The evidence tends to sustain the contentions of both plaintiffs and the defendants, and therefore appropriate issues must be submitted to the jury in order for the facts to be determined.
The principles relating to fraudulent conveyances are set out in
Aman v. Walker,
“(1) If the conveyance is voluntary, and the grantor retains property fully sufficient and available to pay his debts then existing, and there is no actual intent to defraud, the conveyance is valid.
“(2) If the conveyance is voluntary, and the grantor did not retain property fully sufficient and available to pay his debts then existing, it is invalid as to creditors; but it cannot be impeached by subsequent creditors without proof of the еxistence of a debt at the time of its execution, which is unpaid, and when this is established and the conveyance avoided, subsequent сreditors are let in and the property is subjected to the payment of creditors generally.
“(3) If the conveyance is voluntary аnd made with the actual intent upon the part of the grantor to defraud creditors, it is void, although this fraudulent intent is not participated in by thе grantee, and although property sufficient and available to pay existing debts is retained.
“(4) If the conveyance is upon a vаluable consideration and made with the actual intent to defraud creditors upon the part of the grantor alone, not pаrticipated in by the grantee and of which intent he had no notice, it is valid.
“(5) If the conveyance is upon a valuable considerаtion, but made with the actual intent to defraud creditors on the part of the grantor, participated in by the grantee or of which he has notice, it is void.”
These principles are approved in the following authorities:
Black v. Sanders,
These principles, however, relate to fraudulent conveyances of land that is the property of the grantor therein, and do not apply to the conveyance of property held by a mere naked trust, for another who is, in equity, thе real, or beneficial, or equitable owner.
The evidence in the case at bar is ample to sustain the verdict under a proper charge which submits to the jury the contentions in the complaint, and in the answer.
However, if there is a resulting trust in favor of the defendant, Florence Lester, by virtue of the payment of the purchase money out of her funds, then W. P. Lester has no such beneficial interest in the McNаir lands as may be subjected to the payment of W. P. Lester’s debts.
'A trust for the sole benefit of another does not support dower for the trustee’s widow
(Hendren v. Hendren,
If a resulting trust is established the McNair land is,
ab initio,
the estatе, the interest, the property of Florence Lester, and is liable for her debts, as provided by law, and’ subject to her right of alienatiоn. Mordecai’s Law Lectures, 997, 998,
et seq.; Holmes v. Holmes,
Hence there arises the inquiry whether, upon any view of the evidence, taken in its most favorable light fоr the defendant, Florence Lester, a resulting trust arises. We are of the opinion that, when so considered, it does arise. Lord Chief Baron Eyre in Dyer v. Dyer, 2 Cox, ch. 93, gives the nature of resulting trusts of the kind invoked *416 as follows: “The clear result of аll tbe cases, without a single exception, is that the trust of a legal estate, whether taken in the name of the purchaser, and оthers jointly or in the names of others without the purchaser, whether in one or several, whether jointly or successive, results to the man who advances the purchase money.”
The classes of resulting trusts may be stated thus:
(1) Where a purchaser pays the purchase money, but takes the title-in the name of аnother; (2) where a trustee or other fiduciary buys property in his own name, but with trust fund; (3) where the trusts of a conveyance are not declаred, or are only.partially declared, or fail; and (4) where a conveyance is made without- any consideration, and it appears from circumstances that the grantee was not intended to take beneficially.
Williams v. Williams,
The first class of resulting trusts as defined by
Lord Chief Baron Eyre
is the kind of trust set up by defendant. It is in force in this State, as well as in the other courts of this country, except where modified by statutory enactment.
Cobb v. Edwards,
The payment of the purchase money raises a resulting trust in favor of him who “furnishes” or “pays” or “owns” the purchase money, unless a contrary intention, or a contrary рresumption of law, prevents.
Holden v. Strickland, supra; Leggett v. Leggett,
The contrary rule applies to the husband because the law presumes he made the deed to his wife as a gift.
Nelson v. Nelson,
*417
Even wben a part payment is made tbe trust results
pro tanto
in favor of tbe owner of tbe funds.
McWhirter v. McWhirter
Tbe doctrine of resulting trusts is plainly set forth by
Mr. Justice Adams
in
Tyndall v. Tyndall,
In order to establish a resulting trust, tbe proof must be clear, cogent and convincing.
Harris v. Harris, supra; Glenn v. Glenn,
Wben proрerly submitted to tbe jury they determine whether tbe proof measures up to this test.
McWhirter v. McWhirter, supra; Lehew v. Hewett,
Applying tbe foregoing principles; and viewing tbe evidenсe as we are required to do in a case of directed verdicts and involuntary non-suits, we are constrained to bold that there was error in directing a verdict in favor of tbe plaintiffs on tbe first issue, but there is no error in directing a verdict in favor of tbe plaintiffs on tbe second and third issues. Tbe defendant, Florence Lester, is entitled to have an issue submitted to tbe jury to determine whether she is tbe owner of tbe lands in controversy by virtue of a resulting trust arising from tbe payment of tbe purchase money out of her funds, in whole or in part.
This disposes of tbe defendants’ exceptions, save tbe competency of tbe financial statement given by tbe firm of W. P. Lester & Company, through T. B. Lester, whiсh was offered in evidence. This evidence, in our opinion, was competent, upon plaintiffs’ contentions that this transaction wаs a voluntary conveyance by tbe defendant, W. P. Lester, óf bis only property to bis wife, Florence Lester, to binder, delay and defraud creditors.
Bank v. Odom,
Mrs. Lester’s objection to the competency of this statement cannot avail, for that, if tbe facts come within tbe principles announced in Aman v. Walker, supra, and she paid no valuable consideration for the *418 conveyance of her husband's property to her, she is affected by W. P. Lester’s acts, however innoсent she may be of any knowledge of them. If, however, the resulting trust in her favor is established, she is not affected by W. P. Lester’s acts with reference to creditors, and judgment will be entered in her favor.
To the end that a new trial may be had on the first issue and on the plea of resulting trust, the judgment is reversed.
New trial.