206 Wis. 568 | Wis. | 1932
No claim is now made that the complaint does not state a good cause of action for the modification, reformation, or cancellation of the release. The principal contention of the appellants is that it appears from the complaint that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. This contention is based upon the claim that, since it appears from the allegations of the complaint that the plaintiff’s claim for compensation is pending before the Industrial Commission, the commission has full and complete authority to receive parol testimony to contradict the terms of the written release for the purpose of permitting the plaintiff to show the real nature of the release and her understanding and intention at the time she signed it.
While the Industrial Commission has sole jurisdiction to hear and determine all controversies arising under the workmen’s compensation act (secs. 102.14 and 102.16,- Stats.) and undoubtedly has the power to determine the facts as to whether a compensation claimant has made a lawful claim against an employer (sec. 102.29, Stats.), whether an action for damages has been commenced by an employee or his dependent against a third party, whether such a claim has been adjusted, whether an employee or his dependent has waived his claim for compensation, and whether a release has been given, and, if so, the resultant effect upon a claim for compensation, none of such questions is involved herein.
This action invokes a well defined remedy given by courts of equity. No citation of authority is necessary to show that courts of equity have authority in proper cases to modify, reform, or cancel written instruments. On the other hand, the powers of the commission are derived exclusively from the statutes. Wisconsin Mut. L. Co. v. Industrial
No allegation is found in the complaint which warrants the conclusion that the railway company was in any manner before the Industrial Commission or subject to its jurisdiction. No statute is found which would have permitted the bringing in of the railway company as a third party to the particular proceeding pending before the commission. Even if the commission had authority to act, as contended by appellants, without having the railway company before it, and should conclude that such release should be reformed or canceled or considered to be something different from what on' its face it purports to be, so far as its effect upon the compensation proceeding is concerned, leaving it otherwise in full force and effect as between the real parties to it, an intolerable situation would arise.
From the order of the commission set forth in the supplemental case herein, which probably is not properly before us for consideration, it appears that the commission claims no' such equitable powers and in fact specifically refused to exercise them, but held the matter open so that the plaintiff might resort to the courts for the particular relief demanded in this action.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.