273 F. 745 | D.D.C. | 1921
Mr. Sherman Kellogg, the appellant, on April 19, 1919, entered into a written contract with Mr. Edmond C. Fletcher, a practicing attorney, by which the latter was authorized to
Some days afterwards Kellogg wrote Fletcher a letter, saying he canceled the contract, and directing him to proceed no further in the case. Fletcher refused to concur in the cancellation, saying he expected to recover $46,000 or $50,000 “out of one item” of the will. Kellogg insisted upon the cancellation, but Fletcher refused to recognize his right to cancel, claiming that he had by his contract acquired an interest in the subject of the litigation. On April 13 Fletcher, in association with Mr. Henry E. Davis, another member of our bar, who claims no authority in this matter except as he derives it from Fletcher, filed a brief in support of the appeal. May 2 some of the appellees interposed a motion calling on Fletcher to show by what right he prosecuted the appeal, and demanding, in the event that he failed to show any right, that the brief be stricken out and the appeal dismissed. Two days thereafter Kellogg, acting by Mr. W. C. Clephane, an attorney, filed a paper in which it was stated that Kellogg appeared specially for the purpose only of consenting to the motion to dismiss, that he had never authorized the docketing of the appeal, and that he did not desire that it should be further prosecuted. In answer to this motion Fletcher showed the facts related above, and many others, and moved to strike from the files the so-called special appearance of Kellogg.
In Kappler v. Sumpter, supra, we said:
“Whore it is possible, under the circumstances of a particular case, to protect the former counsel by imposing some condition for that purpose, it seems that courts usually exercise their discretion to do so.”
Circuit Judge Wallace, in the Wilkinson Case, supra, ruled that where a litigant seeks to dismiss his attorney—
“Oto court will hold the client to fair dealing, and will refuse its assistance to any attempt to take an unfair advantage of one of its officers. In this behalf courts have frequently and usually required the client to discharge the attorney’s claim for services in the suit, ns a condition of substitution. * * * Ordinarily, when there is an agreement, that the attorney shall get his fees out of the fund in suit, there is an implied condition that ho is to be continued in charge until an available fund is realized.”
As we understand the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Re Paschal, 10 Wall. 483, 19 L. Ed. 992, it does not conflict with these views. The client there was the state of Texas. The opinion proceeded upon the theory that public policy required that the state should have a right, without condition, to substitute one attorney for another, but it was careful h> declare that the rule announced was not one of universal application. It said:
“Whether in any ease, in virtue of an agreement made, an attorney may successfully resist an application of his client to substitute another in his place, we need not scop to inquire.”
In flic recent case of Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117, 34 Sup. Ct. 276, 58 L. Ed. 530, the court held that an attorney, acting under a contingent fee contract, had a lien upon the fund created through bis effort, and intimated that the lien attached to the right vested in the attorney “to cam a fee contingent upon success.” The trend o£ the modern decisions of the court is to protect the right of the attorney to receive compensation for his services, Ingersoll v. Coram 211 U. S. 335, 365-368, 29 Sup. Ct. 92. 53 L. Ed. 208; McGowan v. Parish, 237 U. S. 285, 35 Sup. Ct. 543, 59 L. Ed. 955.