of a deed or deeds relating to the title of these lands, or some of them; that the case has not been tried to the present time. A copy of the indictment is before (he court. A witness testified that he was an habitual forger,— that he had known him to be engaged in forging for 18 years. His method was to send off: for suitable paper, write the spurious deeds himself, usually have them attested by a witness and then by one of his sons-in-law, two of whom had successively been justice of the peace, and then by tobacco, coffee, and other appliances to “age” them, and give them a color which would indicate that they were ancient documents. One of these decals was offered in evidence. It was attested by the witness who testified to the facts, and officially attested by the son-in-law of Lucius Williams, a magistrate, and is now in evidence before the court, with other deeds of a similar character.
Previously, in the same expedition, a special effort was made to arrest this man. The same officers made their way in (he night through miles of the dense and overflowed Ocmulgee swamp. They found his camp on an island, his tent, blankets, and canoe. He was absent. They crossed to the forest and watched his trail, on whicii he must return. He came, discovered them, ran, was pursued, and fired on. He returned the fire, and made his escape. These officers of the court then knew it was a life and death matter to arrest this desperado. .Deputy Kelly testified that they carefully approached the house from the position of concealment in which they had been, and, sending around two of his assistants to the left of the house, lie took his position near a small cotton or buggy house, as it is indifferently called, on the other side of the road, and in a diagonal direction, about 40 yards from tbe house in which Lucius Williams was. I may say in passing that the two men who volunteered to go as deputies to arrest this man were his nephews, and it appears otherwise in the evidence that, because one of them had sworn to an affidavit intended to support the title of Mr. Dodge, and to assist him in the litigation in this case. Lucius Williams, on two occasions, with great difficulty, was prevented from taking the life of one or both of them. On one occasion he had left the house of witness Wells-at daybreak, and, when discovered, had concealed himself in a corner of the worm fence, had drawn the grass over him, and, armed with a Winches
The court has attentively considered the evidence, anxiously and carefully, and, except a doubtful opinion of a physician as to the course of a shot, which may or may not have been deflected by some bone or integument of the body, there is not a syllable of evidence in the case that contradicts Kelly on any material point. Take, for instance, the testimony of Grace. Kelly did not see him on the front porch, and therefore testified he was not there, but in the excitement lie might not have seen him, and perjury should not, therefore, be imirated to Kelly. He testified that he was lying there
What other conflict is there with that witness? None whatever. The young lady, Miss Vickery, testified that she went to the door. She did not hear anybody out there. She said all three men were asleep when she came to the door. It may be remarked that there must have been something very soporific about that dinner that all t,hree should be asleep in 15 minutes after they had left the table. This young woman testifies she was sent for a book. She did not go for the book, but for some reason, she doesn’t know what, she went to the front door and looked out. Is it not natural to suppose she heard Kelly calling on Williams to surrender, although she thinks not? Why should she, sent for one thing, go to the door and look out? She elsewhere stated that she did not know7 whether the Williamses were asleep or not. She heard an expression from Kelly, “Go back lady; go back,” and she ran into the hall as quick as she could go, and then she heard a shot. Can it be that Kelly shot Williams lying on the floor, and shot him in the face, according to the contention of counsel for the state? It was four feet from the door to the window, and this young woman was standing in the middle of the door. Williams w7as lying against the window, w7ith his feet towards the door of the veranda, and his head must have been eight feet, at least, from Miss Vickery, and, according to the testimony of Cameron, he was in full view of a man 35 or 40 yards away from where Kelly stood. Why should this desperate murderer, Kelly, have found it necessary to w7arn this young- lady if he
The testimony of Miss Vickery, instead of contradicting Kelly, confirms what he said. The wounds in Williams’ body confirm what he said. The blood stains on Williams’ rifle confirm the testimony of the officer. The testimony of all the witnesses is that the first two shots, which the learned counsel state were received in Williams’ face, did not stop him. Then even this man might have made his escape through the back door of the house, across the fields to the woods. That was not his purpose. He was like a,n Apache Indian driven to his last stand. He determined to die right there, as he had declared time and again he would do, or to kill Kelly, instead of fleeing, as he might have done, and as Grace did.