14 Colo. App. 208 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1900
James M. Kelly brought suit to foreclose two trust deeds. A decree was rendered foreclosing the first, but as none of the parties complain of that decree, it will not be further noticed. The second was executed on the 1st day of September, 1888, by William S. Kelly, and conveyed to L. D. Christopher, as trustee, certain lands in Mesa county, to secure the payment to Jennie Kelly of two notes of W. S. Kelly to her, bearing the same date, for $625.17 and $2,067, respectively, both payable three years from date. The deed named the acting sheriff of Mesa county successor in trust. The complaint alleged that these notes were indorsed and transferred to J ames Kelly for a valuable consideration be
Jennie Kelly was the wife of W. S. Kelly; James Kelly was his father, and the plaintiff, James M. Kelly, was his brother. James Kelly died before the commencement of the suit. W. S. Kelly and Jennie Kelly were witnesses for the plaintiff, and the latter testified in his own behalf. Christopher and Innis were witnesses for Doyle, and he was a witness for himself.
Upon the evidence the court found that the notes executed by W. S. Kelly to Jennie Kelly, and the trust deeds securing them were voluntary and without consideration; that the plaintiff was not a bona fide holder of the notes and deed; and decreed that the trust deed was of no effect as against the title of the defendant Doyle. Among the reasons for the
At the outset of the trial, on the application of Doyle, the court ordered that the witnesses on both sides be excluded from the court room until called, except the defendant, W. S. Kelly, who was permitted to remain for the purpose of assisting the plaintiff’s attorneys. While the plaintiff was introducing his rebutting testimony, Jennie Kelly remained in
The plaintiff then offered her as a witness to corroborate her husband. Doyle objected, for the reason that she had, notwithstanding the court’s order, remained in the court room, and had listened to the testimony of her husband, and that to permit her to testify would be, in effect, to nullify the order. The objection was sustained. The ruling is assigned for error. It appears that the presence of the witness during the examination of her husband was known to the plaintiff’s counsel. The prevailing doctrine is that the violation of such an order by a witness will not deprive the party, whose witness he is, of the benefit of his testimony, if the party himself is without fault. 1 Thompson on Trials, § 281. But where the order has been disobeyed by the consent or procurement of the party seeking to use the witness, the court may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, refuse to receive the testimony. Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214; Keith v. Wilson, 6 Mo. 435; Bulliner v. People, 95 Ill. 394.
This witness was certainly in the court room with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff’s counsel, and it has not been made clear to us, and we are unable to discover for ourselves, that there was any abuse of judicial discretion in enforcing the order.
We have considered every question preserved by the assignment of errors, and our conclusion is that the judgment should be affirmed.
Affirmed.