42 N.Y.S. 379 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1896
Lead Opinion
It is claimed on the part of the appellants that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that causes of action are improperly united. On the part of the respondents it is claimed that but one cause of action is stated, and that the action is maintainable upon the principles applicable to a bill of peace for the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.
The allegations of the complaint are, in substance, as follows: The National Broome County Bank, a national banking association duly organized under the laws of the United States, and located at Binghamton, N. Y., was engaged in the banking business at that place from, at least, March, 1882, to on or about January 25,1895, when it closed its doors, being insolvent. On the 28th January, 1895, the plaintiff Kellogg was duly appointed, by the comptroller of the currency of the United States, the receiver of said
According to the allegations of the complaint, each of the numerous claimants (defendants) bases his claim upon a pass book issued by the savings bank in the name of the national bank. The authority of the savings bank to bind the national bank in the issue of such a token is a, matter of common interest to all the defendants and to the plaintiffs. The determination of the question whether such authority existed is the object of the action. The plaintiffs allege that it did not exist, and therefore seek to restrain the prosecution of the suits against them. If, assuming the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction, then a cause of action is stated. The receiver has
In Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137, the doctrine is laid down that:
“In cases where many persons have claims, and are prosecuting, or are about to prosecute, them at law, against one defendant or class of defendants, or a fund liable in equal degree to all those persons and to others, a court of equity, to forestall a multiplicity of actions, has jurisdiction of an action for a general accounting and adjustment of all the rights, and to restrain separate and individual actions at law in the same or other courts, thus bringing all the litigation into one suit.”
In 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 854, it is said in regard to .bills of peace:
“One class of cases to which this remedial process is properly applied is where there is one general right to be established against a great number of persons; and it may be resorted to either where one person claims or defends a right against many, or where many claim or defend a right against one. In such cases, courts of equity interpose in order to prevent multiplicity of suits; for, as each separate party may sue, or may be sued, in a separate action at law, and each suit would only decide the particular right in question between the plaintiff and defendant in that action, litigation might become interminable. Courts of equity, therefore, having a power to bring all the parties before them, will at once proceed to the ascertainment of the general right; and, if it be necessary, they will ascertain it by an action or issue at law, and then make a decree finally binding upon all the parties.”
In 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 255, 269, 274, it is considered that equitable jurisdiction is properly exercised where the individual claims were not only legally separate, but were separate in time, and each arose from an entirely separate and distinct transaction, simply because there was community of interest among all the claimants in the question at issue and in the remedy, and many cases are referred to on the subject.
The claims here are all against one fund, and no claimant, by a separate action, can obtain a prior lien. They all arise from the acts of .the savings bank, and depend upon its authority to bind the national bank. The fact that each claimant may have had separate transactions with the savings bank at different dates does not destroy the community of interest, so as to prevent the interposition of a court of equity. Railroad Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592; Board v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219; Bank v. Goddard, 131 N. Y. 494, 30 N. E. 566.
In the case last cited, at page 503, 131 N. Y., and page 568, 30 N. E., it is said:
“A multiplicity of actions at law, involving conflicting claims to the same property, which a court of law could not solve without working injustice, founded upon one continuous and fraudulent scheme, inflicting a similar injury upon all, and different only in detail and degree, and where the legal remedy of fifty defenses to fifty replevin suits is shown to be destructive to the lien and right of the plaintiff, presents a state of facts which fully justifies the interference of equity.”
It is argued by the appellants that the complaint does not state a case which would sustain an action against any one defendant alone, and that, therefore, the action is not maintainable, within the authority of Town of Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462. That was an action for the cancellation of town bonds, and it is explained (sufficient for the purposes of this case) by Judge Rapallo in Town of Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bank, 75 N. Y. 397, 402, where, in speaking of the Town of Venice Case, he says:
“It was not intended to be denied that in the case of instruments creating a prima facie liability, and requiring an affirmative defense, to be supported by extrinsic proof of facts, the circumstance that they were held by numerous parties, who might bring numerous suits upon them in different places, might, under some circumstances, be regarded as a ground for equitable interposition, even though, if there were but a single claimant, equitable relief would be denied, and the party left to his legal defense; nor that, where a party was subjected to or threatened with numerous vexatious actions, equity might not, under proper circumstances, restrain them.”
It is not in actions of this kind an indispensable element that the subject should be of an equitable character. Schuyler Case, 17 N. Y. 608; Board v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y., at page 225. If not, a defendant threatened with a multiplicity of suits at law, all depending upon a common question, would not be deprived of an
It is easily inferable that there is practically no dispute as to the amount of the several claims of the defendants, but the question is, which of the two banks is liable? It is plainly important that this question should be tried and decided in a manner that will bind all parties. Evidently, the burden of the litigation is between the two banks. Until the failure of the banks, the claims were treated as being against the savings bank; but then a different position was taken at the instigation of the savings bank. The fact that the transactions extended over a long period of time does not necessarily prevent the interposition of a court of equity, or unduly enlarge the burden of expense upon the claimants. It is alleged that nearly the same evidence would be involved in the trial of each separate action as in the trial of the present action. Besides, here the savings bank is back of the claimants, and is a party to the action.
It is argued that causes of action are improperly united in the complaint. If, however, the action is properly brought as a bill of peace, then, as to all the defendants who are holders of pass books, there is but a single cause of action. It is not claimed that the savings bank is not properly made a defendant. It is, however, claimed that a cause of action is stated against it which cannot be properly joined with the action against the other defendants. This claim, as I assume, refers to the allegations in the complaint that, in case the national bank is compelled to pay the claimants, then the savings bank be required to account for the moneys it has received. This is not a statement of a cause of action against the savings bank, but of what the plaintiffs will claim in the contingency of their failure to establish, in whole or in part, their own cause of action. When that contingency happens, if it ever does, we must assume that the rights of all parties will be properly protected.
It is claimed that the complaint is multifarious. If, however, there is but one cause of action, and no misjoinder of causes of action, the defendants cannot here complain. “It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to what constitues multifariousness in a bill of equity. Every case must be governed by its own circumstances, and the court must exercise a sound discretion.” Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619.
A case of equity jurisdiction is, I think, presented by the complaint, within the doctrine of the Pfohl Case; and the demurrers thereto were properly overruled.
PARKER, P. J., and HERRICK and PUTNAM, JJ., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur. The facts set forth in the complaint show that each of the holders of the pass books has a cause of action against the savings bank, and that, possibly, some of them also
Interlocutory judgments affirmed, with costs, with leave to the appellants to answer within 20 days upon payment of the costs of the demurrers and of the appeals. All concur.