87 Cal. 192 | Cal. | 1890
The purpose of this action is to recover from the defendants damages for a malicious prosecution of the plaintiff as an insane person, and causing him to be unlawfully arrested and committed to the insane asylum at Stockton. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the court. The plaintiff declined to amend his complaint, and final judgment was thereupon rendered against him, dismissing his complaint, and for costs, from which he appeals on the judgment roll.
The grounds of demurrer are, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and “that it appears, upon the face of the complaint, that the plaintiff has not the legal capacity to sue herein.”
The substance of those parts of the complaint relevant to these grounds of demurrer is as follows: That on January 28, 1889, the defendants willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and without probable cause, “caused and procured the plaintiff to be arrested and committed to the state insane asylum at Stockton, state of California, on the charge of insanity; that under and by virtue of said commitment plaintiff -was unlawfully and against his will detained and imprisoned in said state insane
The learned counsel for respondents contend that the demurrer was properly sustained on the ground that the plaintiff had not legal capacity to sue, for the reasons: 1. That it appears, on the .face of the complaint, that the plaintiff had been adjudged to be insane on January 28, 1889, by the judge of a court of record pursuant to section 2217 of the Political Code, relating to commitments to the state insane asylums; and 2. That such adjudication is conclusive upon the plain tiff, not only that he was insane at the time he was so adjudged, but that he continued to be insane at the time this action was commenced, unless before that time he had been found to be of sound mind, and capable of taking care of himself and property, as authorized by section 1766 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is true that where guardians have been appointed for persons who, by reason of their insanity, imbecility, or habitual drunkenness, are mentally incompetent to manage their property, under statutes in other states similar to article 2, title 11, part 3, of our Code of Civil Procedure, sections 1763-1766, it has been held that an adjudication of such in competency is conclusive against all persons dealing with the ward, until he is restored to capacity to manage his own affairs by an order of court similar to that authorized by section 1766
In the case cited from 8 New York, the court said: “The right of the committee to the custody and control of the property is not superseded during the drunkard’s sober intervals; and therefore during such intervals the drunkard has no more authority to deal with or dispose of the property than while he is in a state of intoxication. If it were otherwise, the proceedings would furnish a very ineffectual security against waste and improvidence. Eveyy transaction would be open to litigation upon the question whether it took place while the drunkard was in a state of sobriety or intoxication; and the committee could not execute his trust with safety to himself or benefit to the drunkard or his family.”
These quotations are madé merely to show that the
The provision in section 1766 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizing the court to restore the person adjudged insane or incompetent to capacity is only applicable to persons adjudged insane or incompetent, and for whom guardians have been appointed under section 1764 of the same code. The application of it to persons committed to the asylums would be utterly inconsistent with the government of those institutions according to the requirements and regulations of the Political Code. After a person has been committed to either of the insane asylums on a charge of insanity, and received into the asylum, no court in this state is authorized to discharge him therefrom, or to restore him to the capacity of a sane pers.,„i, under any circumstances, except upon writ of habeas corpus. The power to discharge him otherwise than upon habeas corpus is vested exclusively in the officers of the asylum.
Section 2197 of the Political Code provides: “ Insane persons received in the asylums must, upon recovery,
By an act of March 9, 1885, the resident physician is authorized, and it is made his duty, to discharge persons who have been improperly committed. (Pol. Code, p. 350.)
By another act of March 9, 1885 (Pol. Code, p. 342), it is provided that the kindred or friends of an inmate of the asylum may apply to the judge who- committed him for an order to be directed to the trustees of the asylum for his removal to their custody; and upon their proving that they are capable and suitable to take care of him, and to give protection against his insane acts, the judge may issue the order. But the act further provides that “ the trustees shall reject all other orders or applications for the release or removal of any insane person, except the order of a court or judge on proceedings in habeas corpus.” (See also a like provision in section 19 of “An act to provide for the future management of the Napa state asylum,” approved March 6, 1876. Stats. 1875-76, p. 133.)
It would seem, therefore, not only that the power to discharge an inmate of the asylum is vested solely in the officers of the asylum, but that such power is to be exercised upon one of only two grounds: 1. That the insane inmate has recovered; and 2. That he had been improperly committed. I think the effect of a discharge on either ground, if no guardian had been appointed, under the act of March 9, 1885 (Pol. Code, p. 342), would be to restore the person discharged to legal capacity to sue. A discharge on the first ground is an adjudication, by competent authority, that the person had recovered from insanity; and a discharge on the second ground, by like authority, overrules or nullifies the order of commitment, and leaves the person committed in the same status, as to capacity to sue, that he was in before he was committed. (Civ. Code, sec. 40.) Be
As the only ground of demurrer argued here is, that the plaintiff has not the legal capacity to sue, and no particular in which the complaint fails to state a cause of action has been suggested by counsel, or discovered, I think the judgment should be reversed, and the court below directed to overrule the demurrer.
The Court. — For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment is reversed, and the court below directed to overrule the demurrer.
The Court. —In submitting this case for decision,’ respondents argued but a single point raised by their demurrer to the appellant’s complaint.
We considered that objection, and decided it correctly.
In their petition for a rehearing, other objections to the complaint are called to our attention. But we have decided—and with manifest propriety — that we will not grant a rehearing in order to consider points not made in the argument upon which the case was originally submitted.
A respondent whose demurrer has been sustained by the superior court ought to fairly present in this court every objection upon which he relies.
We cannot be expected to scrutinize the record for the purpose of discovering points which counsel have not taken the trouble to specify.
Rehearing denied.